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ABSTRACT 2
This Thesis analyses Egyptian economic policy making in the 
1970s. Despite recommendations for decentralisation and greater use of 
market forces, only limited reforms occurred. These resulted in a big 
increase in resources available and the development of new sectors. A 
central hypothesis put forward is that the interaction of the sectors 
made reform hard. These were strong incentives to maintain the status 
quo and not decentralise public sector plus government decision 
making. These included the need to maintain employment in the public 
services in view of the overall shortage of jobs. There was also 
pressure to maintain the country's socialist legacy so as to maintain 
the loyalty of the urban working classes. The impact of rent seeking 
activity is looked at as a source of inertia, preventing reform.
As a result of these pressures the government felt able to reform 
the foreign sector but not the domestic economy. Changing the trade 
and exchange systems would create new opportunities which were not 
available, or not thought to be available in industry and 
agriculture.
The problems encountered in economic policy making are examined 
in four broad areas. The investment and planning system is analysed in 
order to see how consistent and comprehensive development strategy 
was. Pricing policy is dealt with in relation to cotton and public 
industry because of its importance in the economy. The implications of 
these policies are then examined in terms of public finance and the 
monetary consequences of the budget deficit. Finally, the foreign 
sector is looked at with special attention to the areas of 
opportunity: oil revenues, Suez Canal tolls and emigrant remittances.
Conclusions are then drawn about the effects of the 
liberalisation and the reasons why it took such a partial form.
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7Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis will examine the way in which economic policy was made and 
implemented in Egypt between 1970 and 1980. The aim is to show how 
economic problems have persisted despite changes in policy. The 
implication of the analysis is that the problems which Egypt has faced 
were, at least in part, the result of the way in which policies were 
chosen and implemented.
Despite increased foreign aid, petroleum revenues and emigrant 
remittances received in the 1970s compared with earlier periods, 
serious problems persisted. The domestic economy- industry and 
agriculture - were perceived by policy makers to offer a lack of 
opportunity for development compared with the foreign sector. 
Liberalisation of the economy was, therefore, uneven. Foreign trade 
controls were eased and the exchange rate system reinforced, but 
little was done to enable industry and agriculture to expand. The way 
in which these issues were perceived affected the policy choice and 
implementation. The thesis will show the way in which many basic 
issues were in fact evaded. The lack of a clear ideology and consensus 
about economic policy meant that the President and his ministers had 
to make statements about their objectives which were often 
contradictory.
The regime had weak political roots, especially after the 1967 
defeat, and so it had to avoid upsetting any powerful group in 
society. Although the general drift of policy was towards the greater 
use of the market mechanism, it was far from consistent. As a result, 
tough decisions were avoided or, when made, retracted. The failure to 
make tough decisions about consumption meant that the economy in the 
1970s, as in the 1960s, remained in need of foreign aid.
8The hypothesis that economic policy did not receive sufficient 
attention will be illustrated by looking at the lack of economic 
priority in the period before 1973 and the reactive nature of decision 
making since then. A key issue is the way in which policies were not 
carried through to their logical conclusion so that organisations in 
the economy faced conflicting guidelines as to what their objectives 
were.
Much of the economic literature on Egypt has dealt with the 
consequences of policies adopted, rather than the reasons for their 
adoption. Mabro and Radwan (1) were concerned with the 
industrialisation process until 1973; Hansen and Nashashibi (2) and 
Girgis (3) examined the foreign trade sector in the period ending in 
the mid 1970s. None of these writers dealt with the question of how 
and why policies were selected, except in passing. Yet the issues 
involved in that choice and in implementation underlie much of their 
discussions. According to Mabro and Radwan for example, the problems 
in industry after 1962 were those of increasing labour costs arising 
from organisational defects, redistributional policies, supply 
bottlenecks and a deterioration of the relationships within firms, 
among other things (4).
(1) R. Mabro and S. Radwan 'The Industrialisation of Egypt 1939-19731 
Clarendon, 1976.
(2) B. Hansen and K, Nashashibi 'Egypt: Foreign Trade Regimes and 
Economic Development', National Bureau for Economic Research, 1973.
(3) M. Girgis 'Industrialisation and Trade Patterns in Egypt', GCB Mohr 
1977
(4) R. Mabro & S. Radwan, op cit P.30.
9Two studies which cover the period until the end of the 1970s are 
those Ikram(l) plus Hansen and Radwan(2). They surveyed the economy 
from the general and employment perspectives respectively and 
commented, inter alia, on the weaknesses of the policymaking and 
implementation systems. Yet Ikram, echoing Mabro and Radwan, points 
out that little could be said about improvements in managerial and 
technological efficiency because of the lack of data. (3).
Ikram related ’X efficiency1 to problems of wasteage of inputs 
and raw materials in the production process. This was in part due to 
out-dated and badly maintained machinery, lack of supervision and 
incentives and negligent labour. (4). He also included such issues as 
the uneconomic use of long staple cotton in manufacturing coarse yarn 
and cotton. This was a result of the industrialisation strategy, 
pricing and foreign trade systems which oveifbde considerations of 
comparative costs. The implication was that policy at the strategic 
level was at fault.
Both sets of factors need explanation. Part of this can be given 
by examining the decision making process as well as the mechanisms for 
implementation and control. The manager in Egyptian public sector 
industry faced numerous constraints. His ability to hire, fire, 
promote and demote was tightly restricted by the government. Decisions 
about production were, for the most part, determined by the government
(1) K. Ikram 'Egypt; Economic Management in a period of Transition', 
John Hopkin's University Press, 1980.
(2) B. Hansen & S. Radwan 'Employment Opportunities and Equity in a 
Changing Society; Egypt in the 1980's' I.L.O. 1982.
(3) K. Ikram Op Cit P23.
(4) K. Ikram Op Cit P237-8
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through its pricing and investment policies. Inputs depended on factors 
beyond his control. In many respects he was no more than a bureaucrat 
following narrowly prescribed rules. The reasons why the government 
maintained this control, even though it was supposedly trying to 
liberalise the economy, are central to this thesis.
Explanations of managerial inefficiency are a lacuna in the 
economic literature. Some explanations have been provided by political 
scientists. Ayubi's (1) study of bureaucracy and Cooper's of the state 
(2) throw some light on the decision making system at the bureaucratic 
and political levels. At the level of the firm, Baker (3) analysed the 
problems faced by managers in what he called the uncertain worlds of 
Nasser and Sadat. The link between these analyses and the performance 
of the economy is a vital one.
The Government, through the bureaucracy, dominated the economy in 
the 1970s, despite moves towards economic decentralisation. An 
analysis of the way which decision were made and implemented will show 
how the environment in which firms operated changed. This provides 
part of the explanation of the difficulties faced in improving 
managerial efficiency.
(1) N. Ayubi 'Bureaucracy & Politics in Contemporary Egypt', Ithaca
Press, 1980.
(2) M. Cooper 'The Transformation of Egypt', Croom Helm, 1982.
(3) R. Baker 'Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser & Sadat'
Harvard University Press, 1978.
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O'Brien carried out an analysis of this kind for the early 
1960s.(1) He examined changes in economic organisations, concentrating 
on the political, legal and institutional framework as well as 
economic performance. His study published in the mid 1960s came too 
early to evaluate the First Five Year Plan. Yet the problems which he 
looked at and his conclusions are of relevance for the 1970s because 
there was so much continuity in the institutions and economic 
structure.
The general literature on economic development has focused to a 
large extent on three issues. Firstly how far the market should rule. 
The second and closely related issue is whether foreign aid, trade and 
investment should be encouraged. The third question has been the 
choice between sectors (for example industry versus agriculture). The 
issue of why policy towards the market mechanism has changed had been 
discussed extensively with regard to communist countries (2). In the 
context of the non-communist developing world most analysis is 
prescriptive.
(1) P. O'Brien 'The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System', Oxford 
University Press, 1966.
(2) eg. A. Nove 'The Soviet Economic System1 George Allen & Unwin 1961 
D. Milenkovitch 'Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought', 
Yale University Press 1981.
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Recommendations are made for movements towards the greater use of 
market forces in order to maximise a growth or welfare function (l) 
but analysis of the reasons why such changes occur are scarce. Myrdal
(2) has dealt with these issues very generally and Paauw and Fei gave 
a detailed analysis of the influences of different groups and classes 
on policy in some South East Asian countries (3). Abdel Fadil also 
assessed these issues for Egypt in Nasser's period (4). This thesis 
will attempt to explain the reasons for policy changes in the 1970s.
Egypt in the 1970s presented a more complex pattern than it did 
even in the 1960s. Its economic ideology had partly changed but 
policies vis a vis sectoral balances had not. A move towards the 
market mechanism (particularly in the foreign sector) did not result 
in a reduction of investment in heavy industry, or more resources for 
agriculture. It therefore presents a case study which transcends many 
of the classifications which have been made in the literature.
An explanation for this will be provided in the following terms. 
The government wanted to please as wide a constituency as possible 
with its policies, at least among the urban population.
(1) I. Little T. Scitovsky & M. Scott 'Industry & Trade in Some 
Developing Countries', Oxford University Press 1970, and a decade 
later A.Krueger 'Liberalisation Attempts and Consequences', 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978.
(2) G. Myrdal 'Asian Drama' Pantheon, Random House, 1968.
(3) D. Paauw & J. Fei 'The Transition in Open Dualistic Economies' 
Vale University Press, 1973.
(4) M. Abdel Fadil 'The Political Economy of Nasserism', Cambridge 
University Press, 1980.
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Liberalising foreign trade and increasing access to foreign 
exchange enabled the upper middle classes to import many of the 
consumer goods which in the 1960s had been short in supply. Opening new 
sectors of activity to the private sector enabled those with investment 
funds to increase their incomes.
By maintaining its ownership and control of the public sector, the 
regime ensured that the mass of the urban population would remain in 
employment with incomes effectively guaranteed by the state. Expanding 
the bureaucracy prevented growing unemployment among graduates and 
others coming onto the labour market. Permitting emigration also helped 
to reduce excess supply on the domestic labour market and through 
remittances in cash and kind increased real incomes and consumption 
throughout the economy.
The final part of this implicit social contract was the system of 
subsidies on basic commodities. This enabled the poor, particularly in 
urban areas, many of whom had little formal employment and very low 
incomes, to subsist despite increases in international and domestic 
prices.
In ideological terms, the socialist legacy was maintained at least 
in name. At the same time the private sector was encouraged and Egypt 
moved towards closer economic links with the Arab oil states and then 
with the West.
These arrangements had two main economic characteristics. First 
their budgetary and non-budgetary cost rose over time. This was because 
the population grew at the same time as food self-sufficiency declined. 
The second characteristic of the system was its rigidity. It could not 
adjust to changing economic circumstances easily and so distortions and 
inefficiencies arose and grew. These factors paradoxically made reform 
harder.
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The concept of rent-seeking is of relevance in explaining some of 
these factors.
According to Ricardo (1) rent is what is paid for the use of the 
'original and indestructable powers of the soil. Krueger adopted the 
Ricardian definition to cover legal and illegal competitive seeking of 
the returns from commodities in short or fixed supply (2). Her main 
example was the effect of quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports 
into developing countries. Economic agents bid for import licences in 
such situations and pass on the cost of what they have to pay (a 
licence fee or bribe) to the consumer.
An important point about rent-seeking is that, although each 
importer may get fewer imports than he would if licences were replaced 
by tariffs, he still gets a profitable return. Paradoxically, 
therefore, an economy in which the government intervenes through QRs 
and other controls (such as minimum wage rates and interest rate 
ceilings) can result in profits for entrepeneurs on the basis of their 
competitive activity.
Hansen and Nashashibi (3) calculated some of the cost controls on 
imports. The purpose of this thesis is to show how rent-seeking played 
a role in policy making, rather than to quantify its economic costs.
(1) D. Ricardo 'On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation1 
P91, Pelican Classic Ed. London 1971.
(2) A.O. Krueger 'The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society'
American Economic Review, duly 1974 P291-303.
(3) B. Hansen & K. Nashashibi 'Egypt: Foreign Trade Regimes and
Economic Development', National Bureau for Economic Research, 1975.
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The concept of rent and rent-seeking had a number of 
applications. The development of the oil sector most closely 
approximates the Ricardian concept, because it represented a gift of 
nature. The Suez Canal involved capital and managerial input, but its 
economic value was derived from its geographical location. The tolls 
which it earned were, therefore, a form of rental income. Part of the 
Open Door Policy involved the development of warehousing in the Suez 
Canal zone. Income from this activity accrued to Egypt as a result of 
the Canal and its value as a trans-shipment zone. Hopes that the goods 
stored in the zone could be used as a form of collateral were also 
based on the idea of rent.
Tourism revenue can also be considered to have a rent element. 
Egypt attracted visitors to see its archaeological sites. They were a 
gift of history, although some input of labour and management was 
involved.
All of these sectors can be considered as rental or semi-rental 
(tourism) in that the income earned from them was not the result of 
production in economy. Rental incomes were earned elsewhere in the 
economy, on a larger scale however.
Krueger's concept related to the way in which industry and 
agriculture were run and the relationship between the liberalised 
sectors and the state. The Open Door Policy envisaged the creation of 
new sectors which would operate with the approval of the bureaucracy. 
This offered large scale opportunities for acquiring rent. Equally 
significantly it provided work, a raison d'etre and even extra income, 
for officials. The liberalisation did not replace the state with the 
market or even significantly reduce its role. It did increase the area 
of interaction between badly paid bureaucrats and rent seekers. The 
bureaucrats therefore acquired rent in their transactions.
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The focus of the thesis required extensive interviewing of 
managers, officials, ministers, former ministers and others in Cairo. 
The purpose of the interviews was to find out why and how decisions 
were made and implemented. Crucial to an understanding of this process 
was the question of perceptions. Boulding (1) has noted that decision 
makers do not respond to objective facts but to their own perceptions 
of a situation. They therefore need to be seen in the context of the 
institutions and environment in which they operate. This is 
particularly important given the hypothesis put forward here that the 
bureaucracy itself was a major constraint on policy making plus 
implementation and was, in itself, a major issue for policy makers. 
Given these problems and the dominance of the public sector in the 
economy, an examination of the state is central. Dealing with these 
institutional factors will make it possible to pinpoint areas where 
rent seeking was influential in directing policy.
The State's administrative machine for controlling the economy had 
three levels. At the top was the President with extensive power over 
all matters. He had no effective department of his own and used the 
cabinet, plus personal advisors, to deal with economic issues. For most 
of the decade President Sadat was mainly concerned with foreign and 
military policy. He laid down strategic guidelines for the economy and 
on occasion intervened in details. Ministers and senior officials 
formed the second level. They provided the technical (and sometimes 
political) skills for the implementation of policy at the detailed 
level. Their tenure was limited by the need for scapegoats to blame for 
policy failures and by the unwillingness of Sadat to permit any
(1) K. Boulding 'National Images and International Systems' Journal 
of Conflict, Resolution, June 1959.
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individual to remain in office for long enough to build up their own 
power base. The President was willing to trade administrative efficiency 
for political loyalty. Ministers controlled the bureaucracy.
The number of civil servants grew from 1.2 millions between 
1969/70 to 2.0 millions in 1978 (1). By 1980 the figure may have been 
as high as 2.3 million (2). A large percentage of them had little 
education and no real function but the government was committed to 
providing jobs for the thousands of graduates and non-graduates coming 
onto the labour market each year.
This system was directly responsible for controlling the large 
public industrial sector and for influencing the rest of the economy 
towards the government's objectives. The internal problems of the 
1 administration and contradictory policy objectives made for economic 
problems.
A successful economic system needs to motivate people, monitor 
their performance and coordinate their activities. It needs to provide 
incentives for efficiency and disincentives to waste. For this, 
accountability is essential (3). Somehow, individuals and groups need 
to be answerable for what they do both within and outside the formal 
organisation. Within it they need to be responsible to their 
superiors, outside it they need to be monitored by some kind of public 
or state representation. The measurement of output in administration 
is notoriously hard to calculate and so, as the economy became more 
bureaucratic, the problem of assessing, monitoring and rewarding
(1) See Table 3, Chapter 2.
(2) Data from interview at Ministry of Finance.
(3) H.A. Simon 'Administrative Behaviour1, P133, Macmillan, 1961.
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economic performance grew.
Government administration was accountable to the President and to 
a small extent to Parliament. It was, in the 1970s, a mainly closed 
system and was not therefore fully open to scrutiny and public 
criticism. This had major consequences for administration and public 
sector industry which will be looked at. Examining the role of rent 
seeking within the public sector and administration will help to show 
why legal incentives and accountability were not■developed.
Egypt's poverty imposed two constraints on the government before 
it could deal with anything else. Firstly, large subsidies were needed 
to enable the mass of the population to pay for necessities. Secondly, 
the government somehow had to find tens of thousands of jobs each year 
for graduates and non-graduates entering the labour market each year. 
The implications of these factors are examined with regard to 
financial and monetary policies and in terms of their effects on the 
external sector. The second part of the thesis also examines the 
effects of policies designed to control the firm. Planning, investment 
and pricing policies extended bureaucratic controls to firms with 
consequences throughout the economy. It is the relationship between 
policies, their effects on each other, rather than the economic
effects of policies per se which is central. This will help to show
how policy makers responded to problems.
The consequences of these administrative arrangements, coupled 
with the liberalisation of the foreign sector, were felt in terms of 
the state budget. The budget deficit was a major issue in economic 
policy and its financing will be analysed.
Part of the feedback of one policy into another comes from the 
effects of policies on the economy. It is, therefore, necessary to see
how the economy changed in the 1970s.
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The economy suffered similar problems in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
population continued to grow at over 2% p.a. Between 1947 and 1979 it 
doubled, while the area of land under cultivation increased by under 
5%. The cropped area (cultivated area multiplied by the cropping 
intensity) increased by less than 20% and so each feddan (1) had to 
support 3.5 people in 1979 compared to 2.1 in 1947 (2). Between 1960 
and 1976 GDP grew at 5% p.a. and GDP/per capita by 2.7% (3).
This trend was recognised in the 1950s and 1960s; the limitations 
of agriculture as an employer, source of goods and finance led to an 
emphasis being placed on industry. The most intensive period of 
industrialisation was during the 1960s when planning was at it height. 
The dominance of industry in public investment for example, continued 
in the 1970s.
Continued high relative investment in industry did not cause 
faster growth rates in the 1970s for industry than in the 1960s. There 
was a step like increase in output after 1976 when foreign exchange 
increased in supply but, like agriculture (although to a lesser 
extent), it was a disappointment.
The 1970s did, however, bring new sources of foreign exchange 
including increased oil revenues, emigrant remittances, Suez Canal 
tolls and tourism. These funds created what might be called a parallel 
economy; they did not bring about changes in the domestic economy
(1) One feddan equals 1.038 acres 0.42 hectares.
(2) K. Ikram op cit P3
(3) K. Ikram op cit P5, This figure was most probably bloated by 
growth of military spending and administration, as Mabro and 
Radwan claim it was in the period to 1973. Mabro & Radwan, 
op cit P44.
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(industry and agriculture) to any great extent. They will be referred 
to as the 'Rental* sectors, because they depended on nature or on 
decisions made abroad.
They resulted from the liberalisation of emigration, political 
changes which enabled Egypt to re-open the Suez Canal and gain oil 
fields in the Sinai. Tourist revenues expanded as Egypt moved closer 
to the West and economy gained from higher oil prices in the late 
1970s. The sources of wealth relied on the gifts of nature or foreign 
demand for Egyptian labour. Tourism relied on the growth of foreign 
income and demand, more than on Egyptian production in any sense.
These sectors were extremely successful in the later 1970s and 
provided the foreign currency to finance higher imports and 
consumption. As will be shown, they were not greatly used to change 
the domestic economy (industry and agriculture).
X Economic development in the second half of the twentieth century 
cannot proceed without government intervention. This view is derived 
from the work of Gershenkron (l). He suggested that, as an economic 
development took place during the nineteenth century, latecomers to 
the process had increasingly to protect themselves from existing 
industrialised nations. Thus, German industry developed with the 
involvement of banks, something which had not occurred in Britain. 
Later, Russian industrialisation began with government involvement 
which had not happened in either Britain or Germany. If that process 
of linking government and industry was necessary in the nineteenth 
century, then the need has increased in the twentieth as competition
(1) A. Gershenkron 'Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* 
P353-9. Harvard University Press 1962.
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on international markets has became more intensive and extensive. This 
has been recognised by writers with very different views (1).
There is an apparent paradox here. It seems that strong or 
effective government is needed, regardless of how interventionist the 
government policy is. This does not mean that the choice of policy is 
unimportant, but it does suggest that any policy will fail if it does 
not get adequate back-up. For example, a tax policy designed to 
finance educational programmes may be ineffective if the taxes cannot 
be collected (2). The aims of policy may become more modest or less 
interventionist but they will still fail without financial and other 
support. It is the nature of the relationship between government and 
the private sector as much as the relative strength of the two that is 
important. In this respect, important continuities in Egyptian 
economic experience will be noted in the 1960s and 1970s.
(1) e.g. I. Little, T. Scitovsky & M. Scott's 'Industry and Trade in 
Some Developing Countries; P333. Oxford University Press 1970.
G. Myrdal 'The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty 
Programme in Outline' P208-51, Vintage Books, Random House, 1971.
B. Balassa 'Policy Reform in Developing Countries' P87-97, 
Pergammon 1977.
(2) N. Kaldor 'Taxation for Economic Development1, Oournal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol.l, No.l, 1963.
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Chapter 2: The State
The state is defined here to include the President, the Cabinet, 
the Civil Service and all public sector administrative bodies. 
Throughout the period under discussion, it owned and controlled a 
large share of the nation's industry. The latter will be referred to 
as the Public Sector.
This set of institutions dominated Egypt's economic life in the 
1970s as it did in the 1960s. In 1970/71 it employed 1.25m civil 
servants (1). Through this huge bureaucracy, it directly and 
indirectly controlled much of the economy and was directly responsible 
for producing an estimated 53?n of GDP in 1971/2. (2).
In order to understand how policies were made it is, therefore, 
essential that the State be examined. There is another reason for its 
centrality in this thesis. The bureaucracy itself presented the 
President and Ministers with formidable problems. Between 1969/70 and 
1978 the bureaucracy (civil servants in central government) grew by 
74°o to 2.07m (3). Management, control and funding of this body became 
a major preoccupation for economic decision makers.
Egypt's system of government was a Presidential one. This was 
true in the 1960s, but after 1970 Sadat accumulated more power in his 
hands than his predecessor had done in his final years. Sadat 
permitted no one else to remain in a position of influence for long 
and he gained prestige in the 1973 war, something which Nasser lost in 
the defeat of 1967 (4).
(1) See Table 1 below.
(2) See Table 2 below.
(3) See Table 1 below.
(4) E. Ya'ari 'Sadat's Pyramid of Power', Jerusalem Quarterly,
Winter 1980.
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Although the Presidency employed 18,000 in 1978, it provided few 
technical skills to the President (l). He took his advice from 
Ministers and personal advisers on economic matters.
His powers were such that in 1970/71 he appointed 1,101 officials 
to the public sector and 725 to the civil service in order to ensure 
loyalty after the 1970 foiled coup attempt (2). This was equal to 
about 6% of senior and middle management posts.
The President was responsible for strategy and for any details 
which he cared to deal with. The way in which policy developed and was 
implemented from the President down can best be illustrated with an 
example. The October Working Paper was issued by the President in 
April 1974. It contained ideas which had been worked out by ministers 
over the preceeding six years. They advised him on what should go into 
the document. Ministers were chosen for their technical skills and 
political loyalty to the policies of the day. They were responsible 
for drawing up detailed plans to implement general strategy.
The first Deputy Prime Minister and later Prime Minister, Dr.
A.A. Hegazi, drew up the 1974 Foreign Investment Law, number 43, after 
the October Working Paper was issued. He formulated it in consultation 
with ministerial colleagues (3)
(1.) Data from development of Employment in Government 
Administration*. Central Agency for Organisation and 
Administration 1965/66-1978. Comments based on interviews with 
Dr. A.A. Hegazi and Hatem Sadeq, former Official at the 
Presidency and son in law of President Nasser.
(£) M. Abdel Fadil 'The Political Economy of Nasserism1 P96-101 op 
cit.
(3) Interview with Dr. A.A. Hegazi. See Chapter 3.
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If the President can be identified as the source of economic 
strategy, then ministers were the main source of detailed policy. On 
all matters the latter were responsible to the President.
The three tiered decision making process - the President,
the Cabinet and the bureaucracy - was not necessarily inappropriate. 
Abdel Fadil has suggested that responsibilities within the firm can be 
allocated in the following way (l). Senior management has 
responsibility for coordinating broad strategy, objectives, policies 
and functions. Middle management has responsibility for organisation, 
staffing and directing policies. Finally, the lowest tier should be 
concerned with detailed implementation. Each tier should be controlled 
from above, but senior managers should not spend most of their time 
controlling junior ones. They should oversee them and be responsive to 
outside influences and information.
'This could be a description of how a government department should 
work and the difference between this ideal and the actual practice in 
Egypt will be analysed here.
Government administration did not work well for a number of 
reasons. Two of these concerned the senior tiers of the system:
1. Lack of coordination at the ministerial level.
2. High ministerial turnover and unwillingness to take decisions.
At the lower level, three problems dominated and these will be 
examined in the section below on bureaucracy.
1. Contradictory and often vague policy directives
2. Lack of authority and responsibility, unwillingness to take
decisions.
3. Administrative problems resulting in slow and ineffective decision 
making.
(1) M. Abdel Fadil * The Political Economy of Nasserism* P101.
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Presidential and Ministerial Level of Decision Making
President Sadat was unwilling to delegate his powers to ministers
for more than short periods because he feared that rivals to him might 
develop with their own power bases as they had done under Nasser. His 
experience under Nasser and in the 1970/71 purge convinced him of the 
dangers of 'centres of power' as he called them.
Despite the fact that the President had so much power, weak 
coordination and direction greatly reduced the effectiveness of his
instructions. According to the Deputy Chairman of the Central Agency
for Organisation and Administration, compilation of the 1972 state 
budget was hampered by the large number of central government bodies 
which had to be consulted. There was, he said, an 'almost total lack 
of communication' between them (1). No single body had the authority 
to impose its view and the President was the only person who could, at 
least in theory, cut through the bureaucratic maze. At that time, the 
President was unwilling to get involved in economic details.
The need for stable and competent advice at the highest level has 
been recognised. The former West German Finance Minister, Alex Moller, 
who was appointed a senior advisor to Sadat, recommended the formation 
of an advisory and planning unit at the Presidency to prepare 
guidelines for economic policy and to supervise their implementation
(2). He presented his report in 1977, but by 1980 nothing is known to 
have happened concerning this recommendation.
(1) The Egyptian Gazette 4.8.1972.
(2) A. Moller et al 'Proposals for the Solution of the Most 
Important
Structural, Economic & Financial Problems of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt', 1980, German Development Institute, Berlin. P.6
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Ministers knew that their very success might threaten their 
tenure if they became too popular as a result. Being associated with 
unpopular policies could work either way. They might be exploited in 
order to deflect unpopularity from the President or they might be 
sacked as scapegoats for policy failures. Dr. A.M. Kaissouni, who as a 
Deputy Prime Minister was responsible for the subsidy cuts which led to 
the January 1977 riots, had his resignation rejected by the President 
and reluctantly stayed in Government until 1978. Insofar as competent 
ministers were sacked and the administration disrupted, so efficiency 
was sacrificed to political convenience.
The complexity of the decision making process within and between 
ministries and other bodies meant that ministers spent much of their 
time dealing with details of administration rather than with policy 
and its implementation.
Vagueness and confusion of aims meant that other difficulties 
arose. The Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Investment Authority stated 
in 1977 that the 'Open Door Policy left itself open to a wide range of 
interpretations (1).
Ministers were often involved in interministerial conflicts which 
arose as vested interests inside and outside the governments clashed. 
Given their short periods in office, they were frequently unwilling to 
make unpopular decisions. Their junior officials passed a great deal of 
decision making up to them and so the volume of decision which they 
were supposed to deal with was considerable (2).
(1) Mr. G. El Nazar interviewed in A1 Ahram A1 Iqtissadi 15.10.1977,
Quoted by R. Drisoll et al 'Foreign Investment in Egypt1 Fund for
Multinational Management Education 1978, P.50.
(2) M. Berger 'Bureaucracy & Society in Modern Egypt', 1957, P161
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
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The Foreign Investment Law resulted in applications from those 
interested in starting projects. These were dealt with by junior 
officials initially. In the heavily overstaffed bureaucracy, where 
officials had to justify their jobs by creating work, delays were the 
rule (l). Papers had to pass upwards on the most detailed subjects 
because junior officials lacked the authority to make decisions or 
when they had the authority, were unwilling to exercise it.
The US Government found major problems in this area while trying 
to implement its aid programmes. The planning of individual projects 
suffered from a lack of ministerial coordination. Ministries 
responsible for projects organised them without sufficient 
consultation with the Ministry of Planning and relied on the Ministry 
of Economy to supply the foreign exchange required (2)
The Ministry of Industry, traditionally responsible for the 
public sector, tended to represent its interest! inside the government. 
The Ministry was founded during the phase of strong central planning 
in the early 1960s. The Ministry of Economy on the other hand was a 
product of the 1970s when the trend was towards liberalising the 
economy. It was responsible for encouraging the foreign sector and so 
came into conflict with the Ministry of Industry when firms operating 
under Law 43 threatened those in the Public Sector. The bureaucratic 
solution in 1978 was to give the General Organisation for Industry at 
the Ministry of Industry power to block foreign investment proposals.
(1) R. Driscoll et al ’Foreign Investment in Egypt1, Fund for Multi- 
National Management Education, 1978 P30.
(2) Report of the US Controller General, 1977 'Egypt’s Capacity to 
Absorb & Use Economic Assistance Effectively1.
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Table 1: Shares of Public & Private Sector in GDP (?□)
1971/2 and 1979.
1971/2 1979
Public Private Public Private
Agriculture 2 98 3 97
Industry 69 31 61 39
Construction 92 8 74 26
Electricity 100 0 100 0
Transport 74 26 84 16
Housing 7 93 10 90
Utilities 100 0 100 0
Other Services 48 52 77 23
Trade 36 64 )
) 62 38
Finance 100 0 )
Total Economy 53 47 57 43
Sources: 1971/72 - Ministry of Planning, December 1973 'Follow up and 
Appraisal for Year 1971/72*.
1979 - National Bank of Egypt 'Economic Bulletin', 1979 No.2 
T2 (Planned)
A number of ministers were appointed for the expertise which they 
could bring to government. They were known supporters of the current 
trend of policies being followed. As the move towards greater 
liberalisation went on, so new faces appeared in the Cabinet.
Communists were in the Cabinet before the 1973 War but not after it. 
Those brought in for their skills often found that they, or the whole 
administration, faced political obstacles. Governments until 1975 were 
dismissed for failing to implement or support the economic 
liberalisation. After 1975 others were sacked for wanting to go too 
far in the direction of a liberal economy, something which was 
politically impossible for the President to permit. The very high 
turnover of ministers and governments which resulted from this is 
indicated in Table 2 .
This reinforces the view that the government (i.e. the Cabinet 
and its most senior officials) was not responsible for economic 
policy, except in the short term. It looked to the President for 
direction and was permitted to interpret his wishes unless or until 
something went wrong. Given the weakness of the Presidency as a policy-­
making institution, the instructions given were usually badly 
specified. Abrupt changes in emphasis surprised ministers, as in 1980 
when the President made a series of detailed economic announcements 
and sacked the Cabinet. (The details of this move are analysed in 
Appendix 2). The President responded to short term economic problems 
by changing policies or reshuffling ministers. After the 1977 riots, 
ministers were particularly unwilling to make difficult decisions. 
Ministers were like civil servants, in so far as they had relatively 
little leeway on major issues, always reporting to their superior. Yet 
they carried political responsibility and were sacked in a way which 
officials could not be. Dr. A.R.A Meguid was appointed
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Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs (as well as Minister for 
Finance, Economy and Planning) in 1980 after the President had 
announced changes in policies. The new economic supremo therefore had 
no chance to influence the decisions which he would have to implement. 
His opposition to the President's policies in 1980 was indicated in 
his attempts to cut subsidies about six months after the latter had 
increased them.
TableZ  shows that there were 16 government reshuffles in the 
nine and a half years from October 1970 to May 1980. Each 
administration lasted an average of 7.1/2 months therefore. Typically 
a Minister of Planning held office for 18 months and a Minister of 
Supply for just under a year in more than one government. Tenures of 
this length meant that serious administrative and political problems 
arose. Ministers took time to learn about their posts and to 
familiarise themselves with routines. As has been suggested, they 
lacked incentives to make difficult decisions. The system favoured 
short term rather than long term benefits; for example if a budget 
reduced inflation over the following six months then it would be more 
popular with the President than one which pushed prices up in the 
succeeding years. Economic gains were assessed according to political 
rather than structural or long term criteria. Major policy changes, 
such as Law 43 for the encouragement of foreign investment, were 
possible because they did not have any adverse short term effects on 
living standards or prices..
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Finally, it should be noted that Table 1 only deals with some of 
the Ministries responsible for economic affairs. During the 1970s 
there were Ministries for Petroleum, Agriculture, Irrigation, Agrarian 
Affairs, Internal Trade, Transport, Power, Popular Development,
Housing and New Communities. Also to be added are commissions, boards, 
organisations, administrations and agencies. Ayubi listed 1600 public 
authorities, 46 public organisations, 381 public companies, 6 
independent bodies, 120 urban and 1000 rural councils (1). These were 
subject to constant reorganisation.
(1) N. Ayubi 'Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt1. P234
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The Bureaucracy
The lowest tier in the government administration was the 
bureaucracy. It can be considered the decision blocking tier for two 
reasons. Firstly its size, growth and lack of skilled manpower made it 
extremely inefficient in the sense that decisions could not easily be 
implemented, their effects monitored and controlled. Secondly as a 
bureaucracy it was an organisation unsuited to change. Downs has made 
the point that as bureaucractic organisations grow, the capacity for 
effective action by top officials increases at a declining marginal 
rate. The amount of wasted activity increases. This is due, in part, 
to the increasing amount of time consumed in internal administration. 
Also according to Downs, the older such an organisation is the more 
likely it is to develop a self serving ideology (1).
These kinds of problems were implicitly recognised by Sadat. In 
the early 1970s he backed numerous reorganisations of the 
administration because as he said the government was in a state of 
internal 'chaos' and that he was losing 20?o of his energy 'because of 
administration' (2). The central government administration went back 
to Pharonic times and maintained its central role whatever policies 
were followed (3). Nasser expanded it in order to provide jobs in the
(1) A. Downs 'Inside Bureaucracy' Chapter XXII, Little Brown & Co. 
1967.
(2) N. Ayubi 'Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt' P300 
Footnote 166.
(3) G. Baer 'Basic Factors affecting Social Structure, Tensions, 
Change in Modern Egypt' in Milson ed. 'Society and Political 
Structure in the Arab World', Humanities Press, New York, 1973, 
P3-4.
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Table 3; Employment In Government 1969/70 - 1978.
Rate of Growth Share of Total
Year Number (OGO's) p.a. % Employment (?□)
1969/70 1187.7 4.65 N.A
1970/71 1250.4 5.28 15.15
1971/72 1290.5 3.21 14.86
1973 1471.2 14.00 17.17
1974 1660.6 12.87 18.73
1975 1701.0 2.43 18.84
1976 1779.0 4.58 18.97
1977 1910.5 7.39 20.77
1978 2065.3 8.10 21.86
Source: Central Agency for Organisation and Administration
'Development of Employment in Government 
Administration' Information Centre Data Series 
No.11, September, 1979.
N.B. 1975 & 1976 Estimates
1977 & 1978 Ministries of Justice, Defence, People's 
Assembly and Central Auditing Agency 
excluded.
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1960s to those who could not be absorbed elsewhere. University 
graduates were guaranteed jobs under the Employment Laws of the early 
1960s but the trend has been to take on an ever increasing number of 
non-graduates. (See Tabled). In 1970 35,476 'graduates' were reported 
to have certificates 'not approved of. All received government jobs 
under a system of 'intermediate certificates' (1). In the 1980/81 
budget of duly 1980 £E18 millions was allocated for accelerating the 
employment of graduates (2), At a minimum graduate wage of £E240 p.a. 
this would have permitted the employment of an extra 75,000 or 45,500 
at higher graduate rate of pay. The term acceleration suggests that 
the budget may have included other items for such employment.
That an increasing number of unskilled workers were taken on is 
indicated by the fact that in 1974 the Deputy Prime Minister stated 
that 85% of Government employees had less than a university degree and 
that over half were either illiterate or only knew how to read and 
write. This compares with 73% below the university degree level in 
1961 (3).
Table 4 shows that a much larger number of non-graduates (or"non- 
full graduates') than graduates were taken on from 1970/71 - 1978.
(1) A1 dumhuriya, 30.11.1970.
(2) Memorandum concerning the main features of the draft State
General Budget of Fiscal Year, 1980/81 P4.
(3) L. Gullick & O.K. Pollock 'Government Reorganisation in the
U.A.R.' (1962).
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In 1973 the employment guarantee for graduates was made permanent 
by law. With the exception of medical students, university students 
two years after graduation and intermediate level students three years 
after graduation could apply for a government post as of right. The 
Ministry of Manpower checked requests from graduates and ministries 
plug government agencies. Funds were automatically allocated and this 
encouraged requests from state bodies which often exceeded supply(l). 
From 1973 to 1976 the employment guarantee was extended to military 
conscripts. The pressures which were severe in the late 1960s to 
provide more jobs for graduates and others, had not abated in the late 
1970s even though the role of the state was supposed to be smaller in 
the more liberalised economy.
25,091 of the 56,471 university graduates of 1978 and January 
1979 applied for public posts to the Ministry of Manpower in 1981. Of 
the 127,196 who graduated from vocational schools, 81,655 or 64% also 
applied to the Ministry to find them a job (2). These groups remained 
largely unemployed between their graduation and their allocation to 
public posts., Hansen and Radwan estimated them to be 200,000 a year 
in the 1970s (3).
The increasing share of employment taken up by the government was 
in part a result of the reduction in pressure (both legal and 
political) on public sector firms to take graduates.
(1) B. Hansen & S. Radwan ’Employment Opportunities and Equity in 
Egypt' I.L.0.1982. P44-5.
(2) B. Hansen & 5. Radwan op cit P53 footnote 7.
(3) B. Hansen & S. Radwan op cit P39.
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As well as providing graduates and others with jobs the 
bureaucracy grew as a result of its own momentum. In 1968, according 
to Ayubi, the government needed 16,279 graduates, nearly 2,800 more 
than the number available. State organisations and senior officials 
wanted to increase their prestige and promotion possibilities by 
expanding their employment (l). From 1973 to 1977 total reported needs 
for graduates in shortage specialisations equalled 19,305 or 95% of 
applications. In surplus specialisations the over-supply was 
comparatively low, at 38% (2).
The administrative problems created by this employment inflation 
added to the difficulties inherent in the system. According to 
Waterbury, some parts of the bureaucracy behaved like private 
fiefdoms, ignoring directives from above and imposing their own 
decisions (3). Even the control agencies of the government, whose 
activities related to maintaining efficiency and accountability, 
suffered. The Central Auditing Agency had 72 officials at the level of 
Undersecretary of State (4).
(1) N. Ayubi 'Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt1 
P244-5.
(2) B. Hansen & S. Radwan 'Employment Opportunities and Equity in 
Egypt1, op cit P207.
(3) 3. Waterbury 'Egypt: The Wages of Dependency' in A.L Udowitch ed.
'The Middle East: Oil, Conflict & Hope' P332. Lexington 
University Press, 1976.
(4) N. Ayubi 'Bureaucratic Inflation & Administrative Inefficiency: 
The Deadlock in Egyptian Administration' Middle East Studies 
Vo.18 No. 3, duly, 1980.
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The solution put forward in the early 1970s was to try to improve 
the quality of administration and reorganise Ministries. A Ministry of 
Administrative Reform came into existence between 1974 and 1975 and a 
National Institute for Administrative Development was also created. 
Technical consultative offices were set up in the Presidency and 
Popular Councils were organised at local levels to decentralise 
decision making and increase public participation in economic 
activities (1). In an attack on the overcentralisation of government, 
the Ministry of Local Administration was one of those abolished (2).
In 1970, the Finance Ministry was partially decentralised, a move 
which involved creating more posts for graduates. In 1971, the 
Ministry of Economy was reorganised and Higher Advisory Councils were 
created for economic affairs and trade. A general organisation was 
created inside the Ministry to control exports and 'verify imports 
against supply contracts' (3). The 1971/2 State Budget included the 
following points:
1. Employment allocations to be reduced to a minimum and new 
posts to be created only in urgent cases.
2. Redundant manpower was to be distributed after a thorough
study of all posts in all sectors.
3. Privileges in kind would be revised and bonuses 'suppressed'.
4. Personal allowances would be abolished (4)
(1) Presidential Decree No.2282 for 1971 quoted by N. Ayubi op cit, 
P310 and conversations with Dr. A.A. Hegazi.
(2) BBC/SWB 20.9.1971 ME/3793/A/2 2nd Series
(3) BBC/SWB 22.9.1971 ME/3793/A/1 2nd Series.
(4) BBC/SWB 21.9.1971 ME/3792/A/2 2nd Series. 
BBC/SWB 24.9.1971 ME/3795/A/2 2nd Series.
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In October, 1971 the Ministry of Land Reclamation was renamed the 
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Agrarian Reform, with the General 
Authority for Agrarian Reform attached to it. What had been the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform became the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The changes in agricultural control represented the 
continuance of a long struggle in the bureaucracy. The Housing 
Ministry was also reorganised in 1971. In 1974 the Ministry of Finance 
and Foreign Trade was replaced by separate Ministries of Finance and 
Foreign Trade.
This was a period in which the leadership felt that it could 
improve the functioning of the government and the economy by reforming 
existing structures, but these measures were also a sign of weakness. 
The ideology, according to Ayubi, was to introduce scientific methods 
into administration. In practice, reform involved partial, or 
marginal measures with none of the radical change that was needed. He 
stated that administrative reform contained ideological 
rationalisations, fights for areas of control, services and people, 
political participants and institutions, power drives, campaign 
strategies and obstructive tactics, compromise and concessions (1).
It could not be isolated from reforms of the political process as a 
whole because its effects went beyond the administration to society as 
a whole.
(1) N. Ayubi op cit P54 and P237-8.
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In the early 1970s, attempts to reform the administration were 
frequent, but were carried out within an unchanged political and 
static economic situation. An essentially unreformed bureaucracy has 
hindered much private initiative since 1974, something which led to 
various types of activities and systems being chosen in attempts to 
circumvent the bureaucracy.
Below the Ministries were bodies responsible for controlling the 
Public Sector. Public Authorities were responsible for public services 
wfiich were not necessarily profit making. Public Organisations were 
responsible for 'productive sectors' until they were abolished in 
1975. They resembled holding companies and were replaced by weaker 
Higher Sector Councils. Their relationship to the firm and to the 
government is illustrated in Table 5 below.
The Public Sector
Overstaffing and bureaucracy were present on a large scale in 
firms as well as in the government and the intermediate organisations. 
From the early 1960s publicK) owned companies were obliged to take 
on graduates far in excess of their requirements. This policy was 
diluted from 1975 and officially ended in 1979 but the practice 
continued under government pressure (l).
According to the Chairman of the Misr Foreign Trade Company, in 
1980, 50% of his 650 employees were under-employed. This he defined as 
the number who could be sacked without loss of output or sales by the 
Company. He has also said that within the foreign trading sector his 
company was in a relatively healthy position (2).
(1) Financial Times 23.7.1980 Supplement on Egypt P.iv.
(2) Mr. W. Said, Interviewed.
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A more scientific basis for estimating this over-employment is 
to see how many unskilled workers in ill-defined posts there were. 
According to the 1976 Census, a total of 559,900 were employed in the 
textile, clothing and leather sector. Of these 20,000 were government 
employees, 259,000 public sector workers and the rest, 270,900 worked 
in the private sector. Workers defined by skill totalled 64% of the 
public sector work force (165,760) and 92% (249,228) of the private 
sector (1).
This was the pattern in the paper, food and chemical sectors. 
Within Egypt, the public sector employed many more workers than 
equivalent companies abroad. The Abu Zaabal pharmaceutical complex 
was originally estimated to require 898 workers. In the first year of 
operation it employed 2,245 workers (2).
From 1961 until 1975 public sector firms were controlled by 
Public Organisations. They were responsible for most of the functions 
normally associated with a firm's management and were responsible to 
the Minister.
In 1971 an attempt was made in the law to reduce the powers of 
the Organisations and increase those of company managers. These 
measures did not, according to Waterbury, have any effect as they 
were not even implemented. In 1975 the Organisations were abolished
(3).
(1) Census of Population 1972, Central Agency for Public 
Mobilisation and Statistics Cairo 1978 T22.
(2) H. Handusa 'The Public Sector in Egyptian Industry 1952-19771 
in 'The Egyptian Economy over Quarter of a Century 1952-1977' 
Studies and Discussions of the Third Annual Congress of Egyptian 
Economists 1978.
(3) 0. Waterbury 'Egypt: Burdens of the Past/Options for the Future' 
P295. Indiana University Press 1978.
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By 1979 there was discussion of the need to reintroduce the 
Public Organisations in order to increase the coordination of public 
sector activities, but nothing came of the idea. It is significant 
that coordination problems remained so severe that a return to the old 
system was even discussed (1).
Prom 1975 firms were grouped into sectors of similar and related 
activities. The Higher Councils performed a planning and coordination 
role for them. The latter, which replaced the Public Organisations, 
comprised the Chairmen of individual company boards plus officials 
from the Ministries of Planning, Economy and Finance. There were also 
outside experts. Councils were headed by Ministers and had the 
assistance of a technical secretariat.
Each firm had a general assembly which controlled its activities. 
The assembly also met under the chairmanship of a minister and had 
representatives of the Ministries listed above. It also had 
representatives of the Higher Council, the workers and outside 
experts.
The Ministry of Finance which allocated production subsidies had 
a major influence on pricing, budgeting and investment. The Planning 
Ministry until 1980 set overall investment allocations, something 
which was done by the National Investment Bank after that date. The 
Ministry of Economy allocated foreign exchange.
(1) N. Ayubi 'Bureaucratic Inflation and Administrative
Inefficiency: The Deadlock in Egyptian Administration'. 
Middle East Studies, Volume 18, No.3. duly 1980.
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As well as all these institutional influences and systems the 
main Agencies of Central Government monitored the firm. The Central 
Audit Agency was responsible for checking financial results, the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics collected and 
processed industrial data. The Central Agency for Organisation and 
Administration collected data on employment.
Table 5: Organisational Structure of the Public Sector
Ministry of Finance ■ ‘■ - I Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Economy |— |— j Higher Sector Council-]
Ministry of Planning General Assembly
The Firm
Central Agency 
for Public 
Mobilisation & 
Statistics
Central Agency 
for Audit
Central Agency 
for Organisation 
& Administration
Monitoring Bodies 
Bodies supplying personnel 
Lines of Control
Source: Derived from A.D. Little Inc. An Assessment of Egypt's
Industrial Sector,
1978 & N. Ayubi, 'Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary 
Egypt', P2D7-250.
NB: The lines of control indicated here are typical of the firms under 
the direction of the Ministry of Industry or about half of all public 
sector companies.
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Finally the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration 
and Management supervised the implementation of labour laws.
Although the firm had to deal with numerous official bodies 
even after the 1975 reform, the most important control would often 
be a directive to fix prices. The implications of this for the 
financial position of firms and the performance of the economy as a 
whole are discussed in Chapter 4. From an institutional point of 
view such a directive could make the whole emphasis on 
decentralisation meaningless. None of the bodies described above 
had, under such circumstances, any influence comparable to that of 
the controlling ministry.
The 1975 reforms also forbade the sale of public firms to the 
private sector and blocked attempts to raise capital from the 
private sector. Firms totally owned by the state were to have the 
majority of their board members appointed by the Prime Minister with 
the rest being workers' representatives. This led to continued 
politicisation of the firm as well as instability. Directors were 
appointed often for political or personal reasons by the government 
and the high turnover of ministers led to a high turnover of 
directors.
The Board of Directors was given authority to draft the general 
plan for the firm as well as detailed production plans. It could 
also up-grade employees on the basis of their productivity. In 1975 
the Cabinet decided that economic considerations were to be dominant 
in all matters relating to the public sector. This meant that 
decisions about prices as well as employment were supposed to have 
profitability as their main criterion.
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The problems of bureaucracy and their perception by the President 
had a number of consequences. Firstly new institutions were sought 
which would operate outside the State's bureaucractic framework. As 
well as the Movement for Popular Development (1980), such bodies as 
the Arab International Bank (1970) were founded to attract foreign 
currency. It was permitted to operate without many of the restrictions 
imposed by law on existing public sector banks. This trend was not 
entirely new; the Suez Canal Authority and the Aswan High Dam 
Authority operated successfully before the move towards a more liberal 
economy began. They had been set up under Nasser's rule (1). Petroleum 
also operated outside the state sector with foreign investment.
The second trend was to avoid or minimise reforms of existing 
institutions with the exception of reorganising ministries. To the 
President, the civil service bureaucracy and the public sector were an 
inseparable mess. Guidelines for reforming the public sector came from 
Ministers rather than the President either because he did not want to 
face up to opposition directly or because he had no hope that reform 
could be achieved. Reform was not fundamental and the move towards 
decentralisation in pricing came to an abrupt end in 1980. The 
solution to the problem of industrial production was seen, at least by 
the President, in terms of creating a new, private sector with the 
help of foreign investment. This leads to the third trend in policy: 
the tendency to look abroad for the solution to economic problems in 
terms of aid as well as investment.
(1) R.W. Baker 'Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser & Sadat' 
Harvard University Press, 1978.
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The liberalisation programme outlined in the October Working 
Paper of April 1974 was vague. The main thrust of the programme was 
known beforehand: some of the most important liberalisation measures 
preceeded it. These are analysed in Chapter 3. Vet this was the main 
statement of a new era, following the supposed great victory of the 
1973 war against Israel. With its criticisms of the public sector and
its reassurances to public sector workers it did little to create a
consensus on the need for reform. On this vital issue only this was
said: the public sector was overly bureaucratic and the answer to the
problem lay in 'further reorientation .... increasing progress (and 
getting rid of) obstructions and procedures which reduce its 
efficiency (1).
The meaning of this sentence had become apparent in Ministerial 
statements made from 1968 onwards. Yet by 1974 when the impetus for 
reform was at its peak and the government was about to introduce a 
radical foreign investment law, on this issue it was vague. In terms 
of action, less was done than was seen to be done. The abolition of 
the Public Organisations was opposed even by the Prime Minister of the 
1974-5 period (2).
Finally, it should be noted that old 'remedies' were seldom 
completely abandoned. In 1980 the President announced that the powers 
of provincial governors would be increased at the expense of central 
government. This kind of reorganisation of the administration had 
achieved little in the early 1970s.
(1) October Working Paper P58. English Edition, State Information
Service, 1974, Cairo.
(2) Dr. A.A. Hegazi, Interview with
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These characteristics of the decision making process conform in 
part to the ideas of Myrdal. His concept of the 'soft state' describes 
one in which social obligations such as paying taxes are weakly 
enforced, if at all (1).
The Soft State
Egypt has had a long history of centralised administration but 
one in which the official, particularly at the local level, exercised 
power in a harsh, inefficient and often arbitrary way (2). Added to 
this was an experience of colonialism and rule by a foreign power 
through weak and nominally Egyptian government until 1952. These 
factors put many in a position of hostility to authority, fr®^ 1948 
hostility was focused on Israel and this enemy became a rallying cry 
uniting the country and delaying domestic changes. The words of Nehru 
can be applied to modern Egypt when he said, in the Indian context, 
that a generation wed to opposing the colonialist regime became 
accustomed to opposing its own government after independence. The idea 
of continually trying to frustrate centralised government, or at least 
assisting its control did not die in 1952 (3).
These factors made it difficult to create and maintain social 
discipline. Another factor further reinforced this process: the 
revolutionary junta, which seized power in 1952, used the existing 
bureaucracy to govern. This continuity was in force as the regime's 
economic ideology became more socialist in the 1960s and more laissez 
faire in the 1970s.
(1) G. Myrdal 'Asian Drama' Pantheon Random House 1968, P896.
(2) D. Landes 'Bankers and Pashas' Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 1953.
(3) Quoted in G. Myrdal op cit
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The bureaucracy changed it composition over time but many 
officials adapted to very different ideologies. One important element 
of the continuity, which helped them maintain their position, was the 
dominant position of the State despite ideological changes.
This meant that those who had acted as agents of 'oppression' 
before 1952 became the agents of 'progress' and 'reform' afterwards.
A similar phenomenon applied in the 1970s as the same officials 
responsible for planning controls, sequestration and even ifl^ r£sopi'{ig/ 
people under Nasser were supposed to implement reform under Sadat.
This was not easy for them or the institutions in which they worked.
The most extreme form which a lack of social responsibility can 
take is corruption; Ayubi has chronicled a number of cases of 
corruption involving, among others, senior officials. Apart from the 
damage done directly by such activities the widespread perception of 
corruption in the late 1970s, created an atmosphere which was not 
conducive to economic development. What he called the 'civil culture' 
was weak in Egypt and in that environment informal relationships 
dominated (1).
Presidential concern about corruption and its socio-economic 
implications was expressed but action was very limited (2). As well as 
corruption there was the growth of a type of commercialism which has 
had adverse economic and social consequences. Much investment was 
concentrated in luxury housing development;
(1) N. Ayubi 'Implementation Capability and Political Feasibility
of the 'Open Door' Policy in Egypt' August 1980 Draft P74.
(2) President Sadat's speeches quoted in Arab Report and Record, 1 -
15 April 1975 and in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September
1980.
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this being particularly true of Arab funds used in Egypt. In Cairo, 
especially, a kind of enclave has been created within the economy 
consisting of luxury housing, hotels, tourist facilities and imported 
goods. These may or may not have spin-off effects on the economy as a 
whole, but they have had negative socio-economic effects. The visible 
disparity of wealth between the rich and the poor has grown since the 
liberalisation of the economy began; giving rise to social tensions. 
These were most dramatically manifested in the January 1977 riots. 
After then it was extremely difficult for the government to increase 
prices, even of such items as petrol, when the poor saw so much wealth 
about.
This kind of attitude reached its peak in plans to develop the 
Pyramids area at Giza, near Cairo, into a huge resort centre. The 
threat to one of the country's major archaeological sites was so great 
that popular opinion, as expressed in the Press, eventually forced the 
President to cancel the whole project.
Decisions made by government were not always dictated by the
interest of the economy. Moore has chronicled the way in which the
Ramses (later called the October 16th) bridge was promoted in Cairo
(1). In 1961 a bridge over the Nile was planned to be built by a 
German firm but the deterioration in relationships with West Germany 
meant that the plan was dropped.
(1) C.H. Moore 'Images of Development: Egyptian Engineers in 
Search of Industry' M.I.T. Press 1980. P185-7.
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By the early 1970s Greater Cairo's Planning Commission had decided on 
other priorities. A number of builders and consultants, including 
Osman Ahmed Osman, head of the Arab Contractors Company, were pushing 
for the bridge to be built as part of a major road/flyover project in 
the city. A relative of one of the backers was put in charge of the 
Planning Commission and gained Cabinet permission for the bridge to be 
built. He then had the jurisdiction over the project taken away from 
the Commission, which was abolished in 1973. In 1973 the bridge was 
opened as part of a large road construction project.
Moore concludes that activities like this, on a huge scale throughout 
the economy, contributed to a collapse of the State(l). The networks 
of contacts which 'fixed' business deals and reduced government 
control to a shadow of what it was meant to be, was in Moore's view, 
beyond the President's power to clear up (2).
This was not a new problem. At the height of the planning phase 
in the early 1960s numerous problems arose. At that time there were 
failures of communication and coordination plus clashes over lines of 
authority between the Ministry of Industry and the. National Planning 
Commission, the Treasury and the National Bank (3). Presidential 
participation in the planning process was limited. According to 
O'Brien, the planning process was far from optimal, with a failure to 
coordinate the choice of projects and the macro-economic relationships 
implied by the plan. Significantly there was no plan to supersede the
(1) C.H. Moore 'Images of Development; Egyptian Engineers in Search 
of Industry', P205.
(2) C.H. Moore Ibid P206-7 Waterbury emphasises the fact that this 
system was also true under Nasser 'Wages of Dependancy in the 
Middle East; Oil, Conflict and Hope' in A.L. Udowitch 'The Middle 
East: Oil, Conflict and Hope', Lexington University Press, 1976,
P333.
(3) K. Wheelock 'Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis' P159-16Q
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markets and price mechanism by alternative resource allocation 
methods (1).
The overall growth rate was a political decision imposed on the 
planners by the Presidential Council (2). He concluded that the First 
Five Year Plan suggested that all economic activity would be centrally 
planned but in practice the implementation of the Plan included 'no 
more than investment expenditure by the public and private sectors and 
the allocation of foreign exchange'. The formulation of the programme 
was neither highly centralised nor very scientific (3).
The experience of the 1960s is of direct relevance to an under­
standing of the policy making process in the 1970s. Egypt, even in its 
most centrally economic phase did not experience planning in the full 
sense of the word. The planning experience of the 1960s, favoured 
today by some in Egypt, was only a partial one.
In this sense there has been more continuity in economic policy 
than the announcement of an 'Open Door' would indicate. The weakness 
of economic policy coordination and formulation in the 1970s should 
not be related only to the more liberal programme adopted but also to 
something deeper in the nature and structure of the regime.
(1) P. O'Brien 'The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System' P150.
(2) P. O'Brien op cit P157.
(3) P. O'Brien op cit P319
54
The failure of the supreme leadership to become involved in 
detailed economic policymaking contrasts with certain other countries 
in the developing world. During the late 1960s Pakistan's supreme 
economic body was the National Economic Council. Its Chairman was the 
President of the State and it consisted of representatives of central 
and local government at the highest political level. There was also an 
economic coordination committee at the ministerial level to ensure 
consistency in policies at the operational level.
According to Ibrahim, the involvement of the President was 
essential to the development process (1). In fact the President also 
chaired the Economic Coordination Committee. An executive committee of 
ministers dealt with project approval and all these bodies were 
superior to the Planning Commission.
At times there have been senior ministers with coordinating 
powers in the Cabinet responsible for economic matters. Dr. Sidqi had 
such responsibilities in industry, mining and petroleum as Deputy 
Prime Minister in the early 1970s. Dr. Hegazi as Deputy Prime 
Minister, first Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial 
Affairs and Prime Minister from 1973 to 1975 had wide powers as 
Dr. Kaissouni and Dr. Meguid have had since then. Each of these senior 
ministers have been balanced to some extent by others inside the 
Cabinet, as well as outside. Dr. Sidqi was not responsible for Finance 
when he was in charge of Industry. Dr. Hegazi had more authority when
(1) R. Ibrahim 'Administrative Obstacles to Development1 in
R. Robinson ed. Developing the Third World: The Experience 
of the 1960s', Cambridge University Press, 1971.
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he was Deputy Prime Minister because there were no others of the same 
rank at that time. During the periods in which Dr. Kaissouni and Dr. 
Meguid were in power, the position of Dr. Hillal, Minister and more 
recently Deputy Prime Minister for Industry, was powerful. The 
Minister for Industry traditionally respresented the Public Sector, 
often, although not always, against the policies of reformers in the 
Ministries of Finance and Economy.
One implication of this analysis is that the machinery used for 
making and implementing decisions in Egypt was inappropriate because 
it was inefficient. Much of the economic advice given to the Egyptian 
government has made this point, emphasising the need to move towards a 
more decentralised system (1). In view of Gershenkron's analysis, 
cited in Chapter 1, it seems that large scale intervention was 
inevitable in Egypt during the 1970s.
Nove has stated that one of the most serious problems in the 
Soviet economy (during the 1960s) was the inability of the centre to 
know what needed doing at the disaggregated level. Only through the 
bureaucractic hierarchy did the senior decision makers get their 
information (2). These were central contradictions in the system: 
the complexity of the economy was such that decisions could not be 
made efficiently in a bureaucratic way. It would seem that the stage 
of economic development determines the number and the complexity
(1) e.g. Reports by Moller, Belassa, USA Government, IBRD and IMF 
(on the latter see Appendix 1)
(2) A. Nove 'The Soviet Economic System1 P86 & P371.
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of those decisions which need to be made. In the early stages of 
development the bureaucratic hierarchical model may be an effective 
instrument for decision making, planning and control. At this stage 
the number of decisions is small and their complexity limited (l).
This kind of reasoning was used in Yugoslavia when decentralisation 
was implemented (2). Given that both the USSR and Yugoslavia were in 
the 1970s and 1980s much more developed than Egypt (in terms of GDP 
per head), it does not seem that the latter's administrative structure 
was inappropriate. Thq form which it took in Egypt was not ideal 
however. A centralised system may have been as efficient as any other 
but not as it existed in Egypt. It could have permitted the use of 
market forces but needed to avoid the excessive bureaucracy which even 
the USSR found a burden.
Given its mixed economy in 1970 Egypt left the public sector 
basically under bureaucractic control and developed a new sector based 
on private and foreign capital. The central government was left with 
the task of providing employment on a larger scale when one burden - 
that of employing more workers than required - was partially lifted 
from the public sector. This was the only major reform applied to the 
sector from 1975 which was not reversed by 1980. The economy had 
different sectors operating according to different rules. By the end 
of the decade they were not totally isolated from each other - the Law 
43 sector was bidding skilled labour away from the public sector, as 
was emigration, so intensifying the squeeze on the latter. The public 
sector not only suffered from the bureaucratic control but also from
(1) 0. Tinbergen 'Economic Policy; Principles & Design' P2G1,
North Holland Publishing House, 1964.
(2) D. Milencovitch 'Plan & Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought' 
P185.
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competition, ironically from that sector with which it could not 
properly compete. It therefore sought to cooperate with the private 
sector under Law 43.
An important aspect of the relationship was that of rent seeking. 
The corruption which has been analysed represents attempts to make 
private gains (in terms of money, power, status and influence) as a 
result of controls and shortages. During the 1970s funds for paying 
bribes and bidding for licences increased. Given the need to find 
employment for thousands of graduates and others, the bureaucracy also 
grew. The area and incentives for interaction between the private 
sector and the bureaucracy therefork^increased.Foreign investors and 
the Egyptian private sector sought permission for a much wider range 
of activities than were allowed in the 1960s. Their ability to fund 
rent seeking increased as the ’rental' sectors expanded. The 
bureaucrat's need to use his official position in order to make a 
private gain increased as the institution in which he operated grew 
and the chances of his attaining a well paid position shrank.
An attack on the bureaucracy and corruption by the President or 
Parliament was not possible because of the power of vested interests 
at work. The private sector could not provide alternative jobs 
for under-employed civil servants and public sector workers and so the 
bureaucractic problem grew in the 1970s.
Myrdal has provided a cultural or historical reason why officials 
in Asian countries were willing to take bribes or engage in other 
corrupt/extra-legal activities (1). Officials are willing to make a 
market for things which they would be less willing to in the West 
because of the legacy of pre-capitalist, traditional society. In the
(1) G. Myrdal 'Asian Drama' P939-958.
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latter, markets are disorganised or even non-existent. Personal 
connections are therefore vital if individuals want to get things 
done. Bribing an official is seen as an extension of the kind of 
behaviour which got things done in the village.
Public officials were badly paid in Egypt and therefore had an 
incentive to do what they could to increase their incomes. The legal 
means to do this were limited, but with increased funds in the economy 
from foreign aid, investment, oil and remittances the illegal and 
semi-illegal possibilities for gain grew.
The relatively small number of senior officials who could extract 
large gains had a vested interest in maintaining the large bureaucracy 
because they could sell a 'way through it1. This also applied to 
Ministers and others associated with the government. Junior officials 
who had less to 'sell' were protected by their seniors in that the 
latter helped to maintain their jobs.
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Chapter 5: The Origin and Development of the Open Door Policy
The form which the liberalisation of the economy took in the 1970s 
was, in part, a reflection of the development of the economy in the 
1960s.
The early 1960s saw the effective nationalisation of most foreign 
and many privately owned Egyptian firms. Planning was instituted and 
large investments were made in heavy industry. The Soviet model was 
the inspiration for Egypt's first five year plan (1960-1965) and the 
USSR supplied aid plus expertise for its implementation. As in the 
USSR, agriculture was taxed to finance industry and emphasis was 
placed on heavy industry.
Planning was neither as centralised nor as comprehensive as in 
the USSR (1). In terms of implementation the plan was no more than an 
investment programme with the allocation of foreign exchange being 
carried out by the government. Targets other than investments were 
indicative (2). Provision was made for retaining a private sector in 
some areas, noteably construction.
As well as planning the government had certain social, policy 
objectives which involved the introduction of subsidies on a small 
scale and a guarantee of jobs to graduates in the civil service and 
public sector. With a huge expansion of education, particularly at the 
university level, both the number of graduates and those looking for 
work rose (3).
(1) P. O'Brien 'The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System P156-193.
(2) P. O'Brien op cit P319
(3) M. Abdel Fadil 'The Political Economy of Nasserism' P71-87.
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The economy in the 1960s was, at least in theory, tightly 
controlled by the government through the central planning system.
A Minister was responsible for each of the five main sectors of the 
economy: industry, trade, finance, communications and marketing. They 
exercised their responsibilities through public organisations, the 
latter being organised on a sectoral basis. Coordination was nominally 
carried out by the central planning system. A Ministry of Planning was 
set up in 1961 replacing all other planning bodies. The first year 
plan specified output targets in detail as well as the investment 
required to carry them out. According to O'Brien, the overall target 
of doubling national income between 1960 and 1970 was selected by the 
President, probably on a political rather than an economic basis Cl).
The planning system, which involved extensive consultations with 
Ministries and other government bodies, did not work well because 
individual Ministries, often with Presidential backing, were able to 
get projects into the Plan which the Ministry of Planning did not 
believe could be funded. Hence the Five Year Plan became a collection 
of loosely drawn up investment projects. It had little influence on 
the sectoral plans drawn up by individual Ministries (2). O'Brien 
concluded that Egypt never experienced central planning in the sense 
of producing a detailed and integrated set of targets for the economy 
and enforcing adherence to them. Nor did the plan aim to supersede the 
market. It assumed that the market would continue to allocate raw 
materials, labour, intermediate and final production. The start of 
the Five Year Plan preceded most of the nationalisation. Egypt was 
left with a highly centralised structure with all the disadvantages 
and few of the advantages which that involved.
(1) P. O'Brien 'The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System1 P157.
(2) P. O'Brien op cit P159.
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The second five year plan was never started. Hansen and 
Nashashibi stated that the men who pursued the first five year plan 
and its investment targets were not the same individuals as those who 
pushed Arab socialism with its effects on consumption (l). The implied 
lack of coordination and consensus within the government and 
leadership was dramatic.
The type of economy which Egypt adopted in the 1960s was closely 
related to her foreign relations, particularly her alliance with the 
USSR. The latter provided considerable economic and military aid. As 
Egypt became involved in an unsuccessful war in the Yemen and suffered 
defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, she became more reliant on the 
USSR. Her trade was largely with the Communist block and was based on 
a centrally controlled system of trade and payments agreements.
By 1968 Nasser was seeking assistance from the conservative oil- 
rich states of the Gulf. They disliked and feared his socialist 
orientation and interventionist foreign policy as exemplified in the 
Yemen War. In order to attract Arab aid, domestic and foreign policy 
reorientations were therefore necessary.
In 1968 two reforming ministers, Hassan Abbas Zacki and Abdel 
Aziz Hegazi were appointed to the Ministries of Economy and Finance 
respectively. They pushed for reforms of the foreign exchange system 
and the public sector. If subsidies were necessary then they should 
come from the Treasury and would be explicitly accounted for on 
grounds of social policy. Current revenues and expenditures should be
(1) B. Hansen & K. Nashashibi * Egypti Foreign Trade Regimes &
Economic Development*, National Bureau for Economic Research, 
1975, P127.
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balanced and enterprises making losses would, according to Hegazi’s 
plan, be closed down unless there was an explicit social policy reason 
for keeping them in operation. In the late 1960s the President began 
to speak about the need for 'scientific' management and favoured 
Hegazi's proposals because of his concern about industrial 
inefficiency (l).
This was a controversial matter and a sharp debate took place 
over the way in which public sector companies were to be run. Nasser 
came down in favour of a 'technocratic' approach but this did little 
to improve the environment in which industrial managers worked. They 
remained subject to tight political control and were watched over by 
the secret police and others. Baker states that they did not feel 
secure as long as the political left, which dominated the Arab 
Socialist Union (Egypt's only political party in the 1960s), regarded 
them as illegitimate (2).
By the end of the 1960s the economic balance sheet was mixed. 
Industry was almost completely under state control. Agriculture was 
indirectly controlled if not actually owned by the state.
(1) Documents of Abdoul Nasser, January 1967 - December 1968, A1 
Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, Cairo. P377 and interviews 
with Dr. A.A. Hegazi, Finance Minister under Nasser and Mr, 
Hatem Sadeq, Nasser's son in law and former official at the 
Presidency.
(2) R.W. Baker 'Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser & Sadat' 
P48-7Q, Harvard University Press, 1978.
63
According to Baker, the nationalisation of industry in 1960 and 
1961 was carried out for political rather than economic reasons. As a 
result there was no central economic theory underlying the 
administrative arrangements in the economy (1). Hansen has suggested 
that while Nasser may have had socialist ambitions these were not 
shared by the army officers, civil servants and others who formed the 
establishment. They detested socialism and state intervention but 
gained from the expansion of the public sector (2).
Sadat inherited a public sector which was managed by an 
uncoordinated and ineffective system of control. Many of those who 
managed it were out of sympathy with what was supposed to be the 
ideology which governed the institutions in which they worked. There 
was a trend towards using the market to run the public sector but this 
only took the form of government announcements and not actual changes. 
The need to hold down prices and provide large numbers of jobs ran 
counter to the decentralising programme.
Dissatisfaction with economic structures reflected impatience 
with the lack of economic growth. As the economy virtually ceased to 
grow in the late 1960s, powerful groups could only get more at the 
expense of others. Some felt that the economic mechanism was hampering 
growth and latched on to the reforms in the hope of personal gain (3).
(1) R.W. Baker op cit P176.
(2) B. Hansen 'Arab Socialism in Egypt*, World Development, April 
1975.
(3) M. Abdel Fadil, fThe Political Economy of Nasserism1, Plll-112.
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The average annual rate of growth of GDP from 1960/1 to 1964/5 
was 6.6%. Between 1965/6 and 1969/70 it was 4.3% (1). The latter was 
boosted by the growth in defence expenditure and administration (2). 
The growth of GDP was accompanied by a big increase in imports: From 
16.5% of GDP, at factor cost, in 1960/1 to 24.0% in 1963/4 (3). As 
exports stagnated the deficit on foreign trade grew from 2.3% of GDP 
in 1960 to 10.1% in 1962 and 7.5% in 1963 when deflationary measures 
were introduced (4). These deficits were financed by aid from the USSR 
and, until 1965 from the USA. By 1969, aid received from abroad did 
not cover repayments and the effects of the Yemen War, population 
increase and the defeat in the 1967 War were all being felt. Between 
1969 and 1972 non-military aid from the USSR was negative if 
repayments are included (5).
Achievements in investment and industrial output hinged on the 
availability of foreign exchange. In this crucial respect the Egyptian 
plans and the socialist philosophy which underlay them, differed from 
the Soviet model which inspired them. The other crucial difference lay 
in Egypt's inability to increase the domestic savings rate. O'Brien 
described the plans of the 1960s as vague in their explanation of this 
issue (6).
(1) Calculated from R.Mabro & S. Radwan 'The Industrialisation of 
Egypt' P42.
(2) Mabro & Radwan op cit P44
(3) Mabro & Radwan op cit P193
(4) Calculated from International Financial Statistics, IMF, various 
Editions.
(5) Calculated from The Balance of Payments Yearbook, IMF, various 
Editions.
(6) P. O'Brien op cit P112-115.
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In practice, savings, as a share of GDP fell, from 15.5% in 1955 to 
12.7% in 1960, 13.9% in 1965 and 9.4% in 1970 (1).
Against a background of economic stagnation in the later 1960s 
President Nasser faced a choice. He could either try to intensify 
socialism and possibly move closer to the USSR or move towards a more 
market orientated economy. The choice was made in the latter direction 
in a very implicit way, without any announced alteration in official 
ideology. The first slight liberalisation moves came before the 1967 
war but were intensified soon after, when some of those who were to
serve as ministers under Sadat, were brought into office.
Nasser is sometimes considered to have left his successor with a 
socialist legacy but this in an inadequate description of the 
situation in 1970. There was state ownership and control of much of 
the economy plus fiscal arrangements for the poor but inequalities 
increased and the import of luxuries grew as soon as Sadat eased 
restrictions on them (2).
The Transition: Sadat’s Early Years 1970-73
Sadat’s most urgent task on being elected in 1970 was to secure
his own power base. This eventually led to the arrest, trial and
imprisonment, in 1971, of a number of his opponents, who had been 
prominent under Nasser. For at least his first six months in office, 
the President was therefore preoccupied with the struggle for power; 
other matters took second place.
(1) Calculated from K. Ikram op cit P398-399
(2) R.W. Baker op cit & N. Ayubi 'Bureaucracy & Politics in 
Contemporary Egypt1 P13-16.
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Sadat’s first government was formed in October, 1970. Headed by 
the elderly former diplomat, Mahmoud Fawzi, it was designed to appeal 
to all sections of the leadership. The Prime Minister, although not an 
economic specialist, favoured economic reforms. Other ministers were 
given the same posts that they had held under Nasser. Significantly, 
in the first government reshuffle under Sadat (November 1970) Aziz 
Sidqi was promoted from Minister to Deputy Prime Minister for 
Industry, Petroleum and Mines. This was done because of the nature of 
priorities facing the regime. Despite Nasser's acceptance, in 1970, of 
an American proposed ceasefire with Israel along the Suez Canal, 
pressure for war was dominant. After securing his own position, this 
was Sadat's second priority. In 1971 he made the following 
declaration:-
You expect me to speak to you today about the change 
and reorganisation of the state. However, that is not 
my aim at all. The aim we must never forget should 
always be that whatever we do, whether it is affecting 
change, reorganising the state, or anything else - 
anything we build - we must not forget that the aim 
should be the battle (1).
In January, 1972, Aziz Sidqi was appointed Prime Minister with 
the specific charge to prepare the country for war. There were a 
number of reasons for his appointment. Firstly, he had been 
responsible, to a great extent, for the industrialisation programme of 
the First Five Year Plan in the early 1960s and was considered to be 
an able and forceful technocrat administrator. He was loyal to the new
(1) M.A. Sadat, quoted by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) 
18.9.71, 2nd Series ME/3790.
The phrase 'Reorganising the State' referred among other things 
to the reorganisation of ministries analysed in Chapter 2.
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President and was close to the USSR and so could act as a link during 
this period of continued economic weakness in Egypt (l). He favoured 
reform of the existing economic structure, rather than changes in 
structures such as denationalisation, what was later mooted.
Although, under Sidqi’s government, further reforms were 
announced, the emphasis of policy was less on economic change, than on 
preparing for war.
The President's power was limited during this period and his 
known preference for a more liberal economic approach was muted. It 
was hard to push measures which would permit greater freedom to import 
luxuries at such a time. In 1972 the Prime Minister announced a ban on 
imports of certain luxury goods and increased customs duties on 
others. Measures were proposed against the black market and shops 
selling smuggled foreign goods were closed. According to the then 
Minister of Supply, the President opposed the closure of these shops 
in Cairo's Shawarbi Street (2). It was a sign of the slowly developing 
economic liberalisation that, when merchants complained about the 
restrictions, their complaints were upheld (3).
(1) The relationships with the USSR also affected Egypt's domestic
political and economic choices at this time. Progress towards a
more liberal economy could only come as opponents of the policy 
(and more generally those of the President) were removed from 
power. Although his main opponents had been imprisoned in 1971, 
the need to maintain good relations with the USSR, according to 
Rubenstein, meant that Sidqi was a logical appointee to the 
Premiership, despite his commitment to a controlled economy. 
(A.Z. Rubinstein, 'Red Star on the Nile' Princeton University 
Press 1977, P165, For similar reasons, Ismail Sabrl Abdullah, a 
former communist, was appointed Deputy Minister of Planning in 
1971. (op cit P150).
(2) Record of the Arab World 1972, Vo. 2 P1281.
(3) A1 Ahram 3.10.1972 quoted in N. Ayubi 'Bureaucracy and Politics 
in Contemporary Egypt' P4Q8-9.
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There was a clear difference between Prime Minister Sidqi's 
statement that the selling of 'imported or smuggled foreign goods' was 
'completely contrary to the need to transform our economy into a war 
economy' (1) and President Sadat's statement that with the 
liberalisation from 'foreign domination' and 'big capital', the state 
would sponsor private sector activity (2). These statements, made in 
the same year, reflect the differing policy objectives and 
orientations of the two men. The following year Sidqi was sacked.
Inter-Arab Cooperation
The early 1970s were years in which Egypt moved closer to the oil 
rich Arab States. The death of Nasser and the more moderate approach 
of Sadat to the relations with such countries as Saudi Arabia 
facilitated this. On the governmental level^ministers such as Hegazi, 
worked to attract Arab finance.
Coming from small and often weak states, capital imports from 
Arab oil producers were not felt to be a threat to Egypt. The long 
experience of colonialism had made many wary of permitting foreign 
investment by Western firms. Arab oil funds were felt to be a safe 
alternative. The first stage in the liberalisation of foreign 
investment controls was in the direction of Arab investment and the 
government set up a General Authority for Arab Investment and Free 
Zones in 1971 (3).
(1) See Note (2) previous page.
(2) Record of Arab World 1972 Vol 2 P1521.
(3) 3.W. Salacuse 'Back of Contract: Implications of Peace and 
Openness for Egypt's Legal System' American Journal of
Comparative Law, Vol. XXVIII, Spring 1980, No.2.
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The most important economic project started at this time was the 
Suez-Mediterranean oil pipeline ('SUMED'), which was designed to 
bypass the then closed, Suez Canal. The project was a joint Egyptian^ 
Arab one, in which Egypt's share of the capital was provided by the 
oil states. A West European loan, which the Egyptians originally hoped 
for, never materialised.
The main approach to inter-Arab cooperation was bilateral.
The Egyptian-Kuwaiti Investment Company was created in order to fund 
projects in Egypt. Similar institutions were set up with the UAE,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar after 1973. There was also a multinational 
approach with the Islamic Bank for Development, founded in Jeddah and 
the Arab Investment Company in Riyadh, in 1974. So far as Egypt was 
concerned, none of this would have been possible in the 1960s, because 
of the lack of a capital market and the weight of administrative 
restrictions. Arab investment became possible as a result of the 
gradual liberalisation of the economy, although most of it went into 
property development. It did help to reinforce and encourage the 
liberalisation process within Egypt. Sadat's relatively non- 
interventionist foreign policy and the greater market orientation in 
the foreign sector were much more attractive to the Gulf States than 
the policies followed by Nasser.
Another important aspect of the transition phase was the founding 
of a bank in Egypt with privileges unavailable to others at the time. 
Sadat wanted a bank to attract and deal with Arab funds, which would 
not suffer from the restrictions which prevailed in the rest of the 
economy, including the banking sector. The Egyptian International Bank 
for Foreign Trade and Development was set up under Dr. A.M. Kaissouni, 
the former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs under Nasser.
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The Bank was to specialise in financing transactions between Egypt and 
the Arab States and would later attract emigrant remittances as well. 
Its capital was in free currency, as were its transactions. It was 
relieved of taxes, duties and employment controls which dominated 
elsewhere. Starting capital was provided by the Central Bank of Egypt 
and subscriptions were accepted from the Arab States. With their later 
involvement, its name was changed to the Arab International Bank (1).
These measures did little to alter the position of the economy: 
The size of capital inflows was small. They did help to create a 
feeling of movement towards a more open economic system. Egyptian 
emigrants were encouraged to remit funds home and changes in the 
exchange rate in 1972 resulted in an increase in remittances received 
through official channels in Egypt.
In March 1973, Sadat took over the Premiership himself. This was 
a move to centralise control over the levels of power and represented 
a move towards liberalisation in economic policy. At the same time as 
austerity measures were being introduced to prepare the country for 
war, Sadat was granted sweeping powers to increase taxation (2). The 
economic position, according to the President, had 'fallen below 
zero' (3), but the Deputy Premier for Finance and Economy was ordered 
to set up free trade zones and a bank to finance foreign trade (4).
(1) Interview with Dr. A.A. Hegazi.
(2) A.Z. Rubinstein, 'Red Star over the Nile1, P221-223
(3) M.A. Sadat, 'In Search of Identity', P243
(4) A.Z. Rubinstein, op cit, P223.
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The President had backing from an important Parliamentary Committee 
for these moves (See Chapter 4). Their timing was significant: 
Important liberalisation moves were introduced only after the 
President had taken over as Premier. They were carried out as the 
country was being prepared for war; in December 1972 there had been 
student riots, partly as a result of the failure to go to war with 
Israel. As pressure and preparation for war intensified so did plans 
for economic reform.
Sadat's Political and Economic Conceptions
iherited from Nasser, Sadat also inherited a country deeply affected 
by political terror. The extensive use of secret police forces and 
even concentration camps, backed up Nasser's regime. Baker has pointed 
out that many industrial managers were afraid to take initiatives in
In a society with so much power concentrated in the hands of the 
President, it is essential to examine his ideas and conceptions. In 
seeing what he reacted against, it is possible to understand the 
direction in which he was trying to move. In the political sphere, 
changes came quickly, but with regard to economics, change was much 
slower. There were several reasons for this. Political and legal 
changes were a precondition for economic change. Liberalising the 
economy would involve alterations in the balance of economic power at
As well as the administrative and economic systems which he
such a system and that most simply awaited orders from above (l).
(1) R.W. Baker 'Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat1 
P183.
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a time (prior to 1973) when the President's position was 
circumscribed. Finally, a change in the country's international 
orientation was needed; Egypt could not import Western capital and 
technology and de-centralise her economy while being closely tied to 
the USSR. Somehow she had to move towards the West. The outcome of the 
1973 War made such a reorientation possible.
Sadat emphasised the contrast between a 'state of institutions', 
which he wanted to create and the 'centres of power', which he 
inherited. The former would wed institutions to the rule of law. Four 
institutions were envisaged. The first was the executive, the second 
was parliament, the role and influence of which increased under Sadat. 
Thirdly there was the Press, which was freed of many restrictions and 
finally the ASU. The role of the latter declined until it was later 
abolished. In Sadat's view it consisted of a series of cliques which 
exercised their power through secret police forces. It had, he 
believed, made Nasser and Egypt a prisoner.
Among Sadat's first measures were moves towards desequestration 
at the end of 1970 (1).
(1) The Economist, 2.1.1971.
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Constitutional Reform
The process of reform culminated in the introduction of a new 
constitution in September 1971. It was approved by a referendum. Of 
economic significance were the following clauses in the constitution
Article 32: Private Ownership is embodied in non-exploiting 
capital. Its social functions are governed by law to serve 
the national economy.
Article 33: State ownership has its sanctity. Its protection 
and consolidation is a duty of all citizens, since it is the 
basis of the socialist system and the source of popular 
welfare.
Article 34: Private ownership is safeguarded. It cannot be 
brought under sequestration, except in cases stipulated by 
law and by court order. Expropriation is only to be effected 
for public interest and in return for the legally stipulated 
compensation.
Article 35; Nationalisation can only be effected for the 
public interest within the law and in return for 
compensation.
Article 52: Citizens have the right to permanent or 
temporary emigration abroad. The law governs emigration 
procedures.
Article 37; Any aggression on personal liberty and the 
private lives of citizens as well as any aggression on 
the other rights and public liberties would be a crime.
The state is to provide adequate compensation to the 
victims of such aggression.
These clauses were highly significant. Numbers 32 and 33 were in 
the spirit of Egypt's socialist orientation. The others listed above 
were directed towards reassuring people after the era of police power.
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The latter was essential if the public was to have confidence in the 
state. The clause dealing with emigration was, in 1971, theoretical, 
because exit visas still had to be obtained from the authorities. 
However, in a society as closed as Egypt was in 1970-71, this was a 
significant indication of the government's desire to liberalise the 
country. These legal changes were a precondition for the changes in 
attitude which might lead to economic improvements.
The October Working Paper, issued in April 1974, was named after 
the 1973 war, which, as far as Sadat was concerned, marked the 
’liberation' of Egypt in a number of ways. It removed the stain of 
defeat which had prevailed since 1967 and, in so doing, had ended 
much of the pressure for further military action, even though 
territorial achievements in the 1973 war were limited. The war moved 
Egypt towards the West.
The Working Paper contained many ideas which had been formulated 
by the economic liberalisers since 1968. It was written in a very 
personal style and was far from being a scientific representation of 
set ideas. It was issued in the President's, rather than the 
Government's name.
One of the most significant aspects of the Paper and of Sadat's 
speeches in 1974, was the discussion of the economic cost of war. 
Sacred political causes seldom have monetary costs, according to those 
who favour them, and so the mention of these costs suggest a growing 
influence of technocrats concerned with economic improvements. They 
were more interested in economic, rather than military, objectives.
The President's statements reflected their views,^or reflected some of 
his own thinking), which he had suppressed before the 1973 War. The
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feeling that war was a burden and even an unnecessary one, from 
Egypt's point of view, made possible the disengagement agreements in 
1974 and 1975 with Israel. These brought tangible economic benefits in 
terms of oil fields recovered in the Sinai and the possibility of 
reopening the Suez Canal. Yet this was apparently only possible after 
the recovery of national self-respect following the crossing of the 
Suez Canal by Egyptian troops in October 1973.
In pointing the way ahead, the Working Paper recognised the 
inevitability of socialism, but asserted the need for Western 
technology and capital to accelerate development (1). Emigration would 
be encouraged in order to reduce the excess amount of labour on the 
domestic market. The public sector would be committed to plans 
formulated by the state, but the private sector would only be 
influenced by indirect methods, such as taxes, credits, incentives and 
other government measures (2).
The President's frequently stated aim was to get the private 
sector to provide about 30% of GDP. His model was Austria (3). A mixed 
economy would imply a reduced role for the state and, in asserting 
this, Sadat implicitly rejected the atheistic paternalism of Nasser's 
era. He saw Egypt as a family under God with the President as a father 
figure. Disagreements were permitted; the state and its security
(1) The October Working Paper. April 1974, State Information Service
Ministry of Information, Cairo, P65 (English Version)
(2) The October Working Paper, op cit P88.
(3) M.A. Sadat, Interviews on 9.3.1976 and 4.6.1976 in Speeches and
Interviews of President M.A. Sadat ('Speeches') January-Oune 
1976, P198 and P671.
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police would not dominate people’s lives. Criticism would, however, 
remain constrained. The dignity, religious devotion and tranquillity of 
the village were contrasted with the materialism and relative atheism 
of urban life. Although Sadat's policies encouraged a materialism 
which was to become sharper than in Nasser's era, at the heart of the 
economic philosophy was an attempt to make use of private initiative:
"The state cannot do everything for them and the error we 
committed in the application of our past socialism of idols was 
that the state used to do everything for the individual, thus he 
became used to not benefiting from his own capacities and talents 
... There must be a personal incentive for reconstruction"(1).
The idols referred to were the Soviet Union and its allies. A profound 
mistrust of the USSR in political terms and a feeling that its 
economic system was not relevant in Egypt, characterised Sadat's 
thinking. Sadat, like Nasser in the latter's last years, favoured the 
application of 'science'. This can best be interpreted as the 
application of technology and incentive. Sadat also stressed the 
importance of 'faith', a value which he associated with the stability 
of village life; one which reinforced the family and the status quo in 
political terms.
This did not mean that the President would shed his powers, but 
power would be used more liberally and the President would concern 
himself with strategy rather than details. This would remove the 
'hatred' which dominated Egyptian life in Nasser's last years and 
formed, according to Sadat, the worst part of the legacy which he 
inherited (2).
(1) Speeches duly - December, 1977, P252, Speech made on 26.9.1977.
(2) Egyptian Gazette, Cairo, 21 and 24 August, 1973.
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The President laid down an implicit framework for economic 
policy. The private sector would be allowed to expand to about 30% of 
the economy, socialism in terms of a large public sector would 
continue, as would social welfare policies. Few details were spelt 
out, however. Austria was often mentioned, not only because of its 
mixed economy, but also because of its prosperity. The details of how 
this socialism of prosperity were to be implemented would be worked 
out by the government and not the President. This lack of Presidential 
attention to economic detail was to prove a major problem, one 
connected to the structure of the state and the way it operated.
The Impact of the 1973 War
The 1973 War had both political and economic seeds. On the 
political level, Egypt's aim was to recover Arab land lost in 1967 and 
to somehow solve the Palestinian issue. More immediately, she wanted 
to recover the Sinai, thus bling her to re-open the Suez Canal
without the humiliation cjf naving the Israelis on the East Bank. 
Sadat's strategy was one of limited war; if his armies were unable to 
move all the way across the Sinai, he would at least be able to focus 
international attention on the issue of Israeli occupation of Arab 
land. He hoped to secure American assistance in pressuring Israel to 
withdraw.
He chose to fight, as it became apparent that the USA, with or 
without the USSR, would not force Israel to withdraw to the 5 3une 
1967 borders. Indeed, in 1972-73, the international situation looked 
to be moving in the opposite direction, as the Superpowers engaged in 
detente.
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The War achieved one of Sadat's main aims: to involve the USA in 
active diplomacy in the Middle East. By acting as the intermediary 
between Israel and Egypt, the US came to have a new interest in the 
region. As well as supporting Israel, it gained or created an interest 
in the disengagement agreements themselves. It therefore had an 
interest in supporting a regime in Egypt which would negotiate such 
agreements and maintain them. To the West, Sadat gave an impression of 
moderation, because he was willing to gradually disengage from the 
conflict with Israel.
The negotiation and the extensive nature of the second Egypt- 
Israel disengagement agreement led to a break with Syria. This, in 
turn, caused a worsening of relations with the Arab Oil States, which 
feared Baathist (Syrian) and other radicalism, and disliked Sadat’s 
way of dealing with Israel. An element of tension entered into the 
relationship between Egypt and the Arab oil States soon after a War 
which had done so much for Arab unity. The period of Arab unity and 
bilateral cooperation faltered after 1975.
Despite this, Egyptian economic policy aimed at attracting oil 
funds, then increasing at an enormous rate. Some of those who drafted 
the 1974 Foreign Investment Law (No.43) felt that the most important 
source of funds under the Law would be Arab, rather than Western (1).
(1) Interview with Dr. A.A. Hegazi.
Oil funds did come to Egypt, but many came in the form of 
expenditure by individuals in Cairo. This type of spending, 
particularly on luxury housing, entertainment and tourism, caused 
inflation: The price of land and apartments began to increase more 
sharply. This opulence was resented by many in Cairo, struggling on 
much lower incomes. Perceived inequalities contributed to the tensions 
which exploded in the riots of January, 1977. Ironically, this very 
problem made it easier for Sadat to adopt a policy much more along the 
lines of 'Egypt first* than previously.
Victory in the 1973 War, defined largely in terms of the 
successful crossing of the Suez Canal, increased Sadat's domestic 
prestige considerably. He was able to become much more explicit about 
the economic policies which he favoured and pushed for more radical 
and faster reform. Victory also gave him the security to make the 
disengagement agreements, despite opposition in the Arab World. The 
reopening of the Suez Canal on 3 June 1975, not a condition of the 
Disengagement Agreement with Israel. It was typical of the type of 
independence found in the political sphere which could be transferred 
into concrete economic change.
President Sadat had, until 1973, lived under the shadow of 
Nasser's memory. The War made him victorious in Egypt and a figure of 
importance abroad. He gained stature and the power of initiative at 
home for the first time.
The period from 1973 can be seen as marking a major increase in 
presidential power, with importance consequences for economic policy. 
The War was Egypt's first military success since the 1952 revolution.
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Nasser ruled over a coalition of interests and pressures, which 
he never fully dominated (1). His own failings led to a lack of 
strategy. The 1967 defeat forced him into directions possibly against 
his own preferences. Egypt's leadership, as suggested in the first 
chaper, was in a state of internal disarray in Nasser's later years. 
When Sadat took over, the disagreements about political and economic 
policy continued. Even after ousting the leftist group under Ali 
Sabry, Sadat could not openly declare his domestic aims. The War made 
it possible for him to be more explicit. He no longer needed the 
support of those who favoured a pro-Soviet course, or even those who 
wanted to restrict the liberalisation of the economy. His first choice 
of Prime Minister after the War, Abdel Aziz Hegazi, did, however, 
represent continuity. The economy remained in a dangerous condition; 
the War had not been costless and the problems which preceded it did 
not disappear. Cautious technocrats were needed in order to introduce 
the Open Door. Those who had served from 1968-74 would be useful 
because they could not easily be accused of betraying the nation's 
socialist legacy.
Hegazi's government was sacked in April 1975 after only seven 
months in power. This was the political end for those who had served 
under Nasser.
(1) R. Springbord, 1Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: 
Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure System for Reclaimed Lands' 
Middle East Studies, January 1979 and P.J. Vatikiotis 1 Nasser 
and his Generation1, Croom Helm 1978.
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Dr. Sidqi's removal from the Premiership in 1972 represented a move in 
this trend, but could only be done in the name of preparation for war; 
something of greater importance than domestic political issues. Hegazi 
was removed in order to change the pace of economic events and the 
emphasis of economic policy (l). The policy was very much the 
President’s despite its origins under Nasser; the speed of 
implementation was even more a question for Presidential initiative.
1974 brought the introduction of the Foreign Investment Law 
no. 43^  which offered foreign investors tax holidays and exemptions from 
many of the restrictions applied to domestic firms. The General 
Authority for Arab Investment and Free. Zones became the General 
Authority for Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones.
In 1977 the Law was amended so that its benefits would be 
available to Egyptians. By this time there was a growing disillusion 
with the possibility of large scale Arab investment. As a result the 
word 'Arab' was dropped from the Investment Authority’s name.
1977 also saw riots as subsidies were cut and a number of basic 
commodities rose in price. The threat posed to social stability by the 
lack of these goods and services became an Acute policy problem. In 
the years after 1977 it was observed that neither the public sector 
nor domestic, foreign (joint venture) activity was solving the 
problem. Coupled with the need to improve the marketing of foodstuffs, 
a new approach was evolved. In 1980 this had coalesced into the 
Movement for Popular Development.
(1) 'Here I would like to say a few words about the recent Cabinet 
reshuffle. It did not occur because Dr. Hegazi had done wrong in 
any respect (but) because I saw that the pace of the Open Door 
Policy was not as quick as it should be1 President Sadat, Speech 
20.4.75 (Speeches January - June 1975 P232).
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Non-Governmental and Semi-Governmental Approaches
Within the framework of the National Democratic Party (NDP) a new 
initiative was taken in order to increase the production and improve 
the distribution of basic goods and services. This was the Movement 
for Popular Development founded in 1980. Its aim was to encourage 
Egyptian private sector activity in food production, land 
reclamation, housing and agriculture products marketing. Its head was 
Osman Ahmed Osman, Chairman of the President, former Minister and Head 
of the engineers syndicate. As Deputy Premier for Popular Development 
he aimed to increase private investment in the 'New Lands' which had 
been reclaimed from the desert and in good storage projects. The 
Organisation was to be staffed by as small a bureaucracy as possible 
with experts being hired as consultants from the private sector and 
abroad. Osman stated that the Party had to take the lead in investment 
encouragement (1).
There are two aspects of this development which are relevant to 
the analysis of economic policymaking. The first is that the Movement 
for Popular Development represented, in somewhat vague terms, an 
attempt to extend the 'Open Door' inside the economy. There was 
considerable disappointment over the level and type of foreign 
investment under Law 43. There has also been concern about the overall 
pattern of investment, both of the public and private sectors in 
meeting food and other basic needs.
(1) The Egyptian Gazette, 8 March 1981.
The public sector was seen as incapable of dealing with the 
problems because it was overloaded with bureaucracy; reasons given for 
the whole movement towards liberalisation in the 1970s. The private 
sector was felt to lack experience, finance, contacts and the 
infrastructure to deal with the problems but was thought to have the 
power of initiative (1).
The second aspect was the administrative one. Originally the 
popular develoment movement existed outside the government. Then with 
Osman's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister it moved inside the 
government; at least formally. Early in 1981, with his resignation 
from the Deputy Premiership it appeared to lose some of its government 
status. This points to organisational or administrative vagueness. 
Lines of authority were often unclear and were frequently changed. The 
fact that the Organisation and the Movement which it was started to 
direct were outside the government was not necessarily a problem as 
the aim was decentralisation. The changes in the organisation resulted 
in uncertainty; something which constrained activity.
At the time of writing it is not clear whether the Movement for 
Popular Development is anything more than a framework or a slogan. It 
was a reaction against perceived failures in the Open Door Policy and 
it was significant that it was only started after the opening to 
foreign capital. If it is as revolutionary a concept as its supporters 
declared, then it may have been what Egypt needed much earlier in the 
1970s.
(1) Based on an interview with Mr.N. Dief, Consultant to the Popular 
Development Organisation and former Treasury Minister.
Chapter 4: Planning and Investment. Introduction
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This Chapter will examine the principal methods used for 
developing and controlling the economy. In the 1970s these consisted 
of plans for the public sector, plan frameworks for the private 
sector and a move towards greater use of market forces. The latter 
was concentrated on the foreign sector which is analysed in a 
separate chapter. Some liberalisation moves affected the domestic 
economy and these will be examined in Chapter 5, along with the 
effects of planning on public sector performance.
The relationship between planning in the 1960s and 1970s is of 
particular interest because it helps to show how economic thinking, 
institutions and even performance changed.
In the 1970s annual and five year plans were issued. These gave 
targets for overall and sectoral growth. All private sector firms, 
in consultation with the government were issued with annual targets 
for production and investment which were supposed to fit into the 
overall framework. Specific targets were issued and highlighted as 
urgent objectives by the government; housing was a noi>-able example 
in the 1978-82 plan.
The nature of the plans was a function of their origin. They 
came from the Ministry of Planning after consultation with other 
government department, but the Ministry lacked the power to 
coordinate and enforce them. If politically powerful groups 
overspent or went beyond the plan, then the Ministry of Planning 
could not bring them back into line. This affected the methodology 
of the planning process. Material balances were used to try to 
ensure consistency of targets in the planning process but the final
as
version of the plan was usually a compromise of political, economic 
and institutional pressures. The plan was seldom as consistent as 
the planners would have liked.
Targets issued in the 1970s were not exhortatory except in a mild 
sense. Although they were often not met, they were not completely 
unrealistic and did not require the kind of Herculean efforts that the 
Soviet plans did in the 1930s. An exhortatory planning system would 
have required a major effort by the leadership to focus attention and 
efforts on economic objectives. Given the disillusion with planning in 
the 1960s described in Chapter 3 and the moves towards a more liberal 
economy, the President and the government were not willing to play 
that role.
Another major problem with the system was the lack of a 
mechanism, either formal or informal, to enforce the plans at the 
level of the firm. This would have been necessary even if the 
political leadership had been involved in the manner described above. 
As it was not so, the need to motivate managers and other key 
personnel was even greater. Key personnel did not receive productuon 
bonuses and so their renumeration was not directly related to meeting 
plan targets. The complicated problems which they faced in trying to 
generate profit in the public sector are examined in Chapter 5. Given 
these, direct incentives to overcome difficulties were needed. In fact 
bonuses were laid down by the state according to status in the firm. 
Profit sharing benefited all employees in profitable firms but 
profits, as Chapter 3 shows, were something of a residual over which 
managers had little control. Wages were set by the government, 
sometimes with Presidential intervention and were unrelated to 
productivity changes.
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The remuneration system therefore provided incentives to maintain 
the status quo. Managers and employees were guaranteed payments, even 
if they were low and largely unrelated to their own efforts. In the 
highly bureaucractic system no one was given a strong incentive to 
push for new solutions or to use their own initiative in more than a 
narrow way.
Further problems are highlighted by a comparison with the Soviet 
planning system as it existed up to 1960. According to Nove, the 
Soviet system had two key features (1). The first was the use of 
material balances which ensured that the inputs of one industry or 
firm were balanced by outputs from another. Planning was done in 
physical units and covered the whole economy. At least in theory, 
every output and input was accounted for even if continuous changes in 
targets had to be announced. The system was therefore theoretically 
consistent; it did not rely on inputs which were not produced and did 
not involve outputs which were not sold. While many mistakes were made 
and imbalances were generated between supply and demand, the economy 
grew at an overall growth rate which generally satisfied the planners 
and their political masters.
The second feature was the simultaneous planning of inputs, 
outputs, investment and finance. The latter was totally domestic, 
except for a small number of trade credits to cover imports of 
technology. The USSR was therefore self sufficient almost entirely and 
its foreign trade was planned.
Lange has specified some additional factors which are needed for 
planned development in a country such as Egypt (2). These include
(1) A. Nove 'The Soviet Economy1 P79-97, George Allen & Unwin, 1961.
(2) 0. Lange 'Economic Development, Planning and International
Cooperation1 Central Bank of Egypt, 1961.
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investment in agriculture in order to feed growing urban population, 
balance between inputs and outputs and monetary balance. By this he 
meant that there should be enough goods and services available to meet 
demand generated by incomes earned. If a balance of payments deficit 
occurs, then capital imports need to be planned.
Egypt, in contrast, did not plan the whole economy. The foreign 
sector was subject to controls but was not fully planned. Yet the 
plans themselves relied on imported goods and services to a large 
extent and the low level of domestic savings meant that they relied on 
external finance as well.
Given the much greater reliance on the foreign sector in Egypt 
than in the USSR for example, the lack of planning in that field was a
serious weakness. Related to this was the lack of financial planning.
The extent of deficit financing which resulted, its nature and 
consequences are analysed in Chapter 6.
Egypt faced a series of choices in the 1970s. She could try to
liberalise the whole economy or maintain the division between the 
public and private sector. Given the latter choice, she could maintain 
close control over the public sector or liberalise it while retaining 
state ownership and some controls. In the face of constraints which 
are examined below, reforms were limited. The plans under which the 
public sector was supposed to operate were partial, concentrated on 
investment and failed to provide inputs in all cases. Yet the system 
was rigid enough to prevent the emergence of any informal mechanism 
which could balance supply and demand, except for the black market 
which did not solve the problem more than partially (1).
(1) See Chapter 5.
89
The Planning Machinery
Many ministries, authorities, agencies and departments were 
involved in the planning process, as can be seen in Table 1. The 
Ministry of Planning was formally in charge of coordinating plans 
and investment throughout the economy. The plans, which mainly 
consisted of lists of investment projects, were generated by the 
various ministries controlling different sectors. The Ministry of 
Industry, through its General Organisation for Industrialisation, 
controlled, under the 1978-82 plan, 32% of public sector investment. 
The Housing and Reconstruction Ministry was responsible for 14.6% 
(mainly the cement industry), Military production for 6.2% and Supply 
for 2.4%. The latter controlled what were referred to as 'strategic* 
goods such as bread and cheap cloth. The rest was controlled by a 
range of other ministries and bodies.
The Ministry of Planning obtained lists of project proposals and 
adjusted them by persuasion, negotiations and exclusion to fit an 
investment budget determined from a macro-economic model (1). The plan 
then went to the Cabinet and the President for approval. Individual 
projects were not subject to a full social and economic evaluation, 
they simply passed through the bureaucracy in ways shown below (2). 
Investment was not therefore determined by an overall plan, it was 
simply amalgamated into five year programmes. If a particular project 
did not get into the five year plan then it might get into the annual 
plan and budget.
(l) A.D. Little Inc. 'An Assessment of Egypt's Industrial Sector*, 
P35-37, January 1978.
(2) A.D. Little Inc. op cit P42.
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Thia was quite different from the Soviet system because of the 
lack of a mechanism for ensuring consistency. The Ministry of Planning 
in Egypt lacked the power or ability to balance inputs and outputs of 
different sectors or firms. There was no system for continuously 
recalculating the plan and its targets so as to improve the match 
of inputs and outputs at the micro-economic level. Rolling targets and 
plans meant a political or bureaucratic rewriting of overall 
objectives rather than a technical or economic re-examination. The 
plans and targets of the second half of the decade stressed immediate 
needs for food and basic commodities by re-allocating investment 
rather than by changing the mechanism which balance supply and 
demand.
Table 1: Major Bodies Involved in Planning, 1975-80 (1)
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Main Lines of Authority 
Indirect Lines of Authority.
DPM for Finance 
& Economy
[G0FI
Cabinet
President
Min. of 
Economy
Min. of 
Finance
Min. of 
Planning
Min. of 
Supply
Min. of 
Industry
Prime Minister
Min.of 
Mil. Prod.
Parliament
General
Assemblies
Higher Sector 
Councils
Firms in 
Public 
Sector
Organisation 
for Helwan
Firms in 
Public 
Sector
Firms in 
Public 
Sector
DPM for Industry
National Councils
Institute for 
National Planning
Foreign Investment 
Authority
Firms in Private 
Sector under 
Law 43.
Note: 1. In 1980 the National Investment Bank took over the Finance 
Ministry’s investment budget functions.
Source: Developed from 'A Strategy Study of the Egyptian
Matallurqical Industry1 Phase I Report, Atkins Planning Ltd 
in A.D. Little Inc. ’An Assessment of Egypt's Industrial 
Sector' January 1978 Appendix B, Pl-3. and A. Ayubi 
'Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt1 P230-237.
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Procedures?
The Flow of Decisions in the Public Sector
From the viewpoint of the firm a number of decisions were very 
important. These related to new projects, the annual capital budget 
and the annual operations budget. Each involved a separate procedure 
The systems which are analysed below applied in the period after the 
1975 decision to loosen restrictions on the firm.
The most important body controlling industry was the General
Organisation for Industry (GOFI). This was part of the Ministry of 
Industry. GOFI's board was chaired by the Minister for Industry and 
its Deputy Chairman acted as day to day head. On the board were 
Secretaries of State at the Ministry of Industry responsible for 
different sectors, under-secretaries from the Ministry of Planning, 
Finance, Economics and Industry plus the head of the Central Agency 
for Public Mobilisation and Statistics. In theory therefore, other 
Ministries were involved in decision making with GOFI, a body 
belonging to the Ministry of Industry.
Planning a new project involved a complex procedure which is 
described below
Planning a Public Sector Project of Under £E50Q,0QQ
1. Project Department of firm submits project to the:
2. Company Board of Directors which submits the project to:
3. GOFI Technical Department which reviews projects along with 
those proposed by GOFI.
4. GOFI Study Committee (representatives of GOFI technical, legal 
and financial departments) plus company projects department 
examine projects. (+ sector secretariat in Ministry of Industry)
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5. Feasible projects identified and Ministry of Planning informed.
6. Submission of projects for inclusion in 5 year plan.
7. Ministries of Planning and Finance establish funds in 
consultation with other Ministries. (Since 1980 this task has 
been carried out by the National Investment Bank).
8. Finance Committed for projects in the 5 year plan.
This procedure involved consultation with GOFI, two of its 
departments, the Ministries of Finance and Planning and their 
representatives. The Ministry of Industry was involved throughout via 
its sectoral secretariats both formally and informally. Once this 
procedure had been complete and the new planning period had started 
the process of implementation could begin.
Implementation of a New Project
1. Approved projects referred to Committee for preparation of 
tenders.
2. Tenders called for and evaluated.
3. GOFI Technical Committee recommends tender.
4. GOFI Decision Committee (Deputy Chairman of GOFI, Sector 
Secretary, Company Chairmen, GOFI General Managers, Financial and 
Legal Department representatives, Ministry of Finance and 
National Legal Council representatives, plus GOFI experts) 
reviews technical committee findings and confirms them.
5. Decision Committee recommendation submitted to the Board of 
GOFI.
6. Approved tenders acted upon by GOFI or by the company.
This six stage procedure involved consultations with four GOFI 
bodies including representatives of other Ministries and government 
bodies. Numerous personnel were involved more than once in the 
planning/implementation procedure.
The annual capital budget provided funds to cover replacement 
investment (depreciation). The procedures for its approval were also 
complex and bureaucratic. Firstly the firm prepared its capital budget 
for the approval of its general assemt/y. Then the budget was presented 
to GOFI. The Higher Sector Council was also informed. GOFI and the 
Ministries of Planning plus Finance considered the budget along with 
that of other firms. The decision of these bodies gave rise to the 
National Annual Budget. The firm was then given a capital allocation 
and the Higher Sector Council was notified. At least six bodies were 
therefore involved.
The annual operations budget went through an equally complex 
procedure. The firm prepared an operations budget which was submitted 
to its General Assembly. It was then discussed by the Higher Sector 
Council. Finally it went to the Ministry of Industry where the 
Undersecretaries of Production and Finance discussed it with the 
Ministries of Planning and Finance. Approval then went back to the 
firm via the Higher Sector Council.
The Planning system in the 1970s was highly centralised.
Decisions were made by ministers on all matters of substance. The firm 
had a role in supplying information and making requests. The decision 
then went down to it after bargaining between the tiers of the 
administrative hierarchy and between the different sectors of the 
economy and interest groups.
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The complexity of the procedures is an indication of how limited 
the degree of managerial initiative was in the late 1970s. These 
controls applied to investments of over £E500,000. Smaller projects 
could be carried out solely at the firm's initiative if it had surplus 
funds. Such resources were not easy to accumulate in view of the tight 
budgetary control which firms were subjected to. Only 10°o of profits 
could be retained as reserves for disposal by the company.
Depreciation was on a historical rather than replacement cost basis, 
which squeezed companies during the period because inflation had 
accelerated. There were some additional funds not subject to external 
control but these were not usually very significant. Finally the debt 
position of many firms was worsened by the fact that the state banks 
applied market criteria to them when lending without making allowance 
for the social role of the public sector in supplying commodities at 
below market prices. By relying on short term credit, firms increased 
their debt to such an extent that only the Treasury, by direct action, 
could prevent them becoming insolvent (1).
Consistent and feasible targets were hard to draw up because of 
instability in the Ministerial tier of government and because of the 
bureaucractic nature of the administration. These factors were in 
addition to the impact of the price system. The overall plan frame­
work was less important politically than the sectoral priorities which 
it indicated; reflecting the influences of more powerful Ministers or 
the President. This was because short term objectives dominated over 
longer term ones. Targets were drawn up at a macro-economic level
(1) B. Hansen and 5. Radwan 'Employment Opportunities and Equity 
in Egypt' P213-4.
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(i.e. in the government), but at the level of the firm plans often had 
to be subordinated to instructions from above about the need to hold 
down prices. The targets were seldom totally unrealistic; in the 1970s 
attempts were made to make them realistic. They were therefore not 
designed to force major changes in attitudes, behaviour and 
institutions. Nor did mechanisms exist to permit this. Managers and 
other key personnel were not directly rewarded for meeting or 
exceeding plan targets. Bonuses were awarded after the event to whole 
categories of employees on the basis of profits attained or according 
to their status in the firm. Wages were increased by government 
but were not related to productivity changes.
It is significant that throughout the 1970s, despite the move 
towards a less interventionist economic policy, plans were 
continuously announced. It was felt that in this way the Government 
would maintain its developmental role in the economy even if its 
influence was to be reduced.
The Plans
The first and only comprehensive plan to be implemented was the 
1960/1 to 1964/5 Five Year Plan issued in 1960. It was abandoned 
before its completion and the second five year plan (1965/6 - 1969/70) 
was prepared but never implemented. After that planning became a short 
term matter; the preparation of a ten year plan, in two five year 
sections from 1973 was a formality. The first half of the plan 1973/82 
was discussed by the Cabinet and by Parliament in 1972 and 1973 but 
not adopted. The failure to adopt the plans testified to the 
government's inability to generate a consistent and feasible set of 
targets during a period in which foreign currency was scarce.
96
A fresh start was made in 1974 when an interim plan for the 
period July 1974 to December 1975 was adopted. This was formed by five 
year plans for 1976-80, 1978-82 and 1980-84. The 1978-82 plan was the 
first 'rolling’ one, designed to take account of current achievements 
and changing priorities: each year the plan would be extended by a 
year so that greater continuity and reality in setting targets would 
be possible (1).
This was the formal structure in which the economy was supposed 
to operate. In fact the 1978-82 plan had not been submitted to 
Parliament by January 1978 and the Minister who drafted it was not in 
the Cabinet by the latter date (2). The interim plan for 1974-5, which 
was one of the most effective in terms of targets attained, typified 
the approach of the plans, even though its aims were more modest than 
the five year ones. It included among its priorities the 
reconstruction of the Suez Canal area, which has been a major success 
in recent years. Completion of projects already started, increasing 
capacity utilisation in industry and investment in 'strategic' 
projects to meet basic needs were also priorities. This plan was 
important because it was the first to be issued after the formal 
introduction of the Open Door Policy in 1974. It therefore projected a 
major increase in private investment, including foreign investment and 
stressed the importance of productive sectors rather than social 
services.
(1) Arthur D. Little Inc. 'An Assessment of Egypt's Industrial 
Sector1
(2) A.D. Little Inc. 'An Assessment of Egypt's Industrial Sector', 
1978, Footnote, P.83.
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The 1978-82 plan included the following priorities
1. Accelerating the economic growth rate.
2. Changing the pattern of investments to strengthen development
efforts.
*
3. 'Correcting1 the balance of payments.
4. Providing rational decision making at national and enterprise
levels.
These were vague and interconnected objectives, but few of the 
variables were under the control of the planners. They could only 
issue pious words and specify vague means for reaching their 
objectives. The two main ones in the 1978-82 plan included £E3 billion 
investment target and an increase in industrial production of 63% 
between 1977 and 1982.
By 1979 the emphasis had changed with a growing realisation of 
the need for expenditures in order to maintain social stability. The 
1980-84 plan issued in 1979 therefore stressed the need, inter alia, 
to meet the housing requirements of a growing population. The planners 
explicitly recognised the problem of having a high income class 
consuming conspicuously amidst a large lower middle class with low or 
even falling real incomes (1).
The plan called for a review of subsidies to ensure that those in 
need received the benefits, a review of pricing policy and improved 
coordination of investments. Within a year pricing policy became even 
more centralised. The Minister of Planning who was calling for the
(l) Ministry of Planning 'Egypt's Development Strategy, Economic 
Management and Growth Objectives 1980-84' Introduction.
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review of pricing policy - towards a more liberal system - was 
charged, as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs 
in 1980, with implementing tighter controls. This was an indication of 
the powerlessness and lack of influence of even the most senior of 
planners.
The 1980-84 plan also called,for projects with a concentration on 
Egypt's resource base and a 64% increase in GNP over the five years of 
the plan. It aimed to achieve a gross fixed investment rate equal to 
24.5% of GNP of which only 4.5% would be financed from abroad. This 
compares with 13.7% of investment actually covered by external 
resources in 1978 (1).
The 1980-84 plan also recognised the inter-relationship between a 
number of policy variables. It called for a reform of subsidies so as 
to increase efficiency. This would mitigate the immediate effect on 
prices of the removal of subsidies (2). Increased domestic savings 
were called for and could be achieved by higher public sector's 
profits plus a 'rationalisation' (presumably this meant a reduction) 
of government current expenditure (3). The plan was prepared in 1979, 
one year before subsidies were increased and the public sectors 
limited autonomy further restricted.
(1) Speech by the Minister of Planning in 1979 draft entitled 
'Egypt's Development Strategy, Economic Management and Growth 
Objectives' P26-39.
(2) A.R.A. Meguid, Minister of Planning Egypt's Development Strategy, 
Economic Management and Growth Objectives 1980-84' P21
(3) A.R.A. Meguid, op cit, P24.
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Results:
The Pattern of investment
The pattern of investment shows little change in the 1970s 
compared to the 1960s. Agriculture's share fell to even lower levels 
in the early 1970s than in the 1960s and picked up towards the end of 
the decade as problems associated with the supply of food increased, 
(see Tables 2-4).
The share of industry, mining and petroleum exceeded its share in 
GDP by around 8-10%.
Table 2: Selected shares in total investment during Five Year Plans
issued in the 1970s (?o of total investment)
1976-80 1978-82 1980-84
1. Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Drainage 9.3 8.6 12.0
2. Other items relating to 
Food Security (1) 6.0
3. Industry and Mining 26.3 23.7 12.5 (2)
4. Petroleum 6.3 5.5 3.0
3. Housing & Public Utilities 20.7 11.8 16.3
6. Social Services 10.0 9.7 8.0
7. 1.-6. as % total 
investment.
72.6 59.3 57.8
Sources: 1976-80 Atkins Planning Ltd *A Strategy Study of the 
Egyptian Metallurgical Industry' 1977 Appendix 1.
1978-82 Central Bank of Eqypt Economic Review Vol. XVIII, 
No. 3 & 4, 1977, P144-6
1980-84 A.R.A. Meguid, 'Egypt's Development and Strategy 
Economic Management and Objectives 1980-841 P34-36.
Notes: 1. Includes investment in the fertiliser sector. Food
security was defined as a sector in 1980.
2. Total industrial investment equalled 20% of total 
investment. Reclassification of investment discussed 
in text.
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Table 3: Gross Fixed Investment by Sector (%), Years 1960/1 to 1979.
1960/1 1970/1 1971/2 1974 1977 1978 1979
Agriculture 
Irrigation &
7.4 6.1 7.5 5.1)
)
7.7 8.2 8.1
Drainage 9.6 5.9 5.8 3.4)
Industry,Petroleum 30.1 38.4 31.6 36.6 41.1 34.8 37.0 i
Electricity 2.5 5.8 6.9 4.7 5.7 6.8 6.6
Construction N. A 1.5 1.0 1.7 2.5 1.7 2.2
Transport 33.1 21.8 26.5 29.9 24.5 17.5 25.5 i
Trade & Finance N.A 3.0 0.8 0.8 1.7 1.9 1.1
Housing 8.5 8.1 10.6 8.0 9.8 6.7 4.5
Public Utilities 3.4 4.7 3.4 4.5 3.5 3.9 9.9
Other Services 8.7 5.9 6.9 6.8 5.4 8.3 9.6
Less Expenditure -3.3 -1.2 -1.1 -0.8 -1.9 -1.9 0.5
on Land Purchases
Source: 1960/1-1978: K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a period
of Transition' P404-405, 1979.
1979: 'Recent Development in The Egyptian Economy1,
Ministry of Economy, Cairo, January 1981. Economic 
Studies Unit
N.B. Figures do not add up to 100% in original.
a) Includes mining.
b) Includes communication
c) Includes exploration outlays by foreign and domestic oil 
companies.
d) Includes storage and Suez Canal.
Plans issued during the 1970s were responses to the economic 
situation. They presented an opportunity to change course if necessary 
or to reinforce existing patterns.
Between 1967 and 1975 industry's share of total investment 
increased. This was a result of the fall in percentage of total
investment going to Electricity and Agriculture after the completion
10L
of the Aswan High Dam and of increased expenditure on petroleum 
exploration. The latter, together with inflation, pushed up to current 
value of industrial, petroleum and mining investment between 1970/71 
and 1978 by 500?^  (1).
Table 4: Gross Fixed Investment in 1975 prices , 1974-■79 (£EM)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Commodity Sector 395 588 690 707 846 914
Agriculture 60 95 85 114 113 137
Industry & Mining 212 287 326 364 434 408
Petroleum (l) 78 122 157 131 114 220
Electricity 33 33 52 68 112 112
Construction 12 31 70 30 73 37
Distribution Sector 213 399 332 297 406 460
Transport &
Communication(2) 206 383 315 282 389 432
Trade & Finance 7 16 17 15 17 18
Service Sector 142 296 232 235 281 323
Housing 57 177 108 93 91 77
Public Utilities 34 46 39 45 58 83
Other Services 51 73 85 97 132 163
Total, all sectors 750 1283 1254 1239 1533 1697
Source: Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit 'Recent Develop­
ments in the Egyptian Economy* January 1981 P17.
1. Includes exploration outlays by foreign and domestic oil 
companies.
2. Includes storage and Suez Canal investments.
(l) K. Ikram op cit P261 & P404-5
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A comparison of the plans drawn up in 1975, 1977 and 1979 reveals 
two kinds of changes (Table 2 above). The first was a presentational 
one: investment categores were regrouped under a new heading: Food 
Security. Included in this group were items previously under the 
industry title. The reclassification reflected the authorities' desire 
to be seen to be addressing current problems more directly. The second 
type of change was more than presentational: investment priorities 
were altered. The share of agriculture, irrigation and drainage after 
falling in the first two plans was increased, but only to 12% of the 
total. The 1980-84 plan significantly suggested that investment would 
form a slightly lower share of GNP than in 1975, another reflection of 
the urgent need to meet basic consumption needs.
Table 4 gives data on investment in real terms. During the period 
1974 to 1979 total fixed investment rose by 129%. If that in the 
petroleum sector is excluded then the growth was nearly as impressive 
at 120%. A significant part of this was due to stock accumulation in 
1975.
The Rationality of the Targets
According to the Ministry of Economy the incremental capital 
output ratio (ICOR) for agriculture measured over the period 1974 to 
1978 was 3.96; high by internal standards (l). Total investment in 
agriculture in that period was £E467m. The increase in output was 
E£118m. The Ministry of Economy excluded depreciation from their 
calculation of the ICOR (£E467m - £E118m).
(1) Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit 'Recent Developments 
in the Egyptian Economy1 January 1981.
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Within agriculture, the investment trend, at least until 1975, 
was to concentrate funds on new lands rather than existing ones (the 
so called 'New Valley' and other areas versus the traditional Nile 
Valley).
Table 5: The Allocation of Public Sector Investment in Agriculture
1960-75 (%) £Em *
'Horizontal Investment' 'Vertical Investment' 
(New Lands) (Old Lands)
1960-65 82.0% £154.5 18.0% £33.8
1966-70 84.5% £176.2 15.5% £32.4
1970-75 68.5% £127.1 31.5% £58.7
£458.8 £124.9
Source: I.H. El Issawy 'Interconnections between income distribution 
and economic growth in the context of Egypt's Economic 
Development* Draft, December, 1979.
* Private Sector Investment 1960-75 amounted to only £E39.5m.
A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 above shows that investment in 
agriculture in 1977 was even larger than the plan target set by the 
1976-80 plan. This was also true in 1978 compared with the 1978-82 
targets.
Investment in the old lands increased as a share of total 
agricultural investment from 15.5% to 31.5% in 1970-75. This meant 
that it only received 4.2% of total investment in all sectors in 
1971/2 and 2.7% in 1974. The ICOR for investment in the old lands was
io 4-
13, excluding depreciation, assuming, very optimistically, that 20% of 
output in the period 1970-75 came from the new lands. This suggests a 
fundamental and large scale misallocation of resources, even if the 
ICOR calculation is very rough. In fact, according to the National 
Bank of Egypt, land reclamation (horizontal expansion) failed to add 
any land to the agricultural area between 1972 and 1978 (1).
The ICOR for industry was even higher 5.56. If 10% is deducted 
for depreciation then it was 5.00. For the economy as a whole it was 
3.24, a result of relatively high productivity in distribution and 
part of the service sector.
Short term ICORs show why high investment was needed. After an 
improvement in 1977-78 there was a further deterioration as the step­
like increase in industrial production, which resulted from the 
increase availability of foreign exchange to buy raw materials and 
spare parts, ended.
Table 6: Short Term Incremental Capital Output Ratios, 1975-1980
Increase in real GDP Increase in real Investment ICOR
Measured over Measured over
1975-76 1974-75 5.35
1976-77 1975-76 6.10
1977-78 1976-77 4.35
1978-79 1977-78 5.10
1979-80 1978-79 5.59
Sources: GDP: 1975-79 International Financial Statistics 1981 Hand-
Book IMF.
1980: Estimated 8.5% increase , US Embassy, Cairo
January 1981
Investment: Table 4 above.
(1) National Bank of Egypt Economic Bulletin Vol.xxxi No.4 1978 
P349.
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Industry required large scale investment in part because of the 
tend&ncy to concentrate on new projects often on a large scale and in 
heavy industry. The failure to allocate funds to existing projects, on 
a sufficient scale, meant that output growth was limited, at least in 
the short term, because of the gestation period of new investments. 
According to Ikram, 40% of investment in the manufacturing sector 
between 1968 and 1979/80 (when his study was published) went on the 
Helwan Steel Complex (1).
This had an administrative impact. Plans to expand the Iron and 
Steel Works at Helwan were considered too big for Hadisolb - (the Iron 
and 5teel company) itself. They were also though to be too detailed 
for GOFI to cope with and so a new body, the General Organisation for 
the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex, was set up. It survived the 
expansion programme and became a fixture in the bureaucracy, thus 
providing jobs and another vested interest fighting for resources.
A cumulative process operated here. Large and inefficient 
plants required a lot of investment to maintain them. Investment funds 
had to include foreign currency (which was scarce in the first half of 
the decade) so that spare parts could be purchased. Given the symbolic 
importance of plants such as the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex, 
resources were made available on a scale which market forces would not 
have indicated. Investment was seen in political terms; as something 
to support ’important projects’. It was allocated according to 
political criteria. If the Helwan Complex did not get a large 
percentage of the investment funds available then it might not be able 
to function. This would have led to unemployment, something which the 
government feared. Once a precedent had been set then budgets tended
(1) K.K. Ikram op cit P252 Footnote 2.
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to increase year by year. A cut in the budget of such a prestigious 
project would have been politically suspect and so the easiest course 
was to expand the investment budget whenever possible. This reinforced 
the status quo and added to financial pressures in future years.
Firms like the Helwan Complex were not always profitable and so 
could not always pay for the funds which they received. They were not 
charged a market interest rate nor could they themselves charge market 
prices for their products. A web of subsidies therefore evolved 
which made accounting almost impossible. They were an integral part of 
the way in which the public sector ran and some of their consequences 
are examined in the following chapters.
Targets Versus Achievements under the Plans
The targets for GDP growth became more ambitious as planners 
realised the extent of gains from oil and other 'semi-exogenous' 
factors. The economy's performance in most years was worse than the 
more optimistic plan targets. 1975 and 1978 were exceptional years in 
terms of actual growth but reflected weak growth in the years 1974 and 
1977. (See Table 8).
Given the extent of 'semi-exogenous' factors it is important to 
see how far the planners anticipated the sources of growth in terms of 
leading sectors. Unfortunately, data on sectoral growth rates in real 
terms is not available for the whole decade and so only a partial 
evaluation is possible. By concentrating on the later years of the 
decade it is possible to evaluate the plans after the planners had 
had some experience of the more liberalised economy.
Table 7 below provides data for this kind of analysis.
Table 7: Sources of Growth in GDP: Targets and Achievements
Sector
1978-79
Planned
(»)
Actual
Agriculture 3.5 0.3
Industry & 9.7 10.5
Mining 22.5 10.3
Petroleum 22.5 10.3
Electricity 13.3 3.9
Construction 9.8 3.2
Consumption 8.3
Savings 26.6 -12.0
Gross investment 4.4 2.0
Sources: Planned growth: 1978-82 plan
Actual growth: Ministry of Economy op cit P10.
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Agricultural targets were modest but even they were not met. 
Industry did slightly better than planned but the petroleum sector did 
much worse. The latter was particularly hard to forecast due to the 
influence of international prices on volumes produced in Egypt. All 
the other sectors listed did worse than planned.
The share of investment in the agricultural lands of the Old 
Valley increased during the 1970s although the volume of investment 
grew only slowly. It is significant that the bias towards the New 
Lands continued despite the experience of the 1960s, when such 
investment yielded little.
Consumption (of the public and private sectors) grew more slowly 
than planned but savings were 38% lower than the planners had
calculated. Partly as a result of this, investment growth was half the
level planned.
All of these figures are approximate, given the weakness of the 
data and the fact that the deflation of current price data on
consumption, savings and investment was done with GDP data index, the
only one available. The results do indicate the general problems with 
the plans in the late 1970s: They over-estimated savings especially 
from domestic sources. The reasons why savings were lower than planned 
to such a large extent will be analysed in Chapter 6.
Conclusions
A number of conclusions can be drawn about the planning system. 
Firstly, it suffered from institutional weaknesses. These 
included the fact that decisions were made outside formal procedures.
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Bargaining between ministries, as to which projects would be selected, 
was often highly political. There was a lack of interaction between 
the government departments at the technical level. The setting of 
priorities and coordination in the economy was affected by enterprises 
obtaining funds and commitments for external finance. Particularly 
important here was the desire and ability of public sector flm\s to 
channel resources into joint ventures with the private sector thus 
partially circumventing what investment planning there was. Different 
decisions were made on the basis of varying criteria but the lack of 
consistency was worsened by instability in the government. For 
example, between 1970 and 1980 there were seven Ministers and four 
Deputy Prime Ministers for economic and financial affairs (1). The 
instability amongst Ministers and their officials accompanied 
frequent changes in organisational structure and responsibility. There 
was also high turnover in senior management of the public sector.
Planning decisions were therefore made on the basis of 
uncontroversial requests from the firm or resulted from political 
pressures. This weakness in the planning system increased as the 
economy moved towards a more liberal ideology. The Ministry of 
Planning's power and influence, weakened by the problems faced in the 
1960s, decreased even further.
The policy making process was dominated by short term, ad hoc 
decision making, within the framework of annual budgets. Insufficient 
attention was given to optimal investment criteria, something which 
had happened in the 1960s. Inflation in the late 1970s pushed the
(1) See Chapter 2
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government into adopting tough price controls and this increased the 
amount of ministerial interference in the running of public sector 
firms. Inflation was in part a consequence of the liberalisation 
programme,as shown in subsequent chapters. By doing so much to open up 
the economy, the government helped to increase domestic demand without 
boosting domestic supply. Liberalisation of the foreign sector 
resulted in an increase in controls on the domestic economy. Holding 
down public sector prices had major budgetary and financial 
consequences which will be analysed in Chapter 7.
Subsidies, needed to hold down prices, did not discourage the 
government from investing in public sector. Investment was seen as a 
straight forward way of increasing output despite the low capital 
output ratios which prevailed in many of the sectors receiving high 
investment.
These policy making weaknesses were compounded by the enormous 
pressure of day to day business on key decision makers. That pressure 
was partly responsible for their failure to analyse the long term 
consequences of ad hoc decisions.
The third area of criticism was that the plans were not 
comprehensive. They were in fact little more than a list of investment 
projects and exhortations usually aimed at the goverment itself.
Within the firm there was often a separation between the 
development plus planning functions and those of implementation and 
operations. As a result investment was frequently directed to areas of 
low demand. The firm also suffered from the bureaucratic problems 
which plagued the government.
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The absence of direct rewards for plan fulfillment at any level 
meant that few had incentives to use their own initiative. This was 
important at the level of management in the firm. Wage and salary 
rates were fixed by the government with Presidential interventions. 
Bonuses were related to grade or rank rather than achievement. At the 
level of the firm, profit sharing prevailed but profits were a 
residual squeezed between mounting costs and often fixed prices. 
Industrial managers often succeeded despite the planning system and in 
the absence of an informal system which could help them deal with 
shortages, delays and other obstructions which prevailed. This applied 
to government officials at all levels.
Serious misallocation of investment plus failures to plan and 
provide finance were serious problems. The plans did not balance 
inputs and outputs nor did they provide a mechanism for doing so.
IB
Chapter 5: Pricing Policy
1. Its relationship with Planning & Investment Policies,
Although the planning system was weak this did not mean that the 
government was uninvolved in the economy. Through its pricing policies 
it exercised detailed control over industry in the public sector and 
indirect control over agriculture. Pricing policy had direct effects 
on output, but it also had indirect effects through investment and 
planning.
The plans drawn up in the 1970s were on the basis of prices which 
existed in the economy. These were based on a mixture of market and 
administered forces with an increasingly important role being played 
by the foreign sector, mainly through the effects of import prices. 
Hence the investments suggested in the plans were in part responses to 
demand-supply relationships observed in the economy. The planners used 
sophisticated techniques to estimate what ought to be produced under 
hypothetical conditions in which scarcity prices existed. The plans 
were in fact drawn up as a result of the complex procedures, outlined 
in the previous chapter, under which planners lacked the power to 
enforce efficiency criteria on the decision makers. In order to 
understand the outcome and nature of the investment programme it is 
therefore necessary to analyse pricing policies.
During the 1970s inflation accelerated; although this was not 
fully shown up in the official price indices, which were dominated by 
subsidised commodities. As inflation threatened the real incomes of 
the politically important urban population, the government increased
mwages faster than prices and the minimal productivity gains in 
industry. Inflation was also a consequence of the liberalisation of 
the economy. This ironically, resulted in a loss of managerial 
freedom in industry; a move away from liberalisation. The consequences 
of this were more significant than any planning decisions taken in the 
latter half of the decade.
In order to understand the context in which many public sector 
companies worked, the following section analyses the general structure 
of markets and the details of those for two industrial goods and their 
evolution over the decade.
Pricing Policy: The Structure of Markets
By 1975 50% of all industrial output was subject to direct price 
control by central government. At the end of 1978 this had been 
reduced to 35%. In 1980 control was reasserted and most firms in the 
public sector lost the freedom to determine prices. Public sector 
prices rose by 1.6% p.a. on average between 1973 and 1975 compared 
with 19.7% in the private sector. Between 1976 and 1977 the figures 
were 3% and 10.1% respectively. Public sector prices were frozen, or 
even cut, in 1980 against a background of accelerating inflation and 
so the differentials widened in that year. To some extent the 
underlying inflation rate varied between sectors, but the main cause 
of the differential was government policy (1). This policy affected 
the profitability of the public sector and as a result much debate 
occurred on the need for reform.
(1) S. Ranney 'The Open Door and Industrialisation in Egypt: A 
Preliminary Investigation1, Centre for Economic Development 
University of Michigan, Discussion Paper, August 1980 P32 T.XIV.
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The debate failed to highlight the effects of government policy 
on the public sector. By frequently holding prices below their market 
levels, the government caused dual markets to develop; one at the 
official level price and the other at free (or 'black') market prices. 
This had a number of consequences for the economy. Firstly, the 
producer's incentive was limited because it could not legally obtain 
what the market would set as the price and hence its profit. This 
applied mainly to the public sector, which was subject to price 
controls most severely and effectively. To meet demand, production 
elsewhere was in effect encouraged, often on an informal or even 
illegal basis. The latter, as well as the former, was often sold 
privately. Profits resulting from private production were higher than 
those which would have resulted from a competitive market. There were 
efficiency as well as distributional consequences throughout the 
economy, leading to shifts in profit away from the public sector.
Table 1 illustrates the dual market system and the magnitudes 
involved for two commodities. The official price included the cost of 
production (with some input prices themselves being subsidised), 
excise duties and a 'price difference'. The latter was equivalent to 
an indirect tax. The cost of production was measured by the actual
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Table 1: Official and Market Prices for Cement and Reinforcinq Bars
1972 - 1978.
Cement (£E/Ton) Reinforcinq Bars (£E/Ton)
Official Price Market Price Official Price Market Price
1972 N.A. N.A 100 160-180
1973 11 18-25 100 170-200
1974 12 25-40 120 170-200
1975 14 40-55 125 180-210
1976 14 45-60 150 180-190
1977 18 32-55 150 200-220
1978 18 75-90 170 230-270
Source: N. Choucri et al 'Migration and Employment in the
Construction Sectors: Critical Factors in Egyptian 
Development' Cairo - M.I.T. Programme, October 1978 
P103 & 105.
outlay for an input rather than by calculating the marginal 
opportunities involved. A margin was allowed over costs which was 
equal to a fixed profit rate, usually of 10-15%. Profits under such a 
system were neither an indication of efficiency nor a guide to 
optimisation. Hence the calculation of one price took into account 
other prices paid, the latter possibly subsidised. These were 
therefore cumulative effects as each price calculation had built into 
it the non-economic considerations which determined the prices of 
inputs used.
Table 1 also shows that the 1973 market price for cement 
(defined as the middle of the range £E18-25 per ton) was 95.5% above 
the official price. By 1978 the difference was 358%. In the case of 
reinforcing bars the divergence was 85% in 1973 and 47% in 1978. The 
official
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price of cement rose by 63.6% between 1973 and 1978 compared to an 
increase in the market price (again measured by the mid-point of the 
range) of 284%. For reinforcing bars the comparable figures were 70% 
and 35%. Official prices were allowed to rise by similar proportions 
for both commodities although the market price for cement rose far 
more than that for reinforcing bars.
Free market prices were not only a reaction to what could be 
obtained when public sector producers charged less than the market 
clearing price. They were also related to the quantities available on 
the market as a whole and this changed over time. Imports in the 
first half of the decade were tightly constrained by foreign exchange 
shortages but as that constraint eased in both cases, they increased 
as a share of total supply (l). Low official prices may have also had 
the effect of encouraging smuggling out of the country and other 
misappropriations of outputs at official prices.
There was, in addition, a lack of coordination by the 
authorities about pricing. Industrial prices were controlled by the 
Ministry of Industry but different boards, at varying levels of 
authority in the bureaucracy, controlled or influenced difference 
prices. Luxury goods attracted markups and cost increases were passed 
on to the consumer more readily than those related to essential items.
The latter were mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Supply. It bought imported and locally produced basic commodities. 
Fixed quantities were sold at rationed prices to ration card holders 
(all individuals were entitled to ration cards regardless of their
(1) N. Choucri, R. Eckhaus and A. Mohie Eldin ’Migration and
Employment in the Construction Sector; Critical Factors in 
Egyptian Development' P102, dune, 1974.
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income). Additional, varying quantities of these commodities were also 
supplied on the so-called free market. These were available on a first 
come first served basis at fixed prices which were well above the 
rationed ones. These prices were also subsidised although in some 
years, for some commodities, the subsidy was negative (i.e. a tax).
A similar pattern applied to a range of commodities. There were 
some price rises in 1978 and 1979 as the government tried to 
liberalise the domestic economy and reduce the budget deficit but in 
1980 President Sadat intervened to reduce living costs and reversed 
the trend (see Appendix 2).
Private gains from reselling rationed or price controlled 
commodities was not confined to important industrial items like 
Cement. Rental incomes, as defined by Krueger (1), were obtained in 
many ways. Meat bought at £E0.70 a kilo from government shops was 
sold to private butchers for £E2,00 a kilo. Apartments were sublet at 
huge profits throughout Cairo (2). These and many other abuses 
discredited a system of subsidies designed for welfare purposes. The 
abusers made abolition or modification of the system extremely 
difficult. If the price of all meat, for example, was determined by 
the market then those who resold it could not make profits in the 
manner described above. This would have hit the urban working class 
who, although poor, were by no means the poorest in Egypt but were 
politically important.
(1) A,0. Krueger 'The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society
American Economic Review, dune, 1974.
(2) 'The Economist1 10 January, 1979.
These kinds of activities created an atmosphere of cynicism 
which had economic and political consequences. The allocation of basic 
commodities could not be determined entirely by market forces because 
many Egyptians were too poor to pay the international prices which 
would have resulted for some commodities. On the other hand, the 
socialist inheritence of subsidies was discredited by corruption. An 
ideological void was created in which people fought for their own 
immediate best interest without the invisible hand maximising that of 
the nation as a whole.
Cotton
One of the most important sets of prices in the economy was that 
of cotton. Trade in cotton was controlled by the state and until 1977 
it was Egypt's largest earner of foreign currency.
The export price for cotton was determined on international 
markets and it increased by 125% between 1970 and 1974 (Table 2)
That paid by domestic spinning mills to the government was held 
constant during the period. The price paid to the farmer rose by 29%. 
Demand increased from the mills as a result of the low price and this 
restricted the amount of raw cotton available for direct export. 
Production costs rose by 87% between 1972/3 and 1978 (Table 4) while 
prices rose by 76%. Yields increased so that revenue per feddan 
planted increased. This was particularly true in 1978, an 
exceptionally good year from a climatic point of view. Profitability 
was squeezed in the years 1972/3 to 1978 by the government, which 
controlled the prices on inputs and outputs. Domestic users of cotton 
were heavily subsidised in comparison to international price levels.
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The government made a loss on the internal side of the trade by 
selling for less than it paid, but made gains on the international 
side where higher, international prices prevailed.
Agricultural imports such as pesticides and seeds were 
subsidised, drainage and irrigation were provided without charge by 
the state but farmers were obliged, by law, to plant quotas of cotton. 
As the price which they received was fixed by the government at much 
less than the export price, many found it worthwhile to produce crops 
which were not subject to controls. Although fines were imposed on 
farmers not meeting their quotas, it was often more economic to pay 
the fine. The next effect was to lower the acreage available for 
cotton production with consequent export revenue losses (1). In 1970- 
74 cotton took an average of 1,551,000 feddans. In 1975-78 it took
1,302,000, a fall of 16% (2).
The fall in exports was considerable: from 6.01 million metric 
kantars in 1972-3 to 2.49 millions in 1977-8. In 1979-80 the figure 
was about 2.7 million as a result of a good harvest and a 21% increase 
in the farm gate price (3).
A major factor behind the slow growth of cotton output was the 
low price paid to the farmer both in relation to the costs of
production, the cost of living (to the extent that he was not self
sufficient and therefore relied on purchases for his livelihood) and 
the price which could be obtained for other products.
(1) The Financial Times (F.T) Supplement on Egypt 30 July 1979.
(2) K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a period of Transition' 
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, U.S.A. 1980, P414.
(3) F.T. op cit.
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The increase in the farm gate price for cotton in 1979 was 
significant because it was the largest one granted. In 1974 and 
1976 rises of over 20% had been granted but those in the rest of the 
decade were below 10%.
The price rise increased incentives to produce cotton at the 
expense of other crops or crop combinations. An examination of the net 
gains from the increased cotton price from 1979 provides an indication 
of the implicit losses which occurred before that year, as a result of 
the previously prevailing price.
The increase in cotton production carried out by farmers in 
response to the price rise will have affected the economy. The nature 
of this effect depended on long and short run area and yield 
elasticities for cotton; in other words, the degree of their 
responsiveness to price rises. The change in the cotton price cannot 
be considered alone; it needs to be placed alongside changes (if any) 
in the prices of alternative crops.
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The Ministry of Economy has calculated the probable long and 
short run effects of the cotton price assuming no other changes in 
economic variables (1). Their main conclusions were that in 1979 (the 
short term effect) the area under cotton would increase by 7.4?£ and 
production would increase by 15.9?o. The net revenue resulting from 
this would contribute £E72.4 m to National income and £E64.1 to 
exports (2). In relation to total national increase and exports in 
1979 these figures are not large but in so far as they are net gains, 
they indicate the potential which existed in agriculture. Increasing 
the price of cotton had budgetary effect; the government would have to 
pay farmers more. It would recoup the extra cost by charging more for 
imports and this would not necessarily reduce the relative incentive 
to product cotton if all subsidised agricultural import prices were 
increased. In 1978 the government earned £E122.8 m from cotton (by 
selling it abroad at higher prices than it paid at home). The increase 
in the price paid to farmers would have cost £E70.8m. This would 
therefore represent a transfer within the economy from the state to 
agriculture (3). An alternative way in which the government could have 
the increased cost of cotton it bought, would have been to increase 
the price it charged to the mills.
(1) Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit (E.S.U) * Policy 
Study on Pricing and Taxation of Ma.jor Alternative Agricultural 
Crops*, Cairo, August 1979.
(2) Calculated from figures in Appendix 2 of E.S.U. op cit.
(3) E.S.U. op cit P27-29.
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The idea that the cotton price should be increased is based on 
the belief that insufficient incentives existed before 1979. Cotton 
was a state monopoly and its production was forced (by law) on many 
producers who could get a higher net revenue from producing other 
crops. From the point of view of agricultural strategy, it has to be 
asked whether quotas for cotton production should have existed here at 
all. Taking summer and winter crops together, the average net revenue 
in 1978 of producing cotton and berseem in rotation at the 1978 price, 
was £E112.1G1 per feddan. At the 1979 price this was estimated at 
£E166.671. These figures compare with £E260.553 for berseem and rice, 
£E255.363 for berseem and maize. The increase in the cotton price in 
1979 therefore only made cotton a less unattractive a crop, reducing 
the disincentives to produce it (1).
By holding the price it charged the mills for raw cotton below 
the international price, the government was effectively protecting 
domestic producers from foreign competition. By valuing inputs and 
outputs at international prices it is possible to calculate whether 
this was efficient, in the sense of maximising output and exports.
In order to calculate the net contribution of a product to 
exports, two concepts are useful. The first is the amount of foreign 
exchange earned per £E1 of domestic resources used (FXR). This is 
calculated as a ratio of net potential foreign exchange earnings at 
international prices to domestic resource costs valued at their 
opportunity cost.
(1) E.S.U. op cit table.
mFXR = Value of Exportable output - Value of traded inputs
Value of factors of production + Value of non-tradeable 
inputs.
Domestic resource costs include depreciation, fuel costs, wages, 
the rental of land, interest paid inside Egypt and an imputed return 
on capital. These are calculated at domestic prices.
The second concept related to exports shows the amount of 
foreign exchange earned from £E1 of an exported product (FXO). This is 
the ratio of the difference between the value of exported output and 
the value of traded inputs to the value of exported output, all inputs 
and outputs being valued at international prices. Outputs are valued 
at F.O.B. prices, inputs imported or replacing imports domestically 
are valued at the C.I.F. import price of the import or its substitute. 
Those inputs which have been exported have been valued at the F.O.B. 
export price:
FXO = Value of Exportable output - Value of tradeable inputs 
Value of exportable output.
Related concepts can be used to evaluate gains to the economy. 
The first measures the amount of national income, at international 
prices earned in producing £E1 worth of an export product (VAO). This 
can be done by looking at the ratio of value added earned by the 
export and the value of exportable output. Value added is equal to the 
values of output of the exported product minus the value of all 
inputs, traded and non-traded. This can be summarised as follows:
VAO = Value of Exportable output - Value of tradeable and 
non-tradeable outputs 
Value of exportable output
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Finally the value added at international prices earned by £E1 
worth of domestic labour and capital (the latter in domestic prices) 
can be assessed (VAF). This can be expressed as follows:-
VAF = Value of Exportable output - Value of tradeable and
Non-tradeable inputs 
Domestic Factor Cost
These coefficients have been calculated for cotton year and 
fabrics produced at the Misr Spinning & Weaving Plant at Kafr-el- 
Dawar.
Table 3: Economic Returns from two Exported Cotton Products
Yarn Fabrics
1 2  3 4
Foreign exchange/£El
domestic resources used (FXR) -0.100 1.772 -1.071 1.395
Foreign exchange/£El of
exported output (FXO) -0.33 0.363 -0.339 0.442
National income/£El labour
& capital used (VAF) -0.544 2.084 -1.918 1.557
National Income/£El
exported output (VAO) -0.129 0.304 -0.431 0.350
Source: Data supplied by Ministries of Industry and Economy, Cairo 
Calculations from Ministry of Economy.
Notes: Outputs valued at FOB export prices, imports at CIF price
Exchange rate $ = £E0.70 used for all calculations.
1. Yarn calculations based on yarn mix actually produced in 1977
2. Yarn calculations based on assumption that fine yarns are
produced only.
3. Fabric - Actual outputs and inputs 1977
4. Fabric - Assumes use of coarse yarn only
The data in Table 3 column 1 shows what actually happened in 
1977. All the figures for yarn and fabric production show that the 
economy lost from the production of these products. The plant in 
question (Kafr-el-Dawar) may have been particularly inefficient but 
the negative returns indicate the extent to which that was permitted. 
The worst example is the loss of £E1.918 worth of national income for 
each £E1 worth of labour and capital used in fabric production at the 
plant. This compares with a potential gain of £E1.557.
The mills could make a nominal profit on their production 
because they bought their cotton (and other) inputs so cheaply; the 
price being fixed and subsidised by the government.
Column 2 & 4 show what would have happened to the four 
indicators if adjustment had been made to the pattern of inputs and 
output .^ Calls for such changes had been made at influential levels 
years before these results were produced, but to no avail (1).
The figures in Table 3 give an approximate summary of the 
losses to the economy from production in one plant and include the 
effects of government subsidy to the mills (charging them less than 
the farmer is paid). Raising prices charged to the mills would have 
reduced the subsidy bill and might have discouraged loss making 
production. Without other changes the plant might have had to close 
and unemployment would have resulted.
(1) e.g. Dr. A.M. Kaissouni, in a lecture at the National Bank of 
Egypt, reprinted by the National Bank of Egypt, distributed 
with their Bulletin, March, 1974.
n a
Table 4; Costs of Cotton Production (£E1 / Feddan) 1972-78
1972-3 1973-4 1974-5 1976 1977
Rent 25.27 26.10 26.11 32.00 31.92
Wages 24.39 30.20 40.78 50.15 58.73
Draftpower 2.64 3.35 3.37 5.90 5.22
Machinery 4.96 5.53 6.52 7.72 10.08
Seeds* 1.27 1.29 1.32 1.43 1.47
Organic
Fertiliser* 3.75 4.37 5.83 6.39 7.36
Chemical
Fertiliser* 8.37 8.10 3.46 9.22 9.12
Pesticides* 4.70 6.07 9.40 7.31 7.38
Other Costs 1.15 1.19 2.05 2.68 2.40
Total Costs 76.50 86.20 98.84 122.80 133.68 143.04(1)
Sources: 1972/3 - 1974/5 K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a 
Period of Transition1 op cit P428.
1976-78 Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit 'Policy 
Study on Pricing and Taxation of major Agricultural Crops' 
Cairo, August, 1979, Table la.
Notes: ^Subsidised Items
(1) Estimated, 1% increase over 1977, no detailed breakdown 
given in source.
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In so far as cotton was a leading export sector so its output 
prices were determined by international market forces to a greater 
extent than other sectors which exported less. It therefore suffered 
less than other industries from price controls while at the same time 
benefiting from price controls on its inputs. It was also able to make 
use of subsidised credit. Interest rates were not determined by the 
market and the public sector had preferential access to credit 
available. The macro-economic and monetary implications of this are 
examined in Chapter 6. In so far as the cotton sector was profitable, 
at the prices which prevailed, it needed less of the subsidised 
credit than other sectors.
Pricing Policy and Public Sector Performance
The trend towards less control between 1975 and 1980 reflected 
deep dissatisfaction with the functioning of the public sector (1). It 
was pictured as highly inefficient, badly managed, wasteful and even 
corrupt. Extreme advocates of liberalisation wanted to sell parts of 
the public sector to private interest. The President’s position was 
somewhere in the middle; he pushed for change and issued declarations 
about job security for public sector workers. By not specifying, in 
detail, his ideas for reform, he created a vacuum in which mistrust 
and uncertainty flourished.
(1) According to the 1979 Plan, the public sector produced 57?o of 
GDP.
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The politics of this issue were significant because of the way in 
which the leadership, press and public perceived them. This influenced 
policy as much as the actual performance of the sector. In this 
connection, Boulding's view that perceptions are more relevant than 
any notion of the ’objective situation' in decision and policy making, 
is apposite (1).
Typical of the criticisms of the public sector was that made by 
the Parliamentary Budget and Plan Committee in 1973. It stated that 
the total fixed investment in the public sector in 1973 was £E4.245 
billion. On this it made a profit of 2.4% or about £E102 million (2). 
Their criticism went much further than that of earlier Prime Ministers 
under Sadat who had called for reforms during Sadat's Presidency (3).
The complexity involved in evaluating the performance of the 
public sector derives from a pricing system which failed to reflect 
scarcities. It was used to deal with short run inflationary problems 
by such means as wage rises unlinked to productivity increases or 
subsidy rises to cover increased international prices of basic goods. 
When interest rates were increased in order to rationalise the use of 
capital and encourage savings some producers got special subsidies.
Pricing policy affected the valuation of output throughout the 
economy. The most dramatic example of this was with regard to energy 
prices.
(1) K. Boulding 'National Images and International Systems' The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution iii, 2 June, 1959, P120-1,
(2) J. Waterbury 'Egypt: Budens for the Past/Dptions for the Future' 
Indiana University Press, 1978, P291.
(3) Eqyptian Gazette 30.12.1971 and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
25.1.1972, ME/3897/A/5.
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According to the Ministry of Economy's Economic Studies Unit, 
domestic sales of refined petroleum products created added value of 
£E270m in 1979. If those products had been sold domestically at world 
prices or exported, then value added would have been £E1.528 billion. 
The implicit subsidy was therefore nearly £E1.3 billion. Selling at 
the higher price would, amongst other things, have boosted GDP by a 
similar amount (1).
The rate of return calculated on the basis of existing prices is 
therefore often misleading. By using prices which reflected scarcities 
it is possible to calculate the social rate of return, indicating 
real gains or losses as a result of a firm's activities. Such 
calculations have been done and they show that in some areas the 
public sector's real performance was better than indicated by their 
financial rates of return. The latter is calculated using prices which 
actually prevailed in the economy. Of the twenty firms in Table 6, 16 
had higher social than financial rates of return. The negative 
profitability of reinforced iron production reflects low selling 
prices on the official market as noted. The inappropriateness of the 
original investment in the iron and steel industry is suggested by the 
even bigger losses which would have occurred if international prices 
had prevailed.
Profits were not the only social or economic contribution made by 
public sector companies. These firms paid taxes and dividends to the 
government, made contributions to social funds for workers benefits 
and partly financed their own investments. As has been said, they also 
paid wages to many more workers than they actually needed.
(1) Ministry of Economy 1 ri-e.
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Table 3: Financial and Social Rates of Return of Public Sector
Industries, 1977
Financial Rate of Social Rate of
Return - (F.R.R) as Return - (S.R.R.) as 
% of Capital (a) % of Capital (b)
Reinforcing Iron -18.9 -28.6
Tobacco -1.3 80.0
Aluminium 1.8 ---- 2.8
Nitrogen Fertiliser 5.6 27.0
Food Flavouring 8.8 89.6
Food Canning 9.2 25.0
Knitwear (Cotton) 10.1 11.4
Vegetable Oil 10.2 272.5
Cement 11.0 40.5
Soft Drinks 21.6 57.8
Carpets 25.5 20.2
Starch 27.6 67.7
Underwear (Cotton) 28.1 32.7
Confectionery 29.2 39.2
Spinning (Cotton) 36.2 10.0
Biscuits 42.9 35.6
Source: H. Handusa 'The Impact of Economic Liberalisation on the
Performance on Egypt's Public Sector1 2nd B.A.P.E.G. 
Conference, Public Enterprise in Mixed Less Developed 
Countries Sponsored by Boston University & Hsfvard Institute 
for International Development 2-5 April 1980 T.4.
a. FRR = Cash surplus - capital employed (fixed assets + inventories
or stocks)
b. SRR = Social profit - capital employed where latter is fixed
assets + inventories. Social profits = value of output 
minus value of traded and non-traded inputs minus value 
of domestic factors other than cost of capital employed.
All quantities valued at shadow prices. Shadow exchange 
rate = £E0.70 when official rate was $1 - £E0.65
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The budgetary system also makes Identification of public sector 
company profits a complex matter. The public sector was divided into 
two for administrative purposes. The first group consisted of public 
authorities mainly responsible for services. The second group was that 
of firms operating, until 1975, under public organisations. This group 
was the public industrial sector. Both groups remitted 65% of their 
profits, net of tax and depreciation, to the Treasury and put funds 
aside for investment (so called investment-refinancing). In so far as 
depreciation was calculated on a historic rather than a replacement 
cost basis, so profits were boosted in an inflationary economy. This 
increased the flow of resources to the Treasury under the 65% rule but 
reduced the net amount available to firms for investment.
Untransferred profits, dividends and investment refinancing 
should be added to transferred profits in order to calculate the 
surplus of the public industrial sector.
Table 6: Gross Surplus of the Public Sector 1970/1 to 1978 (£Em)
1970/1 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
1.Transferred
profits (1) 101 81 137 188 154 244 348 539
2.Untransferred 
profits(l) 54 44 74 101 83 131 207 290
3.Investment
Financing 87 100 127 150 210 331 268 473
4.Total 1-3 242 225 338 439 447 706 823 1302
Source: 1970/1-1978 K. Ikram Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of
Transition' P408 Table 11.
(1) Notes: Untransferred profits equalled 65% of total profits
(Ikram) op cit P57-8). Transferred profits calculated as the 
remaining 35%.
As information on dividends and taxes paid by firms was not 
available for the whole period, a separate calculation for 1978 is 
made in Table 9 betovj
mTable 7: Public Economic Sector: Transferred profit by type of
activity, 1970/71 to 1979 (£Em7
1970/1 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
l.Suez Canal 0 0 0 0 14 46 57 107 148
2.Petroleum 
Authority 4 2 4 3 18 84 177 192 631
3.Other (1) 97 79 133 185 122 114 149 240 223
of which:
a) Public 
Firms
Sector
_ - - - 51 95 166 185
b) Services 
(2)
63 54 74 37
4.Total of 
1+2+3
101 81 137 188 154 244 384 539 1002
Source: Ministry of Finance
Notes: 1. Before 1976 no breakdown between services and firms
available.
2. Includes the Central Bank, agriculture, irrigation, 
housing, constructions, supply and international trade.
Line 3a of Table T above can be broken down by source in order to 
isolate the profits of the public industrial sector, at least for the 
years 1976 to 1979. From the table above total profits of public 
sector firms for the period 1976 to 1979 can be calculated using the 
65?o rule.
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Table 8: Total Profits of Public Sector Companies, 1976 to 1979
1976 1977 1978 1979
Profits 78 146 255 285
Increase over
previous year % 90 75 12
Source: Table 7, Line 3a above.
The increase in profits from 1976 to 1979 was largely the result 
of increased profitability in the petroleum sector, which benefit-red 
firms as well as the Petroleum Authority.
Returning to the broader concept of the public sector (i.e. 
including service authorities) the following calculation estimates the 
net contribution of the sector's surplus in 1978.
Table 9: Estimate of the net Public Sector surplus in 1978 (£Em)
Profits (1) 829
of which transferred (539)
untransferred (290)
Taxes (2) 552
Dividends (3) 355
Investment refinancing 473
Total 2209
Total less subsidies 2081
Source: (1) Table 7 Line 4 above
(2 & 3) Public Enterprise Information Centre
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Figures for industry were much worse than those for the 
public sector as a whole. It received £E120m of the £E128m subsidies 
allocated in order to cover higher interest payments as interest rates 
rose.
The final figure in Table 6 above is a financial, one based on
prices which existed at the time rather than scarcity ones. Profits of 
ms
£E3>38, m^compare with those of £E102m reported by the
Parliamentary Budget and Plan Committee cited above. It is not clear 
whether the Committee was referred to transferred or total profits.
The profits figure is not however a true guide, the notion of a 
surplus is a more accurate reflection of the public sector's 
contribution. Even that ignores the burdens of excess employment and 
other restrictions which affected publicly owned firms.
Conclusions
Subsidies in the 1960s were used to increase the purchasing power 
of the poor in the towns. In the 1970s the system was used to control 
inflation. As the international price of imported basic foods 
increased so was the cost of welfare. Allocative efficiency was 
reduced and inflation was built into the economic system. The Open 
Door Policy compounded the inflationary problem by increasing the role 
of imports. It also increased the funds which could be used for 
misappropriating resources in limited supply.
Pricing policy became the single most important means of 
government control over the public sector. With the exception of oil, 
that sector's relative position worsened as increased controls at the 
end of the decade intensified its managerial problems.
13 >
Chapter 6: Financial Policy
Introduction
Financial policy had two objectives in the 1970s. The first was 
to support the development of the economy by providing resources for 
investment. In so far as planning consisted mainly of investment 
targets, so financial policy was related to planning mainly via 
investment. The second purpose of financial policy was to cover a 
range of current expenditures, in effect supporting consumption. This 
was the result of a series of political and social policy commitments 
and finance for these did not fit in closely with any notion of 
planning.
Investment rose as a share of GDP in the 1970s. Much of this was 
the result of government action but resources to cover the cost of 
programmes were often missing. Investment was part of the planning 
framework but savings were not. The government had great difficulty 
raising tax revenues, had limited revenues from public sector profits 
and was therefore forced to raise funds by borrowing, both at home and 
abroad.
The cost of social commitments to hold down foods prices and 
those of other basic commodities, increased as the economy became more 
exposed to international prices. This was a result of government 
policies. Living costs rose and in order to maintain real purchasing 
power, the government was forced to increase public sector wages.
These went up usually without productivity increases, the latter could 
not be obtained without changes in the firm which would have entailed, 
inter alia, more decentralisation than the government wanted. As a 
result costs rose, feeding an inflationary spiral.
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Social commitments increased in cost as the population grew and 
food production stagnated. The latter was one of the consequences of 
the lack of investment in agriculture discussed in Chapter 4.
The effects of large scale borrowing were along the lines of 
financial repression as analysed by Mckinnon (1). Borrowing abroad to 
finance large balance of payments deficits also had significant 
effects, not least because the availability of foreign funds after 
1975 reduced pressures for domestic reform. In this sense the role of 
foreign assistance was significantly different from that described by 
Chenery and Strout (2). They suggest that it can increase the supply 
of funds for investment, supply imports and provide missing skills 
plus organisational capacities. As well as looking at the nature of 
financial repression in Egypt, this Chapter will examine the impact of 
foreign capital in terms of Chenery and Strout's analysis.
Despite the general policy of reducing the state's economic role, 
public expenditure (on wages, salaries, interest payments, capital 
items including capital transfers) as a share of GDP rose from 34.8% 
in 1970 to 54.1% in 1975 and 58% in 1978 (3). The importance of 
decisions made by the government did not therefore decline in the 
1970s despite the change in economic ideology.
In order to illustrate these effects this Chapter will examine 
the main elements of government expenditure besides investment; 
subsidies and wages within the context of total expenditure. It will 
then analyse taxation as a source of revenue before dealing with the 
effects of government borrowing.
(1) R. Mckinnon 'Money and Capital in Economic Development1,
Brookings Institution, 1973.
(2) H. Chenery & A. Strout 'Foreign Assistance & Economic 
Development1 American Economic Review, September 1966.
(3) K. Ikram op cit P407-9.
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Policy Options and those chosen in Egypt
The government in a developing country can act in different ways 
to stimulate development through its spending and fiscal policies. It 
can run the public sector at a loss in order to subsidise consumers 
and/or the private sector. The state can try to raise a high level of 
taxation in order to maximise revenues but its ability to do this 
depends on its administrative strength plus the willingness and 
ability of consumers to pay taxes. Tax revenues will be needed to 
cover the public sector loss unless the government wants to run an 
overall deficit.
A deficit can be financed from foreign and/or domestic sources. 
Reliance on the latter can result in a kind of implicit taxation 
through inflation caused by printing money. The former will have 
consequences for the balance of payments through loan repayments. An 
underdeveloped financial system at home makes foreign borrowing more 
attractive because the latter has less impact on domestic prices and 
finances imports.
In practice, all these measures were used in Egypt. The public 
sector, with the exception of oil and the Suez Canal, contributed 
little to the Treasury in terms of growing revenues. Taxation was 
linked to expenditure rather than income and so tended to be related 
to imports rather than domestic growth in nominal terms. Finally, the 
budget deficit and debt repayments played in increasingly influential 
role in the economy.
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Financing Investment
Mabro and O'Brien noted that investments in the first year plan 
were very reliant on imports (1). This remained true in the 1970s.
As well as the goods and-services used in the investments made, 
finance was needed and imported on a large scale to fund projects.
The strategy of the Open Door Policy was to attract foreign 
finance and investment in order to accelerate the rate of economic 
growth. The fact that this actually occurred was a sign of success, 
but the failure to increase domestic saving, by more than the rate 
experienced, posed serious questions of long term viability over 
government policy. In 1970/1 domestic savings covered about 63% of 
gross fixed investment, in 1979 it only covered 47%, The growth of 
investment was only possible because of foreign funds, according to 
the data presented below in Table 1.
Table 1; The Funding of Investment in % of GDP, 1970/1 to 1979
1970/1 1971/2 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
1. Gross
Fixed 13.0 12.8 13.1 17.4 27.3 24.1 23.3 27.9 30.4
Investment
2.Domestic
Savings 8.2 7.9 8.0 5.4 7.3 11.5 14.3 14.2 14.4
3.Foreign
Financed 4.8 4.9 5.1 12.0 20.0 12.6 11.0 13.7 16.0
Investment  ______________________________________________________
Source: 1970/1 K. Ikram op cit P397
1979 Ministry of Economy op cit P10.
(1) R. Mabro & P. O'Brien Structural Changes in the Egyptian
Economy 1937-65' in M. Cook ed. Studies in the Economic History 
of the Middle East* Oxford, 1970, P423.
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1976 some of the funds obtained from abroad were not used, 
particularly when allocated for projects. The Middle East Economic 
Digest reported that only 23?6 of funds allocated for projects by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development between the US fiscal years 
1975 to 1977 had been used. On the other hand 97% of funds allocated 
for food aid were spent during the same period (l).
Although output growth benefitted after 1975 from the greater 
availability of foreign exchange, there is evidence that imports of 
capital goods exceeded the demand for them. A World Bank study, quoted 
by the Ministry of Economy, stated that a bottleneck in the 
construction industry meant that output was too low to use all the 
capital goods imported for it (2). Increased availability of foreign 
exchange resulted in imports of a speculative nature, anticipating a 
boom in the construction sector (see section below on financial 
repression). Low demand, compared with supply was a result of the lack 
of domestic savings which limited the availability of domestic 
resources. This is a similar effect to that which limited the use of 
American project aid (3).
The plans were much more detailed about investment than about 
savings or finance. The former was seen as the route to economic 
development, the latter as a constraint to be removed with external 
assistance. Foreign aid brought problems because its sectoral 
allocation did not always reflect plan priorities (4). The 1980-84
(1) M.E.E.D. May 1978 P41.
(2) ’Recent Developments in the Eqyptian Economy' Ministry of Economy 
ESU January 198f, P.22.
(3) Report of the US Controller General ’Egypt's Capacity to absorb 
and use Economic Assistance Effectively1 1977.
(4) 'Egypt's Development Strategy and Growth Objectives 1980-84'
A.R.A. Meguid, P15.
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plan, issued in 1979, called for a more careful 'husbanding' of 
resources. It did not specify how this was to be done (l). It admitted 
that investment would rely on external finance to a large extent even 
for covering domestic expenditure.
The failure to meet investment priorities despite increased 
foreign aid is one of the most significant patterns in Egypt's 
development in the 1970s. The Open Door Policy helped to encourage an 
inflow of resources on a scale never previously experienced.
Investment targets were continuously adjusted but this process was not 
coordinated with the pattern of external finance. As well as 
restrictions imposed by donors, the bureaucracy in Egypt made the flow 
of funds to priority areas problematic. Vested interests fought for 
new projects and expansion of existing ones reducing funds for working 
capital, repairs and other more mundane tasks.
One way around these problems was to encourage private sector 
activity, this was done to some extend under Law 43 of 1974. As this 
sector was outside the direct planning framework it is examined 
briefly in Chapter 7.
(1) 'Egypt's Development Strategy and Growth Objectives, 1980-84', 
P.40, Ministry of Planning, 1979.
Table 2: Central Government Expenditure by Type, 1975-79
(Year to 31 December)
£Em 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
1. Current Expenditure 2416.6 2661.8 3208.8 3488.3 4516.6
(a) of which Wages 
& salaries 523.7 640.3 791.6 904.1 993.0
(b) of which other 
purchases of G&S 507.9 564.9 593.3 630.0 762.0
(c) Interest Payments 82.5 99.3 168.5 216.8 462.1
(d) Subsidies & other 
current transfers 1302.5 1357.3 1655.4 1656.6 2299.3
2. Capital Expenditure 495.9 1111.6 701.9 662.8 1073.8
(a) of which fixed 
asset purchases 199.0 756.6 353.2 470.2 653.0
(b) Capital Transfers 276.5 271.0 214.7 170.6 396.9
3. Total Lending minus 
Repayments 314.7 311.8 650.8 914.5 1060.3
4. Grand Total 3227.2 4085.2 4561.4 5083.0 6650.8
?o Shares
Wages as % Total (la/4) 16.2 15.7 17.3 17.7 14.9
Subsidies (ld/4) 40.4 33.2 36.3 32.6 34.6
Current (1/4) 74.9 65.2 70.3 68.6 67.9
Capital (2 15.4 27.2 15.4 13.0 16.1
Fixed Asset Purchases (2a/^) 6.2 18.5 7.7 9.2 9.8
Sources: Government Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982. Vol VI IMF
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Subsidies
One of the most important reasons why the budget deficit grew in 
the mid 1970s was the continuing need to provide basic food and a 
range of other commodities to the mass of the population at fixed 
prices. These had, to some extent, to be imported at a time of 
increasing international prices. Fixed domestic prices encouraged the 
consumption of a growing population.
They were originally introduced on a small scale in the 1960s for 
a narrow range of essential goods and services. The specific aim of 
the policy was social; to help the poor, but the whole population 
stood to gain from such a system, at least in terms of short run 
consumption needs. In 1960 the total cost came to £E9m, a small and 
manageable amount (1). Until 1965 Egypt received considerable food aid
from the USA and so no short term balance of payments problems
resulted.
Table 3: Net Losses of the General Authority for Supply Commodities 
1973-1978, £Em.
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
89.0 330.1 408.7 250.2 330.6* 423.1*
Source: K. Ikram op cit P336
Note: *Part of the losses in 1977 and 1978 were due to the move from
the higher official to the lower parallel exchange rate.
In addition to these direct subsidies, there were others for 
industry , agriculture (see Chapter 4) and private consumers, 
are included in Table 4.
(1) K. Ikram P327.
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Subsidies had a macro-economic impact in that they required 
funding. This section will attempt to indicate some of the costs 
incurred. Many subsidies were covered by the accounts of the General 
Authority for Supply Commodities, which made losses on the sale of
wheat, flour, maize, edible fats, rationed oils, sugar and other
items. It made small profits on sales of unrationed edible oils,
unrationed sugar, tea, cotton, seed and other items. The net position 
is shown in Table 3.
Table 4: Total Direct Subsidies paid by the Government 1973-1980/1
£Em.
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980* 1980/1*
“131 4l0 622 434 650 7l0 1288 1269 1556
Sources: 1974-7 K. Ikram op cit P321
1980 and 1980/1 Budgets: CBE Annual Report 3anuary-3une 1980
P32
1970*1 The Impact of the Elimination of Subsidies on
the C.O.L. of Egypt's Urban Population, K. Korayen 
Cairo Papers in Social Science, Vol.5 No.2 April 1982 
P70.
Note: *Budget proposals for 1980 and then newly defied financial
year 1980/1.
Another group of subsidies were paid to industry for specific 
reasons such as compensation for freezes on their output prices. These 
had to cover increased interest costs when interest rates were put up. 
These rose from £Elm in 1974 to £E120 in 1978 (1). Subsidies as a 
share of the total budget deficit were 1.5?o in 1970/71, 50.4% in 1974 
and 34% in 1978 (2).
(1) Public Enterprise Information Centre
(2) K. Ikram op cit P406-7
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Subsidies helped to create demand for some commodities in the 
economy but the pricing policy of which they were a part did not 
encourage the growth of supply in the economy to meet demand. As a 
result inflation, shortages and imports increased.
The problem of inflation has been closely related to the growth 
of subsidies. Demand was stimulated as a result of subsidies, for 
example, automobiles, a luxury in a country with Egypt's per capita 
GNP, have been subsidised. The domestically produced car itself, 
petrol and parking have all been subsidised. Income inequality permits 
demand for such goods. As a result, the demand for, and use of, cars 
has produced massive congestion in Cairo which, in turn, has created 
a 'need' for new investment in roads, bridge and related items, none 
of which contributes to the social welfare of the mass of the 
population in urban or rural areas. Subsidies on cars are perhaps the 
most dramatic example of the way in which the authorities have failed 
to select strategic products for assistance. Their failure in this 
instance had led to the development of a range of motorcar related 
demands. There have been beneficiaries, but they have not been in the 
group most in need of government help (l).
The implicit energy subsidy did not enter the government's 
account because it did not involve actual transfer payments. Waterbury
(2) has estimated the value of the subsidy on petrol to have been 
£E206m in 1976, £E310m in 1977 and £E867m in 1980. In 1980 the
(1) Ministry of the Economy, op cit, P109.
(2) 'The Egypt of Nasser & Sadat1 3. Waterbury, Princeton University 
Press, 1983.
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subsidies on bottled gas and high octane fuel came to an additional 
£E101m. Ikram estimated the implicit subsidy on all fuels in 1978 at 
£E427 (1) and the Ministry of Economy's (2) estimate for 1979 was 
£E1312m. These reprented a growing proportion of national income if 
the latter is measured at existing prices (i.e. domestic energy prices 
at about 20?o of their international leve^.
Table 5: Implicit Subsidy as a Share of GDP 1976-1980 (?o)
1976 4.9 (petrol only)
1977 6.3 (petrol only)
1978 T A  (all fuels)
1979 10.5 (all fuels)
1980 5.8 (Petrol, gas octane} .
Sources: Waterbury, Ikram & E.5.U. cited above and International 
Financial Statistics, IMF 1978 and 1983.
If energy prices in the economy had been equal to international 
ones then the GDP would have been higher. If these figures are added 
to declared subsidies, then their share in national income was:
Table 6: Direct & Implicit Subsidies as share of GDP (?o)
1976 10.2 (petrol only)
1977 11.7 (petrol only)
1978 1176 (all fuels)
1979 20.8 (all fuels)
1980 13.3 (petrol, gas & octane}
Sources: Tables 4 & 5.
(1) K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition1
John Hopkins University Press, 1980, P.280.
(2) 'Recent Developments in the Egyptian Economy', Ministry of
Economy Economic Studies Unit, January 1981, P.15.
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This problem has been recognised at the official level by the 
Economic Studies Units at the Ministry of Economy. They stated that 
the adjustment of relative prices contributes, in the short run, to 
inflation, but in the longer term, the correct (or market) price 
increases the economy's ability to adjust to changing demand, reduces 
bottlenecks and hence contributes to lower inflation (1)
Domestic output has not increased commensurately and an increased 
balance of payments deficit has resulted. The problem of inflation is 
not only related to aggregate expenditure on subsidies, but also to 
the structural effects of implicit subsidies. These are designed to 
hold prices at a particular level. The producer therefore has no 
incentive to increase his production to meet any excess demand and 
therefore will not necessarily take steps to increase efficiency.
Wages
The second major element of the government’s current budget was 
wage and salary costs. Frequent changes in the way in which budget 
data were calculated and presented make time series comparisons 
problematic. Table 2 shows that wages took about one fifth of the 
budget at the beginning and end of the decade. Together with other 
'current expenses' they accounted for 13.2% in 1970/1 and 61% in 
1980/1. This contraction permitted an increase in investment although 
borrowing continued to underpin the budget.
(1) Op cit P61.
Table 8 gives a breakdown of the public sector wage bill. The 
trend was for growth considerably in excess of inflation as measured 
by the consumer price index. The absolute burden increased because of 
the expansion of the bureaucracy analysed in Chapter 2. The civil 
service wage bill grew at a faster rate from the middle of the decade 
as it took the burden of supplying jobs of which the public industrial 
sector had been partly relieved. Table 7 shows that wages in 
administration grew much more slowly than in agriculture, a sector in 
which market forces operated to a much greater extent (1). In so far 
as the government had more applicants than it needed so it did not 
need to pay high wages. This was the limited extent to which market 
forces operated in the public labour market. This did not prevent 
continuous increases in wages designed to match rising prices.
Table 7: Wages in Agriculture and Government Administration
Average wage 1966 = 100.
Agriculture, men Goverment
Average daily wage Administration
1970 99.9 101.9
1971 99.9 100.6
1972 103.4 103.4
1973 111.6 110.2
1974 138.9 107.8
1973 182.2 115.0
1976 239.2 129.4
1977 298.2 147.8
1978 345.4 159.6
1979 411.7 171.8
Source: B. Hansen & S. Radwan, Employment Opportunities and Equity
in a Changing Society: Egypt in the 1980s1, P71, 
International Labour Office, 1982.
(1) B. Hansen & S. Radwan, op cit.
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Table 8: Expenditure in the State Budget on Wages 1970/1 - 198Q/1
UEmT
Central Local Service Economic
Government Government Authorities Authorities Total
1970/1 296.1 78.2 54.5 419(1)
1971/2 313.4 82.8 49.7 446.9(1)
1973 361.1 131.7 97.3 540.1(1)
1974 397.3 147.2 52.5 597.5(2)
1975 219 252 76.8 104.4 652.2
1976 252.2 297.1 90.9 128 768.2
1977 336.3 343.0 107.4 151 937.7
1078 369 402 120.0 173 1065
1979 379.9 529.5 148 200.4 1257.8
1980 606 592 147 288 1633
1980/1 783 596 148 (3)
Sources: 1970/1 & 1971/2, CBE Economic Review Vo. XX No.4, 1971
1973 - 1977, NBE Economic Review various editions.
1978 - 1980/1, CBE Economic Review & Annual Reports 
various.
Notes: (1) Includes £EQ.5m special fund
(2) Includes E£0.1m special fund
(3) Economic Authorities spending excluded from state budget 
under new presentation from 1980/1.
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Government Revenues
The share of central government revenue in GDP rose from 16.2% in 
1974 to 23.6% in 1978 (1). This was mainly due to increased taxes on 
foreign trade. These rose as a share of GDP but increased exemptions 
meant that they actually fell as a share of imports at the end of the 
decade. As imports rose in relation to GDP this went largely 
unnoticed. The devaluation of the Egyptian Pound added to the local 
cost of importing and thus to tax revenues. Imports rose in large part 
because private consumption did and so the government revenue base 
relied on an unhealthy balance of payments deficit.
Revenues from the public sector activities were limited by the 
policies followed with regard to pricing. In 1970/71 total public 
sector profits were £E101m. Of these £E4m came from the Suez Canal and 
none from petroleum. In 1979 the total was £E1002m, of which £E779m
CKo^« r S'
came from sources in the Suez Canal and petroleum (Table . Profits 
from industry rose by 130% over the period but prices as measured by 
the consumer price index increased by about 110%, The annual increase 
in profits was therefore about 2%, according to the official index 
which understated the true rise in prices.
(1) K. Ikram, ’Egypt; Economic Management in a Period of 
Transition’, P324.
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Table 9; Government Revenues 1969/70 - 1978 (£Em)
1969/70 1970/1 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Total 750 869 903 1018 1184 1524 2015 2755 3306
of which
Cent.Gov. 658 726 745 830 968 1222 1595 2373 2672
of which
(i) Tax 524
(ii) Transf. 
Profits 40
(iii)Other 
non-tax 94
564
101
61
584
81
80
616
137
78
683
188
97
948
154
120
1251
243
101
1876
384
113
2034
539
119
Investment
Self financing 36 87 100 127 150 210 331 268 473
Local Gov.
Revenues 56 56 58 60 66 92 89 114 141
Source: K. Ikram, 'Egypt11 Economic Management in a Period of
Transition ', op cit. P409.
Table 10: Sources of Tax Revenue, 1970/1 - 1976t (£Em)
1970/1 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Personal Income 28.2 25.9 32.3 33 31 48 55 52
Business Profit 115.3 120.2 128.5 143 195 277 387 538
Goods & Services 166.0 181.2 190.7 195 229 284 340 360
Foreign Trade (inc. 
Customs duties) 196.3 193.7 205.7 231 400 538 979 920
Property 19.2 23.8 16.7 21 30 19 18 23
Other 39.4 38.7 92.7 59 63 86 97 141
Source: K. Ikram op cit 1974-78, P319.
1970/1-73, P411.
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Taxation
Increased tax revenues, resulting from higher import volumes, 
indicate how unplanned the revenue gain was and how transitory its 
duration might be.
Other sources of taxation performed much less well. Taxes on 
personal incomes actually fell from 0.8% of GDP in 1974 to 0.6% in 
1978. They also fell as a share of total tax revenue from 4.8% in 
1970/71 £0 3tQ% in 1977 (1). Two points are significant here. Firstly, 
in a nominally socialist country, which Egypt was, even in 1974, the 
level of income tax levied was extremely low. The effectiveness of the 
collection mechanism was weak. Both the rates of tax and 
administrative weaknesses gave Egypt's socialism a vague and shadowy 
nature. Secondly, little was done to increase revenues in a period of 
growth. This might be expected to some-extent in a climate of partial 
laissez faire, but to have permitted the share of GDP collected in 
income tax to fall from such a low base as 0.8% in 1974, suggested 
that the government's laxity was almost deliberate.
The same argument applies to taxes on property which could have 
increased their yield with the boom in land prices and urban 
construction, particularly of housing for the wealthier. The only 
other tax revenue to increase in revenue between 1974 and 1978 was the
(1) M. Reda A. El-Edel 'The impact of Taxation on Income Distribution: 
An Exploratory attempt to estimate Tax Incidence in Egypt* in 
G. Abdel Khaled & R. Tignor eds. 'The Political Economy of Income 
Distribution in Egypt'
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business profits tax. This was a result of oil export growth and the 
reopening of the Suez Canal (1). Reliance on indirect taxation 
increased. In 1978 these brought in a total of £El,280m, compared to 
the £E52m from personal income tax and £E528m from the business 
profits tax (2).
Price differences, which formed an important source of government 
revenue, did not show up directly on all fiscal accounts. This was 
because they represented the difference between buying and selling 
prices and formed parts of the government's trading activities. In 
1976, they came to £E185.5m, 16.1% of total tax revenue (3).
A move towards greater reliance on indirect tax had its origins 
under Nasser. According to Abdel Fadil, indirect taxes and price 
differences (equivalent to a tax) on 'wage goods' increased faster 
than those on consumer durables (4). It was therefore easy for 
President Sadat's governments to follow the same trend and allow the 
increase in imports to finance government expenditures. If the 
socialist inclined Nasser adopted an inegalitarian tax and pricing 
policy, then the less socialist Sadat would not be betraying the 
nation's inheritance if he maintained or intensified those trends.
(1) K. Ikram, op cit, P318-320.
(2) K. Ikram, op cit, P319.
(3) Ministry of Finance, Financial Accounts Report for 1976 quoted 
on P42 of A. Mohie-Edin Urban Income Distribution, September 
1980, draft.
(4) M. Abdel Fadil, 'The Political Economy of Nasserism', Cambridge 
University Press, 1980.
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The 1980/81 budget contained a statement that the burden of 
indirect taxes adversely affected the welfare of the poor and 
’contradicts the philosophy of the new era'. It went on to state that 
tax laws would be reviewed with special attention given to the
situation of both rich and poor (1). That such a statement was made
is significant, given the large disparities of wealth and income 
which have developed over recent years. In terms of understanding the 
decision making process and the influences on it, it is necessary to
find out why so little was done to shift burdens from the poor to the
rich.
A simple answer is that the government, or the regime, 
represented those who had a vested interest in the status quo, or 
that they were synonymous with those groups. Another explanation is 
that the administrative machinery was too weak for effective taxation 
of income and wealth. Alternatively, low taxation of the rich may be 
seen as a means of providing incentives in the economy.
It is not necessary to go as far as Kaldor does in order to 
justify higher taxation than that which prevailed in Egypt in the 
1970s. Kaldor argued that taxation is an important way of increasing 
savings in the economy, in that it reduces consumption. This is 
needed in order to finance the infrastructure. The need to use 
taxation is reinforced by the weakness of the banking system as a 
means of mobilising resources in many developing countries (2). Even 
if these developmental reasons are ignored, there are 
socio-economic reasons for spreading the burden of taxation.
(1) Memorandum regarding the main features of the draft State General 
Budget of Fiscal Year 1980-1981, Ministry of Finance (English).
(2) N. Kaldor 'Taxation for Economic Development1 Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vo.I No.l, 1963.
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Government Borrowing and its Effects
As well as having a weak tax collection system, the government 
increasingly relied on borrowing to cover its expenditure. The under­
developed state of the banking system meant that, among other things, 
finance was not available to all sectors of the economy. According to 
Mckinnon (1), financial repression is a situation in which small 
borrowers, particularly in rural areas, do not get the same access to 
finance as favoured ones; the latter usually in urban areas. The 
former rely on local money lenders and others who charge high interest 
rates. In Egypt this situation was compounded by ceilings on interest 
rates which meant that savers were offered a negative return on local 
currency deposits. Furthermore, the government pre-empted much of the 
credit available by its own borrowings.
The overall fiscal deficit rose sharply in the 1970s (see Tables 
12 & 13). This is a reflection of the largely unplanned nature of 
government finance.
Table 13 shows that the share of the central government's deficit 
financed by the central bank (’monetary authorities') grew from 13% in 
1975 to 67% in 1979. It also shows the importance of short term loans 
and advances. As a share of domestic borrowing they were 31.6% in 1975 
and 84.7% in 1979.
(1) R. Mckinnon 'Money and Capital in Economic Development1, 
Brookings Institution, 1973.
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This huge growth of borrowing was a reflection of the 
shallowness of the financial system. As Table 13 shows, the long term 
bond market was of minimal significance. According to Kassem (1), much 
of the borrowing from deposit money banks represented government 
borrowing via state banks to finance the deficits of public sector 
companies. The willingness to fund these deficits is an example of the 
favouritism which Mckinnon identifies with financial repression. The 
alternatives were either to close bankrupt state companies or 
completely reorganise their financial, pricing and employment 
systems.
Krueger has attempted to quantify the gains made by firms 
receiving what Mckinnon called 'favouritism1. She estimated that, with 
20.3 billion Rupees of credit outstanding in India, rent of 407 
million Rupees was received because interest rates paid were 2% lower 
than those which would clear the market (2). Her calculation was based 
on an estimated market clearing rate of 8%.
It is not possible to calculate a market clearing rate for Egypt 
but it is clear that actual rates were below the market clearing 
levels. Although interest rates have risen in Egypt they have not 
fully responded to market pressures and failed to offer a real return 
on domestic currency deposits for most of the decade, (Inflation was 
higher than shown in Table 9).
(1) 0. Kassem 'Financial Repression in the Egyptian Economy' P3,
Draft.
(2) A.O. Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking 
Society1, American Economic Review, duly, 1974.
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If domestic borrowers received an implicit 2% subsidy then their
gain amounted to £E9m in 1975 and £E31m in 1979 (based on total debt
financed domestically)(1). If the subsidy was 5% then they gained 
£E23m and £E78m respectively.
In so far as borrowing was forced on firms by their inability to 
charge market prices for their products while having to pay centrally 
regulated wages and salaries, so the interest rate subsidy amounted to 
a partial compensation for losses forced on them.
From 1971 to 1978 central bank claims on the government and 
commercial banks grew at an increasing rate practically every year. 
There was a slowdown in 1979 and 1980 but net claims on the government 
as a share of total domestic credit grew from 68.4% on average between
1970 and 1974 to 69.8% between 1975 and 1980 (2). This caused a large
scale growth in the money supply.
Liquidity, defined by M2 or M3 grew much more rapidly than the 
national income in nominal terms. According to Friedman and Schwartz
(3) the growth of M2 can be partioned into three elements. The first 
is central bank liability growth, controlled by the government and 
referred to as the monetary base: B.
(1) Table 13.
(2) International Financial Statistics 1981 Yearbook, IMF.
(3) M. Friedman & A. Schwartz A Monetary History of the US 1879 - 
19601, Princeton University Press, 1963.
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Table 13: Financing the Central Government's Deficit, 1975-1979
(£Em)
By Type of Debt Holder
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Total Deficit 938.4 1556.8 1113.6 1245.6 1964.3
(i) Financed Abroad 477.2 639.7 525.7 300.7 397.0
(ii) Financed at Home 461.2 917.1 587.9 944.9 1567.3
by (a) Monetary Authorities 125.0 125.0 400.0 517.1 1321.4
(b) Deposit Money Banks 183.1 232.0 59.8 408.6 156.7
(c) Other 153.1 560.1 128.1 19.2 89.2
2. By Debt Instrument 
(Domestic FinanceJ
(i) Long term bonds 72.1 75.7 8.0 - 36.4
(ii) Long term loans 56.3 74.4 73.2 381.0 203.3
(iii) Short term loans 
& advances 145.6 177.3 437.0 521.0 1327.6
(vi) Other 187.2 589.7 68.9 42.9 -
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, Vol.IV, 1982
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The public's preference for holding cash as opposed to deposits 
and the bank's reserve ratio are the other elements. Kassem (1) has 
shown that B explained 33% of the growth of M2 in 1971. The rest was 
due to increased bank lending. In 1972-74 B explained 70 to 109% of 
the change in M2, with the reserve ratio having a negative role. In 
1975 B and the reserve ratio had about equal roles as the government 
reduced the latter. In 1976 the reserve ratio was increased and in 
1977 it was cut again. B dominated the rise in M2 in 1976 and in 1978 
with the reserve ratio playing an important role in 1977. The public's 
cash reference had a marginal role. From 1976, rising interest rates 
increased demand for savings deposits and reduced cash preference. The 
shares of M2 are given in Table 14r.
Although the role of savings accounts (or term deposits) rose by 
12.1% of M2 between 1970 and 1980 they did not play as big a part as 
Mckinnon would advocate for successful monetary development. In what 
he describes as the successful case of Korea, savings accounts 
increased from 21% of M2 in 1960 to 65,7% in 1970 (2). This suggests 
that increased monetarisation of the economy - the ratio of Ml or M2 
to GDP - is not a sufficient guide to the quality of development. The 
ratio of M2 to GNP in Egypt rose from 35% in 1970 to 54% in 1980, 
compared to 56% in the UK in 1970 and 29% in Argentina in 1970 (3). 
This suggests Egyptian progress in monetarising the economy
(1) 0. Kassem op cit
(2) R. Mckinnon, op cit, P109
(3) Figures on Egypt from Ministry of Economy op cit and those on
UK and Argentina from Mckinnon op cit.
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but the nature of that process is clearly important. Much of it was 
due to the expansion of foreign currency deposits. These played an 
increased role in M2, particularly in savings accounts. The growth 
of domestic currency savings accounts was therefore more limited than 
the figures in Table l^ t suggest. As dollar interest rates rose in the 
late 1970, so foreign currency accounts became more attractive, given 
the protection they afforded against devaluation and the unattractive 
interest rates obtainable on local currency deposits. The share of 
foreign currency in M2 was 14.4% in 1978, 17.9% in 1979 and 20% in 
dune 1980. Its share in savings accounts was 15.5% in 1978, 28.8% in 
1979 and 37.5% in dune 1980 (1).
(1) Ministry of Economy op cit, P91.
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The heavy, though declining, dominance of currency, shown in 
Table 14 is the opposite pattern from that which would be expected in 
a developed economy. Low or even negative interest rates discouraged 
savers from using deposit accounts denominated in local currency. 
Commercial banks were unwilling and/or unable to lend on a large scale 
to private sector industry and on a commercial (i.e. undirected) basis 
to the public sector, for two reasons (1). Firstly, the finance 
available was limited by unattractive interest rates and secondly, 
the government pre-empted resources. This was done by inflationary 
deficit financing which reduced real incomes. The Banks were state 
controlled and so the instructions received from government were 
mandatory. The expansion of the monetary base took the form of central 
bank lending to the government and to the commercial banks. Both of 
these sets of loans supported the debt of the government and the 
public sector.
According to the Ministry of Economy , central bank borrowing 
by the government increased much faster than Ml (2). Part of the 
government's expenditures went on imports of basic foodstuffs and 
other commodities. This meant that the borrowing used to buy foreign 
exchange did not result in an increase in the money supply. The sale 
of basic commodities by the government withdrew funds from the 
economy, although in smaller quantities than their sales without 
subsidies would.
(1) Ministry of Economy, op cit, P42.
(2) Ministry of Economy, op cit, P41.
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The expansion of liquidity took place against a background of 
price controls and shortages. As a result, liquid balances accumulated 
which encourage imports, black market activities, property plus other 
speculation and an outflow of capital (1).
Table 17 shows how foreign currency contributed to the apparent 
monetarisation of the economy between 1978 and 1980. (Data is not 
available for the period before 1978). M2, as a share of GDP, rose 
between 1970 and 1978 but it fell between 1978 and 1980 (by 5%). M2 
minus foreign exchange (held in current accounts and deposit accounts) 
also reduced the share of M2 in GDP by 7.7% in 1978, 9.8% in 1979 and 
9.7% in 1980.
Table 16: Increases in Real Balances 1978-9 and 1979-80
Dec 1978-Dec 1979 Dec 1979-Dec 1980
Current Accounts
- CPI Deflator 13.3 -0.2
- GDP Deflator 1.7
Current A/Cs Minus 
Foreign Currency 
- CPI Deflator 20.7 10.7
- GDP Deflator 8.3
Savings Accounts
- CPI Deflator 34.7 4.5
- GDP Deflator 20.9
Savings A/Cs minus 
Foreign Currency 
- CPI Deflator 16.2 9.2
- GDP Deflator 4.3
Source: Ministry of Economy.
Foreign exchange in current accounts fell by 10.8% and that in savings 
rose by 167.7% in nominal terms between 1979 and 1980 (December to 
dune)
1) Ministry of Economy, op cit P.46.
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Table 17: Ml & M2 Minus Foreign Currency as % GDP. 1970.-1980
Dec 1970 Dec 1978 Dec 1979 3un 1980
Components of M2
Current A/c/GDP 8.7 13.9 13.6 12.0
Savings A/c/GDP 9.1 16.9 19.7 18.1
Currency/GDP 17.7 22.3 21.1 18.0
Ml/GDP 26.4 36.2 34.7 30.0
M2/GDP 35.5 53.1 54.4 48.1
M2 - Minus Foreiqn 
Currency
Current A/c/GDP 8.9 9.4 9.1
Savings A/c/GDP 14.3 14.2 11.3
Ml/GDP 31.3 30.3 27.1
M2/GDP 45.4 44.6 38.4
Sources; Monetary Data; Ministry of Economy 'Recent Developments 
in the Egyptian Economy1. E.S.U. op cit P31,36 & 91.
GDP: International Financial Statistics. IMF.
The Ministry of Economy suggest that emigrant remittances, 
tourist revenues and payments in foreign currency by foreign residents 
in Egypt were major sources of foreign exchange which eventually went 
into bank accounts. Table 15 shows how dramatically the most important 
of these items grew.
The devaluation of the Egyptian Pound (see Chapter 7) increased 
the local currency value of foreign exchange so that the effect of 
bank holdings, measured in Egyptian Pounds, was even greater than 
Table 15 indicates. As these funds were concentrated in savings 
accounts, so the latter increased as a share of M2.
1CA
The value of real balances was affected by the way in which 
inflation is measured. Given that the consumer price index (CPI) 
understated the actual inflation rate, so the true increase in real 
balances cannot be measured exactly.
In most years the GDP deflator was close to the CPI but in 1978-9 
it was 22.4% compared to a CPI increase of 9.9% (1). Both deflators 
have been used in the table below for the period 1978-9.
(1) Ministry of Economy, op cit, P31.
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The effects of inflation cannot be so easily and precisely predicted 
because some will be able to escape it by increasing their prices or 
earnings. Other will not, but who forms the two groups of 'gainers' 
and 'losers' is not easily calculable. It therefore represents an 
'implicit', rather than 'explicit' way of dealing with a problem (1).
(1) In a conference in 1973, this issue came up in a different 
context. Jacob Arnon, former Director General of the Israeli 
Finance Ministry, discussed some advice which he and Professor 
D. Patinkin had given, years before, to the then Minister of 
Finance. The latter, wanting to build a factory, suggested that 
money be printed to cover the costs of the project. Arnon 
reported that Patinkin replied as follows: If the money was 
printed, then the factory could be built, a visible sign of 
success for economic policy. It would also result in 'houses 
without doors and windows' over time, as inflation.resulted. 
Jacob Arnon, in a symposium on The Economist's Task in the 
Economy, P22, Issues in the Economy of Israel, ed, H. Halevi 
and Y. Kop Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in 
Israel, 1973.
The political impact, in the short run, of building a new 
factory may be considerable, but the impact over a longer 
period of time of inflation, can be more serious,as the 
events of 1977 and 1980, in Egypt, show. The inflationary 
process, if it is used in the way described above, is a means 
of delaying the making of choices in an explicit way and 
forcing those choices onto the economy implicitly.
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Foreign Sector Implications
The low level of domestic savings meant that investment had to be 
financed abroad to an increasing extent. The corollary of low savings 
was high consumption, something which in turn led to a growth of 
imports.
Table 18: Foreign Trade as a Share of GDP, 1960/71-1979 (?o)
1970/1 1971/2 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Share of 
Exports(l) 14.0 13.3 14.0 21.2 19.5 19.6 19.2 17.1 24.6
Share of 
Imports(2) 18.7 18.2 19.1 33.2 39.5 32.3 30.1 30.7 39.8
Trade Balance 
share 4.7 4.9 2.1 12.0 20.0 12.7 10.9 13.6 15.2
Sources: 1970/1-1978: K. Ikram, 'Egypt: Economic Management in a
Period of Transition1 Table 5 Statistical 
Appendix.
1979: ESU 'Recent Development in the Egyptian Economy 
US Embassy Cairo 'Economic Trends' January 1981.
Notes: 1. Goods and Services
2. Derived from export and import figures.
The liberalisation was mainly confined to the foreign sector; 
imports became much less restricted and the exchange rate system was 
rationalised. The number of exchange rates was reduced and more trade 
was carried out at rates corresponding to market rates (see Table 1, 
Chapter 7). The net effect was an increase in imports as the system 
controlling their entry into the economy was liberalised. The other 
element was increased access to foreign exchange, from 1976.
11%
Savings
Although savings increased as a share of national income in the 
1970, according to the Ministry of Economy, the savings rate was below 
that of other countries with similar levels of per capita income (1). 
The Ministry suggested that the lack of savings has limited the volume 
of domestic resources available for investment. The savings ratio 
(savings as percentage of GDP) fell between 1978 and 1979 (2). Ikram 
also noted a small fall in the ratio between 1977 and 1978 (3).
The unsatisfactory performance of savings, either by individuals 
or public and private sector firms, has meant that the government, 
with its weak tax collection system, had to force involuntary savings 
in the economy. This was done by borrowing and by inflation. The 
latter represents c\n unplanned means of obtaining resources, because 
the real expenditure which inflation prevents, cannot easily be 
predicted. If the government sets a certain tax, then it can make 
calculations about the revenue which will be generated and about the 
expenditures which will be displaced by the tax. Printing money to 
cover part, or all, of a budget deficit caused inflation.
(1) Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit 'Recent Developments 
in the Egyptian Economy1 P23.
(2) Ibid, P10, calculated from GDP at market prices.
(3) K. Ikram, 'Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of 
Transition'
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Tables 19 to 21 give an indication of the changes in the balance 
of payments and in debt accumulation plus repayments. The deficit 
worsened over the decade but never exceeded its 1973 level. Borrowing 
was limited before 1973, but, as the terms of trade (see table 20) 
worsened in the middle years of the decade and the demand for imported 
food (among other goods) rose, so short term borrowing from private 
banks abroad increased. By 1977 these expensive loans were, to some 
extent, replaced by longer term loans from GODE (see Appendix 2) and 
the USA. In the last two years of the decade foreign currency earnings 
from petroleum exports, Suez Canal tolls and tourism grew rapidly as 
did remittances of Egyptian workers abroad.
These financial inflows enabled consumption and investment to 
grow at a faster rate than output, particularly in the late 1970s.
They also reduced the pressure for domestic reform, by providing an 
alternative source to domestic savings. There was a kind of 
circularity to this; the foreign sector was liberalised much more than 
the domestic economy because it offered easier opportunities for 
reform. The results of these reforms reduced the pressures to change 
policies and institutional arrangements in the domestic economy. More 
funds were available to pay, for example, wage increases unlinked to 
those in output. This makes evaluation of the liberalisation programme 
therefore become a complex matter. The improvement in the foreign 
sector was at least in part the result of government action. It made 
the problems of the domestic economy less pressing. For the policy 
makers, in their political capacity, this was a success, but from the 
viewpoint of the development of the economy different conclusions can 
be drawn. This matter will be taken up in the concluding chapter.
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Chenery and Strout have suggested that developing countries 
face three contraints, usually consecutively (1). These are shortages 
of savings, skills and foreign currency. Foreign aid can assist in 
dealing with all three. It should enable the economy to deal with each 
shortage successively. In Egypt there is evidence of all three 
shortages occurring simultaneously but there is little evidence that 
foreign aid per se made these constraints less binding. Although 
investment was increasingly financed by foreign aid, so was 
consumtpion in the public and private sectors. According to Efrat, 
grants from Arab States worth nearly $5bn in the 1970s, went on 
military spending before 1973. Given the growth of public consumption, 
this was likely to have persisted in the period after 1973. Funds from 
Arab countries were not accompanied by technical or other expertise. 
Only the USA set up a major aid related mission with a range of 
technical experts. Foreign investment brought outside experts but, in 
so far as it was concentrated in non-productive sector so the benefits 
were limited, (see Chapter 7). Aid did permit a large increase in 
imports. These consisted of investment as well as consumption of goods 
and the former contributed to an increase in industrial output.
Foreign aid enabled investment to be increased and this enabled the 
economy to expand. High capital output ratios in the areas of highest 
investment, limited its effect however. These were necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for growth; in the long run they did little to 
encourage self sufficiency.
(1) H. Chenery & A. Strout 'Foreign Assistance & Economic 
Development* American Economic Review, September 1966.
(2) M. Efrat 'The Defence Burden in Egypt during the Deepening of 
the Soviet Involvement in 1962-73', PhD Thesis London University, 
May, 1981, quoted with the Author's permission.
17G
Other aid flows (mainly loans) were increasingly used to repay 
debt. Between 1970 and 1978 disbursed debt outstanding (medium and 
long term borrowing) and disbursed banking facilities (short term 
borrowing) increased by $8.576m (Table 22). Repayments of principal in 
the years 1970 to 1977 were $11.310m and interest payments were 
$1.329bn.
The burden of debt is assessed in Tables 24 & 25. It is broken 
down according to the source of borrowing. Various definitions are 
given, all moved in the same direction each year. The burden fell 
between 1970 and 1972 but grew in 1973, except when allowance is made 
for inter-government grants. By 1977 two indicators showed an increase 
and two showed a slight fall over 1976. In 1978 three indicators 
showed an increase and one a fall.
Given the range of definitions available only a general 
conclusion is possible. The debt burden rose over the period and, when 
grants are excluded, it exceeded the inflow of foreign currency 
(excluding further borrowing) considerably.
The burden of interest payments was higher in 1978 than in 1970 
according to all the definitions given in Table 25.
Table 20: Terms of Trade for Cotton Exports & Wheat Imports 1969-76
1969-70 1973-4 1974-5 1975-6
1. Wheat (cif/ton) 25 79 112 88
2. Cotton (Menoufi extra
long, fob/ton) 530 1200 844 677
3. Ratio of 2. to 1. 21 15 9.5 9.4
Source: K. Ikram, 1 Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of
Transition'
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Conclusions
The government was faced with two main tasks in the 1970s. It had 
to finance and organise the development of the economy, largely 
through investment. It also had to maintain the real incomes of the 
poor mass of the population. The latter had to be done at a time of 
rising international prices, nearly static domestic food production 
and with a growing population. The liberalisation of the trade and 
exchange rate systems exposed the economy to international price 
movements more than ever before, but the planning system did not 
foresee these effects until the late 1970s. Even then the lack of 
coordination and financial planning meant that targets remained 
unrealistic.
The planners assumed that over time the domestic saving ratio 
would increase, reducing the need for external finance. The savings 
ratio did increase in the early 1970s but fell towards the end of the 
decade. In 1975 domestic savings covered 37.1% of investment. Under 
the 1978 plan it was supposed to cover 78.8% in 1980 and 100% in the 
year 2000. There was no discussion as to how the savings ratio would 
be increased (1). In this sense there was no real financial planning.
Planning of finance was of special importance in Egypt in view of 
the government's problems in raising revenue. Low receipts from income 
and capital taxation reflected fundamental political, institutional 
and administrative weaknesses. The buoyancy of indirect taxation 
reflected a dangerous reliance on imports of consumer goods which did
(1) National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin Volxxxi No.l, 1978 P5.
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little for the economy and exacerbated social tensions. That the 
public sector was not a major source of profits for the state was a 
result of government policy, especially with regard to pricing. 
Government policy was therefore self-defeating; by holding down public 
sector prices for short term socio-economic reasons the state added to 
its deficit. In the conditions which prevailed in Egypt, this meant 
that inflationary borrowing was required, something which undermined 
the government's stabilisation and long term growth objectives. Even 
this was only possible because of the special circumstances which 
enabled Egypt to import foreign finance and pay her bills with 
emigrant remittance funds and from the late 1970s with petroleum 
revenues. These sources of foreign currency, which were not the result 
of domestic production (in industry or agriculture), are examined in 
Chapter 7.
The structure behind these policies was that of a partly 
liberalised economy. The external sector was opened up but the 
domestic sector was not. The planning framework bore less relation to 
reality as the foreign sector responded to international pressures and 
opportunities and the rest remained bureaucratically controlled. The 
kind of fiscal and monetary imbalances analysed here were therefore 
direct results of the mix of policies followed.
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Chapter 7: The Foreign Sector
Introduction
The balance of trade in goods and services moved into ever larger 
deficit in the 1970s (l). Imports of goods and services played a far 
greater role in 1980 than in 1970. So did capital imports.
Despite this, most of what occurred in the foreign sector went 
unplanned, except in the broadest sense. By permitting emigration, 
encouraging remittances, making the political changes required to 
reopen the Suez Canal and develop the Eastern Oil Fields, Egypt made 
great use of her natural and human resources. These yielded very large 
sums in foreign currency, although emigration had costs which are 
examined below. Whenever the government eased fiscal and monetary 
policy, imports rose. The state itself imported many commodities both 
directly and through its control of the public sector. The lack of 
planning resulted from the view of the foreign sector as an area of 
opportunity for liberalising the economy.
In this sector, as elsewhere, incentives for efficiency were 
lacking. There were a number of very different reasons for this.
The first was that for many commodities, during much of the 
period under examination, the real exchange rate was overvalued. This 
encouraged imports and discouraged exports. It therefore discouraged 
domestic production.
The second reason was the increased availability of foreign 
exchange from around 1975. There were various sources of this, each of 
which will be examined below. Spending foreign currency became a 
panacea for economic problems.
(1) Table 18, Chapter 6.
185
A third reason was the institutional arrangements which existed 
in the economy. Much of the public sector's foreign trade was carried 
out by publicly . owned foreign trade companies. These firms made 
their profits by maximising the amount of trade which they carried 
out. With the constraints on exports (which are examined below), their 
objective was to maximise imports. Imports therefore had a lobby 
within the public sector.
Finally, the history of foreign exchange shortages in the 1960s 
and early 1970s meant that when foreign currency became available it 
was usually spent up to the budget limit. This was one way of 
ensuring that the budget would be maintained the following year. It 
was also an easy way of increasing output in the middle of the decade. 
As a result capital goods as a share of total imports rose from 13.5% 
in 1974 to 32.6% in 1978 (1).
State control over the foreign sector meant that it had 
considerable influence over the balance of payments but this element 
of control was not the same thing as planning. For example, the state 
brought in consumer goods but it did not monopolise their supply, nor 
did it decide on an optimum supply. As the foreign sector was 
liberalised so it was increasingly left to the market to determine 
supply.
(1) Table 6
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Plans for the Foreign Sector
As long as plans were issued they said something about foreign 
trade and payments. The 1980-84 plan will be briefly examined as an 
example. It called for the acceleration of export oriented sectors and 
the implementation of import substitution projects. It called for an 
improvement in the balance of payments as well.
The plan, which was issued in 1979, proposed the implementation 
of a unified exchange rate as a means of rationalising the foreign 
sector. This happened in 1979. The long term aim was to have foreign 
finance cover imports of capital goods and technology only.
The choice of projects in the economy depended to a large part 
on what foreigners were interested in financing. This was because 
domestic savings were low and capital imports were needed as noted in 
Chapter 6. For this reason only 0.3% of disbursed foreign assistance 
and 3.3% of allocated aid went to agriculture up to the end of dune, 
1979 according to the data presented in the plan (1).
The plan did not suggest how exports were to be increased except 
through the unification of the exchange rate.
Trade Policy and the Exchange Rate
Between 1970 and 1974 most imports were funded by the foreign 
exchange budget controlled by the government. After estimates were 
made of the foreign exchange earnings of exports of goods and 
services, foreign credits and debt servicing requirements, a residual 
was left. This was in convertible and bilateral account currencies and
(1) A.R.A. Meguid, ’Egypt’s Development Strategy and Growth 
Objectives, 1980-84'
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was allocated to each sector. Imports were then decided on by Boards 
and Organisations in charge of each sector. Non-residents could use 
the premium exchange rate to buy foreign exchange, paying 35% above 
the official rate. There were tariffs which, according to Girgis, came 
to 42% nominally on a national average value added weighted basis (1). 
Writing in 1980, Ranney found a similar pattern and extent of tariff 
discrimination as Girgis had (2).
By 1974 the parallel (premium) market had grown and so the area 
of direct government control had become relatively smaller. In 1976 
most imports were shifted to the parallel market. This meant that they 
were subjected to a once for all devaluation of as much as 43%.
Between 1976 and 1980 the parallel market exchange rate fell by 3% 
against the US Dollar (3). Egyptian prices, as measured by the 
consumer price index, rose by 66% between 1976 and 1980. In reality 
they rose much more as the official index was heavily weighted with 
subsidised goods and services. US export prices rose by 43% (4). 
Against her main trading partner, Egypt lost at least 20% in 
competitiveness (5). This affected all goods and services in the 
parallel market in 1976.
(1) M. Girgis ’Industrialisation and Trade Patterns in Egypt1, P115
(2) S. Ranney 'The Open Door and Industrialisation in Egypt:
A Preliminary Investigation', op cit
(3) Calculated from International Financial Statistics, IMF 
1981 Yearbook.
(4) Calculated from International Financial Statistics op cit
(5) In 1975 65.8% of Egypt's imports came from the USA. In 1980 the 
share was 72.5%. 'Directions of Trade', 1982 Yearbook, IMF.
in
Table 2 shows how the inflation rate differential with the USA 
increased from 1975 and especially after 1979, the period in which the 
exchange rate system was supposedly being rationalised. This 
encouraged imports and discouraged exports. It should be noted that 
the Egyptian inflation rate was considerably higher than the Table 
shows because the latter was biased towards subsidised items. Table 1, 
Chapter 5 shows how far this was true for two commodities.
Despite the continued liberalisation, control over imports was 
retained through the Open Licence system, but this was a much freer 
regime than its predecessor.
The relative freedom within the parallel market was limited by 
periodic shortages of foreign exchange. In the free market foreign 
exchange was worth considerably more and so funds were diverted from 
the parallel market. This limited legal imports but permitted illegal 
ones because the free market was in effect a black market. The 
government’s policy was to shift imports from the foreign exchange 
budget to the parallel one.
In order to see how far liberalisation of the trade system has 
gone it is useful to refer to the periodisation suggested by Krueger 
(1).
(1) A.O. Krueger 'Liberalisation Attempts & Consequences', National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Ballinger 1978, P302-303.
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Phases in the Evolution of Exchange Control Regimes
1) Quantitative restrictions ((QRs) imposed and intensified on 
international transactions.
2) Various price measures taken to offset undesired effects of 
restrictions.
3) Systematisation of phase 2 changes: formal exchange rate changes 
and removal of some phase 2 surcharges. Reduced reliance on QRs.
4) Continuation of liberalisation trend 
3) Full liberalisation
The movement from early to later phases entails, according to 
Krueger, four closely related processes. Firstly there is a 
rationalisation of the system when piecemeal measures, dominant in 
Phases 1 and 2 are replaced by an aoross-the-board exchange rate 
change. Secondly, the reduction in premiums and/or the replacement of 
QRs by price measures liberalises the system. (The term 
'Liberalisation' has been used more broadly so far, to include all 
moves towards reliance on market forces). Thirdly, there is a 
reduction in the bias of the price system due to the increased 
domestic price of exportables relative to imported goods and import 
substitutes which result. Finally, there is a reduction in the
192
variance of effective protection rates. This is because the move from 
QRs to pricing measures usually reduces the amount of protection and 
raises the domestic prices of those items previously negatively 
protected (l).
In 1975 import duties (most of which were customs duties) were 
equal to 32.6?o of the value of imports. In 1979 they were 33.2?o (2). 
It is not possible to estimate the value of imports coming into the 
country illegally nor the increase in this activity, but the evidence 
is of a rapid expansion which partially invalidates the comparisons 
made.
In terms of Krueger's categories of the phase of liberalisation 
Egypt in the 1970s moved from Phase 3 to Phase 4. This suggests that 
while movement through the phases has not been rapid, the end 
situation is favourable from a liberalisation point of view.
(1) A.O. Krueger, Ibid P15-16.
(2) Calculated from 'Goverment Statistics Yearbook1 Vo.V, IMF, 
International Financial Statistics' IMF and Table 10, Chapter 6. 
Conversion at Official Exchange Rate.
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Exports
Export Revenues from the rental sector were the main source of 
export growth in the 1970s. Oil exports depended on foreign demand and 
internationally determined prices. Suez Canal tolls depended on 
international demand for use of the Canal. Remittances depended on 
foreign demand for Egyptian labour. None relied on manufacturing in 
Egypt. All increased without changes in agriculture or industry. Only 
remittances were related to domestic changes through reforms of the 
exchange rate system which, to some extent, encouraged emigrants to 
send funds home.
The liberalisation programme encouraged remittances, and moves 
towards a military and political settlement with Israel enabled Egypt 
to reopen the Suez Canal in 1975 and increase her oil export after 
that date. In this respect, policy was extremely effective in 
increasing foreign currency earnings.
Tables 3 & 4 show how fast these factors grew and how important 
they became relative to traditional industrial and agricultural 
exports.
19<f
TABIM 3 : Tar/jl. £X  PORTS AAf0 THOSE OP TH£ R£NTAi-
secroxs *980
To f a /  e x p o r ts  o f  
tyoocJs ** 
S *rrt'c e $  f ro  6 )
Petro /eum  t  
re/atm cf proc/octs, 
S u e z  ConatHtiS
3,000
1,000
200
n / 0  V  72 73 7-f 75 f t  77 75 77 90
SOUR C B  ; T a 6 /e .  Sa/e> yy
Ta
bl
e 
4:
 
Re
nt
al
 
It
em
s 
an
d 
To
ta
l 
Ex
po
rt
 
($
M)
i—1
CD O St st 00 rH st
00 o NO A •H • A
On A NO On ■—1 CM A
rH CM CM NO 00 H
On a ON A ON On A
a st CO i—1 St • A
ON a LA CM <H ON o
i— 1 i—i CM st A H
00 00 A A CM A
a 00 i—1 A" A* • st
ON NO A A On CM CM
i—i i—1 CM NO •—1
a o A' 00 A o <t
a a CM CM A • A
ON NO st ON On CM A
rH •H A <— 1
NO CO ■—1 A st O i—1
a NO i—1 A A • st
ON CM A A" A NO A
i-H rH A ■—1
A st A NO A ON vt
a NO 00 NO i— 1 • O
ON i-H A NO A st
i—i i—H i—1
<t <t O OO CM CM CO
a O NO A* • NO
ON I-H CM A NO A
■—i H
A IA a A'* CD •H A'
A 1—1 -H A • 00
ON rH ■H CM ■— 1 00
rH i— 1
CM st o St 00 NO On
a LA a A ■ A
On rH ■H NO A
i— i
i— 1 a o A st CO st
A CM A • st
ON o 00
i— 1
o NO O On A st ■H
A IA CM NO • 00
On St A
rH
CO
p CO
o I—1
3 H
TD o
O (—
P CD
0_ H CD
CO CD
■>« c C
CO
i—1 u -p
o -p
IH N •H
P CD E
(D 3 CD
O- in DC
CO JD CD
CM
i—1
O
CD P
-P P
P CD
O CL
CL
X CD
f—« LJ 3 CD
O C P
1 •H a
CO E 3
CD TD
CO CD O
CD P P
H P CL
CO XD O
P + CL TD
O ca X C
1— LJ CO
,—.
TD QD P
19J
rH
OO
On
P
cd□c
.COn
> N
so
coo
o
A
p
p
COHc
H
s:
d dLO
L d
2: *
— L_ •
A DD CM
*> E IP CM
A O
A c 0
On o CM H
H O CO XD
LJ On 0H h-
C ■p
s t 0 P •H r\
A •H 0 a NO
On P JD
rH Q E CL p
>- 0 o 0r' CT CD p
CD LJ 0 CL
a o A 0
•H 0 E JD
-P _C ■V o CD
CD P 0 c
•H o o 1
P c •H CD
co •H p LJ 0
p W o
in P •H P p
C P O 3
0 0 0 o
TD E P A 0
CO Q in P
P cr P • »\
1— H i—l 0 JD
0 0 *H O
P > ■H c P
o 0 a •H
CD c •v
od 0 0
CD 4-3 c A 0
O c ■H XJ O
JO 0 L_ •H
P a • TD >
CO 0 i—1 0 0 p
0 DC 0 > P 0
A — C o 0 in
O JD E
1 i •H CO • H TD
4J P C
A CD 0 A 0 0
A 00 C LJ
1 1 P 0 0
CD St 0 i—1 O TD
A A P  JD CO O
ON On <= 0 ON O■—1i—1i—i |— 1—1CJ
jd a 1—1CM
CO
CDO
P
3O
CO
19G
Exports other than oil, measured in dollars were over 23% lower 
in 1979 than in 1974. As the 1979 figure was affected by a devaluation 
of the Egyptian pound (via the unification of the exchange rate at the 
lower parallel market rate) the dollar amount is biased downwards. The 
1978 figure, unaffected by this, was 17% lower than that for 1974. 
Their share in GDP rose by only 3.4% even with oil included. (Chapter 
1 Table 1).
This weakness was the result of a number of factors. Mabro 
explained slow export growth in the 1930s and 1960s as a result of 
rigidities in the economic structure and policy outlook (1). Girgis 
concluded that internal conditions, including policy choices, were the 
main cause of export weakness rather than international conditions of 
demand (2).
There are two aspects to this bias against exports. Firstly, the 
system of protection, pricing policy and conditions of demand within 
the economy militated against exports. Secondly the government was 
unwilling to adopt a positive policy towards exports, seeing them as a 
residual rather than as a central variable in the growth process (3).
(1) R. Mabro 'The Egyptian Economy 1932-19721 Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1974, P181.
(2) M. Girgis 'Industrialisation and Trade Patterns in Egypt' 
J.L.B. Mohr Tubingen 1977, P203-4.
(3) Arthur D. Little Inc. 'An Assessment of Egypt's Industrial 
Sector' danuary 1978, P97.
mApart from industrial subsidies, which were not specific to 
exporters, devaluation was the only measure applied to exports. 
Operating as disincentives to export were the strength of domestic 
demand which outran the supply of many commodities and inflation.
The foreign exchange shortage in Egypt was dealt with by tariffs 
and a more rapid movement of imports of goods (but not services) to 
the parallel exchange rate up to 1977.
The availability of commodities for export depended, to some 
extent, on the pricing system. Compulsory deliveries of cotton to the 
government at prices lower than those on world markets, meant that 
producers lacked an incentive to increase output. They may 
furthermore, have been producing the wrong crop or product compared to 
that which would have been developed in a free market. Specifying 
which crop is to be produced may be sub-optional but then paying less 
than the international price for it compounds the problem. "Price 
differences^ plus the price paid to the farmer for, say, cotton equal 
the export price and are a measure of the disincentive to the private 
producer. In terms of personal incentives this was less important for 
public sector industry because the choice of what was produced did 
not directly affect the incomes of the producer. An example of the 
former was the price paid to farmers for cotton. In 1976 this was 
£E32/Kantar while the export price was £E46 per Kantar. The total 
purchased from farms was £E10Qm and the total value of export, £E155m
(1).
(1) R.S. Eckhaus, F.D. McCarthy & A. Mohie Eldin 'Multisector 
General Equilibrium Model for Egypt1, Cairo University 
Development Research and Technological Planning Centre, Updated 
version of 30 June 1978 Report. (Updated Version undated).
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Imports
An important feature of Egyptian economic policy making in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s was,the use of imports to deal with short 
term economic and political problems.
In 1970 when President Nasser died, the supply of imported and 
locally assembled luxury goods was sharply increased. This also 
occurred after the 1967 war, when the regime faced severe domestic 
tensions which resulted in riots early in 1968. Local output of such 
items as automobiles and televisions could be increased rapidly by 
importing more kits, or parts, used in the assembly of the final 
product. It was not always necessary to invest in capital equipment in 
order to increase production. Years of relatively high domestic 
production were those of high capacity utilisation. Higher levels of 
production or assembly did result in high imports. The policy of 
importing more luxury goods and kits for local assembly could not be 
sustained for more than a few years at a time before 1975 because of 
the weakness of the balance of payments and consequent foreign 
exchange shortages. This is illustrated in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Imports & Domestic Production of Cars and Televisions 1965/74
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1975 1974
Cars
-Imported 2158 1811 1023 3545 3944 9489 15196 3998 7448)
-Domestic )25800
assembly 552 494 1891 2325 3590 5750 5380 5591)
Television
-Imported 21* 328* 36* 84* 249*13867 23309 18352 18745)
-Domestic )87900
assembly 56200 50400 48600 29900 43200 64200 66900 75600 49100)
Source: Federation of Egyptian Industries Yearbook, various editions
(1967-75) and K. Ikram op cit P88, T4-3 (1974)
* = tons
mThe import boom which followed Nasser's death and continued 
during the early period of Sadat's rule ended in 1972. By then the 
threat of international opposition to the new President had receded 
and the government took steps to restrict the inflow of luxuries. This 
was done according to the Prime Minister because of the need to 
transform the economy into a 'war economy' (1). Imported luxury goods, 
many of which came into the country illegally, did not provide the 
right background against which to ask for sacrifice from the 
population. A ban on many such imports was announced in 1972 along 
with a 50% increase in customs duties on others.
In 1973 the number of cars imported rose by 86%. There was no 
fall in domestic production to be made up for. This occurred despite a 
continued severe foreign exchange shortage. Neither during the war, 
nor in the period immediately after it, was thereany reduction in 
imports comparable to that which occurred in 1967. Indeed, taking 
imports and domestic production together, demand for cars in 1974 was 
98% higher than in 1973. As the foreign exchange constraint eased in 
the late 1970s, so imports were permitted on an even more liberal 
basis. Yet the years between 1973 and 1977 saw a rapid worsening of 
the balance of payments as the cost of many basic, non-luxury, imports 
rose and Egyptian demand for them expanded. By 1977 the debt servicing 
crisis had reached its peak but imports of cars and televisions 
continued to increase rapidly in value terms.
(1) Statement to the People's Assembly 23 January 1972 reported 
by Radio Cairo, quoted in 'Record of the Arab World' Beirut 
1972, Vol. 11, P.1281.
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In May 1980 President Sadat ordered reductions in import duties, 
among other measures designed to slow the rate of inflation. The 
reduction applied not only to basic foodstuffs and raw materials 
imported but also to household and consumer durables, including luxury 
items such as colour televisions (l). The goods which flowed into the 
country in greater quantities as a result, included some items which 
competed with domestic production. By 1980 the foreign exchange 
constraint was no longer a major problem for policymakers; it had all 
but disappeared. Other considerations came to the fore, such as the 
social impact of increased luxury goods imports in a country with much 
poverty. By lowering the price of luxury goods the President hoped to 
lower the cost of consumption for those who could afford such goods at 
the old price and to make them available to a slightly wider section 
of the population. This may not have been a carefully calculated move, 
but the effect was of the kind described.
Smuggling was a significant issue in Egypt and should be ~ 
considered alongside declared imports. Although it is likely to have 
declined as import controls eased, significant volumes of goods were 
thought to have been smuggled into the country in the early 1970s. In 
February 1972, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economy and Foreign Trade 
stated that over the previous four years £E80m worth of commodities 
and 33,000 cars were known to have entered the country illegally (2). 
If each car is conservatively valued at £E2300, then their total value 
was to £E82.5m.
(1) The Economist 24.3.1980.
(2) A1 Ahram, Cairo, 19 & 21 March, 1973. Quoted by N. Ayubi, op cit 
P383.
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The total value of smuggled goods is much higher in any period 
than the government states, A more recent example of the magnitude of 
the problem was cited in an official report issued in 1979 (1). In it, 
the Ministry of Economy criticised arrangements at the Port Said Free 
Zone, All imports into Port Said were, in 1979, exempt from customs 
duties, but the city was not sealed off from its surroundings. It had 
both legal and illegal entry and exit points. At one such point in 
1979, 40,000 visitors a day were going into the city and smuggling out 
goods.
The Economic Studies Unit at the Ministry of Economy therefore 
recommended that customs exemptions be limited to capital goods only
(2 ).
Weak administrative control was evident in the foreign exchange 
system. Since 1974 the freedom to use foreign exchange has been 
substantially increased. Traders and individuals who held foreign 
currency generated by transactions which fell under the parallel 
market were allowed to use those funds for direct importing of goods 
and services. This amounted to implicit approval of a free market for 
imports. In 1975 the number of goods which could be imported under 
this 'own exchange' system was dramatically expanded.
(1) Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit 'Study of Law 45 
Investment Policies', December 1979 P36.
(2) Ministry of Economy, E.S.U. op cit.
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The Composition of Imports
The figures in Table 6 do not fully reflect the share of consumer 
goods in total imports. This is because many such imports were 
excluded from exchange control data. Smuggled goods (via Port Said and 
elsewhere) were also excluded, by definition, from customs data. The 
Central Bank do not specify which source they use, but as both series 
are deficient they should be used with caution in assessing the level 
of consumer goods and luxury imports.
In addition it should be noted that the category of intermediate 
goods included such items as kits for the assembly of cars, 
televisions and other consumer durables.
Fuel as a share fell as local oil production increased. 
Intermediate goods fell possibly because taxes on some such goods were 
higher than on final products. Capital goods increased their share as 
investment increased and the import content of investment remained 
high. Even without the qualifications given above, the share of 
consumer goods rose.
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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Shares in the Import Bill, 1970-1980 (7o)
Raw Intermediate Capital Consumer
Fuels Materials Goods Goods Goods
8.2 13.5 37.6 23.4 17.3
7.0 20.1 37.4 20.4 15.1
5.4 17.0 43.4 19.9 14.3
2.0 22.3 36.5 21.9 17.3
2.6 32.0 34.3 13.5 17.6
6.8 18.8 40.2 16.9 17.3
3.9 16.2 29.8 27.1 22.9
1.8 13.4 32.8 30.1 21.9
1.1 11.6 30.9 32.6 23.8
0.6 12.2 33.3 30.6 23.3
0.7 13.9 37.5 24.5 23.4
■78: Economic Review, Vol.xix, Central Bank of Egypt
Nos. 3 & 4, 1979.
1979-80: Economic Bulletin, Vol.xxxv, National Bank of 
Egypt, No.2, 1982.
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Imports were financed by remittances, but the latter increasingly 
took the form of goods rather than cash. These imports, paid for by 
Egyptians abroad, were not included in the balance of payments figures 
given in Table 22 of Chapter 6. Those figures are based on exchange 
control records and goods imported by emigrants did not require 
currency exchange. They were included in data on customs clearance but 
this data excluded many exempted items and imports by the government. 
There is therefore no satisfactory series on imports. The share of 
remittances coming into Egypt as goods rose from 12.1?a in 1974 to 
62.1% in 1978 and 59.4SS in 1979/80 (1).
This shows evidence of the financial repression discussed in the 
last chapter. At its simplest, despite the adoption of a more 
favourable exchange rate, there were increased incentives to buy goods 
rather than save in banks, at least until 1978. From then on, as has 
been shown, interest rates, especially on foreign currency account, 
rose. This may have been the cause of the increase in the share of 
cash in remittances from 1978 to 1980 as well as in the total volume 
of remittances and the proportion held in foreign currency.
(1) 1974 and 1978 from National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin,
Nos. 3 & 4. 1979 T8.
1979/80 from Central Bank of Egypt Annual Report 1980/81 Sept. 
1981.
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The National Bank of Egypt has stated that 31% of 'own exchange' 
(i.e. remittance financed) imports in 1976 and 23% in 1978 were 
'luxury or unnecessary' (1). This definition excluded 'means of 
transport'. If they are assumed to be mainly cars, which is 
reasonable, then the share of luxury goods rises to 58% in 1978. 
Additionally, foodstuffs amounted to 14.8% in that year. These are 
unlikely to have been basic goods and therefore can be added to the 
total for luxuries.
All of these figures excluded imports via Port Said and its free 
zone. These came to $70m in 1976, $196m in 1977 and $233m in 1978 (2). 
According to the Ministry of Economy, only about $60m of the three 
year total (12%) was subject to tariffs, consumer goods constituted 
80% of the total and between 33% and 75% of the value of imports into 
the zone was then smuggled into Egypt (3).
The liberalisation encouraged demand for imports by increasing 
their availability. They met the gap between savings and investment, 
the lack of domestic food production and the overall imbalance between 
demand and supply in the economy. Financial repression provided 
speculative incentives to import as well.
(1) N.B.E. op cit P167-168
(2) Ministry of Economy, Economic Studies Unit 'Study on Law 43 
Investment Policies' December 1979, P36.
(3) Ibid.
20£
The Reorientation of Egypt's External Trade
In 1970 49% of Egypt’s imports and 74% of her exports were with 
countries which had bilateral trade or payments agreements with Egypt
(1). These arrangements had existed since the 1940s with West 
European countries and provided for tight government control over 
trade so as to avoid the build up of deficits in countries short of 
foreign exchange. Western nations ceased to use such arrangements in 
the 1950s as their financial position improved but the Soviet block 
continued to trade under these arrangements. In the 1960s as Egypt 
moved closer, both politically and economically to the USSR, so 
bilateral trading arrangements were worked out with Soviet block 
countries. They also existed between Egypt and a number of developing 
countries.
Throughout the period of bilateral trading, Egypt's exports went 
mainly to the centrally planned economies and others with agreements 
whereas her imports came mainly from free market economies. The 
effects of this trading system have been analysed by Girgis (2) and 
Hansen and Nashashibi (3). From a policy point of view, they had 
important implications. Those who sought to liberalise the economy in 
the period after 1968 saw freer foreign trade as a central objective. 
Whatever the precise effects of the controlled system were, compared 
with a freer one they felt that it was not beneficial (4). Change
(1) M. Girgis 'Industrialisation and Trade Patterns in Egypt1 
J.C.B. Mohr Tubingen, 1977, P159.
(2) M. Girgis op cit.
(3) B. Hansen & K. Nashashibi 'Egypt: Foreign Trade Regimes and 
Economic Development' National Bureau of Economic Research,
1975.
(4) View of Dr. A.A. Hegazi, Finance Minister in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, interviewed.
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was not easy to effect however. In 1974, 30 bilateral agreements 
remained in farce, 12 with Soviet block countries.
A fall of bilateralism meant a decline in the relative importance 
of trade with the Soviet block. Cotton was one of Egypt's main exports 
and was totally controlled by the State. Falls in export demand, as a 
result of the reorientation of trade, meant that production was hit; 
exporters could not easily move towards more competitive markets with 
products which had previously been protected by government controls 
(1).
From 1968 the liberalisers began to reform the bilateral trade 
arrangements then prevailing. From 1970 President Sadat added 
political reasons for a move towards changing the trade system. He was 
dissatisfied with the lack of military aid to Egypt and with the fact 
that the USSR was unable or unwilling to act decisively on Egypt's 
side in the struggle with Israel. Soviet involvement in the country 
was resented and in July 1972 about 13,000 advisors were expelled
(2). This was despite considerable economic and military assistance 
made available by the USSR from the early 1960s and earlier.
The relationship between the USSR and Egypt had two elements each 
of which needs considering.
(1) S. Ranney 'The Open Door Policy & Industrialisation in Egypt:
A Preliminary Investigation1 Center for Research on Economic 
Development. The University of Michigan, Discussion Paper No.87 
August 1980.
(2) M.A. Sadat ;In Search of Identity' Collins, 1978 P228-231.
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Firstly, the trading relationship, under the framework described, 
showed a total Egyptian deficit from 1962 until 1973 of $112m. This 
was a relatively small amount by any standards over such a long 
period, Efrat has suggested that Egypt received more from the USSR for 
her exports than she would have done on World markets.
The gain over the period 1962-73 came to about £250m. Egypt exported 
manufactured goods which would not sell on international markets. That 
the USSR and her East European allies took these goods meant 
industrial growth occurred in Egypt which would not necessarily have 
happened under freer trading conditions (1),
The second aspect was economic aid. From 1963 to 1965 the U.S.A. 
provided more aid than the USSR and in 1970 and 1971 repayments to the 
USSR exceeded drawings. Economic aid after 1969 was dwarfed by the 
amount of military aid however. Although its purposes was military, 
one of its consequences was economic. It had to be paid off with 
interest, at least in theory. This in turn had political implications 
for a country in dangerous financial circumstances.
The decline of bilateralism was an important move towards freer 
trade. One result of the reduction in state control was a general 
increase in imports, particularly of consumer goods.
(1) M. Efrat ’The Defence Burden in Egypt During the Deepening of 
the Soviet Involvement in 1962-731 PhD Thesis, London 
University, May 1981. P24-3G. (Quoted with permission of the 
Author).
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Foreign Investment
A central feature of the liberalisation programme was the opening 
of the economy to foreign influence in terms of trade and investment. 
The move towards encouraging foreign investment with tax and other 
incentives was politically, as well as economically, significant 
because it represented an opening up of Egyptian society to foreigners 
and a move away from state control of economic activity. If foreigners 
were to visit the country, sell and invest there, then conditions had 
to be very different from those which prevailed in the 1960s. 
Foreigners would not invest in a country which had no private, 
domestic sector, given Egypt's history. In turn, further local 
investment would be encouraged by the commitment which the government 
made to foreign investors. The memory of nationalisations, 
sequestrations and even imprisonments did not die with President 
Nasser; his successor had to prove his commitment to the private 
sector.
The central piece of legislation designed to attract foreign 
investment was Law 43 of 1974. It was significantly amended in 1977 
when, amongst other things, local investors were granted the same 
privileges as foreigners.
The regime's perceptions of the issues involved in foreign 
investment is of relevance here and an attempt will be made to compare 
some of the expectations with the results.
The public sector was involved in a number of joint ventures 
under Law 43 (known henceforth as Law 43 companies). It also supplied 
a large share of the capital for investment in certain sectors. This 
raised sensitive issues about the role of the public sector and the 
influence of joint venture companies.
2it
The most important issue in assessing the success of a policy is 
the size of its contribution to economic development. The official 
view has been implicitly stated to be 'disappointing' and this was one 
reason for the move in the late 1970s towards a concept of 'Popular 
Development' which would encourage domestic private sector activity.
Table 7 shows that there was some success in attracting foreign 
investment. In fact the results have been much more modest if the 
petroleum sector is excluded. It is the pattern of investment rather 
than the total amount which has disappointed many Egyptians.
To a certain extent, the investment pattern under Law 43 has been 
outside the government's control. It vetted all applications and could 
reject undesirable proposals, but seldom did. It usually approved 
proposals because it wanted to maximise activity and did not want to 
interfere excessively. Looking back on the first five years of the 
policy, some have seen that the government needed to impose a frame­
work on investment under Law 43. This could have been done by 
rejecting investment proposals which were thought to be undesirable 
(1).
The policy, at its inception, laid emphasis on storage of goods 
as an activity to be encouraged. The government pushed for the 
construction of warehouses in the Suez Canal Zone so that Egypt would 
develop as an entrepot centre, transhipping goods between Europe, 
America and the Gulf States. She would be able to make use of the 
goods stored as collateral on which to borrow and the presence of 
those goods in the country might in turn encourage investment by 
highlighting the fact that it was peaceful (in contrast to the
(1) Dr. A.A. Hegazi, former Deputy Prime Minister responsible for 
the introduction of Law 43, interviewed.
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position before 1974) (1). After the 1973 war the government came 
under considerable pressure from the Suez Canal Zone to speedily 
reconstruct the area which had most directly suffered from war since 
1967. It was not therefore disposed to be fussy about the activities 
which were to go there.
This aspect of the policy has, in retrospect, been highly 
criticised although those who wrote Law 43 deny that it was their 
intention to permit or encourage any of the abuses which have occurred 
since 1974. II is one of the clearest examples of a kind of rent- 
seeking . Warehousing would permit Egypt to sell 'space* and earn an 
income while producing nothing. She was trying to take advantage of 
her geographical location.
The nature of the foreign investment which Egypt attracted in the 
1970s was closely related to the stage and structure of its 
development. This was even more true of the domestic private 
investment which has developed in the 1970s. Egypt had, in the years 
before 1970, been a closed economy and to some extent it was a closed 
society. Despite the extensive socialism which had been introduced in 
the 1960s, there had been an accumulation of private wealth in these 
years. The possibilities for private consumtion were limited as 
imports were tightly controlled and because the pattern of production 
inside the economy moved only gradually towards meeting the demand of 
the relatively well off. As soon as the barriers to consumption were 
eased, incentives to import or produce luxury items increased. In a 
country with a recent history of nationalisation and sequestration,
(1) 'Middle East Economic Digest1, 14.1.1977, P4.
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there were disincentives real or perceived to domestic production and 
so imports tended to fill a vacuum. This had a significant impact on 
the pattern of investment financed by foreign and domestic sources.
The pattern was not unique to Egypt: many developing countries began 
their development processes with production patterns not necessarily 
suited to the domestic mass market. The mass market in Egypt was 
supposed to be catered for by the public sector. Entrepreneurs in 
developing countries are often unsure of the stability of the economic 
and political structures which exist in their societies and therefore 
tend to invest in those sectors which will yield quick returns or 
which involve limited funds. Only when they feel more secure do they 
become more willing to take risks.
From the international perspective most foreign investment in the 
1970s was done by large companies; only they had the resources, 
knowledge, expertise and even bargaining power to carry it out. Such 
firms in the manufacturing sector however have tended to concentrate 
their production in developed economies. Those which have shown the 
greatest interest in Egypt have been banks, companies in the service 
sector plus those using locally available natural resources such as 
petroleum. The latter had access to Egypt in the 1960s.
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Table 7: Foreiqn Investment as a Share of Total Fixed Investment
1971//2,i978 (£EM).
1971/2 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
1.Gross Fixed 
investment 363.0 378.3 462.4 640.0 1228.0 1323.0 1805.0 2183.0
of which 
-Private 40.0 41.0 38.0 27.5 176.5 236.0 366.0 360.0
-Public 325.0 337.3 424.4 612.5 1051.0 1089.0 1439.0 1823.0
2. Foreign 
investment n.a n.a n.a 27.0 58.0 117.0 170.0 172
As % of 
gross fixed 
investment n.a n.a n.a 4.2 6.7 8.8 9.4 7.9
Source: 1. K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a period of 
Transition1 op cit P405
2. K. Ikram Ibid P347.
Figures in source are in dollars converted to £E at the official 
exchange rate.
Soft drink manufacturers took an interest in the Egyptian market 
both because of its size and because of the potential use of local 
citrus products. These companies were criticised inside the country 
for making products which were not essential and even 
considered socially undesirable in that they represents pattern of 
consumption closely related to Western standards. Finally, the room 
for value added is limited as is export potential.
21H
The amount of foreign investment has disappointed many and the 
volume of employment created has been limited. Table 8 shows that by 
the end of 1979, 132 projects were in operation in the manufacturing 
sector under the provisions of Law 43. The^ j accounted for 29% of the 
total number of projects in operation and 43% of the total approvals 
for the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing approval (a guide to the 
number of applications for that sector) by the end of 1979 accounted 
for 28 % of total approvals.
Table 8: Investment Under Law 43i Number of Projects at Year's End 
1977/1980
1977 1978 1979 1980
1. Approved projects 744 903 1079 1287
a) Inland 482 391 766
b) Public Free Zone 201 295 249
c) Private Free Zone 61 67 64
of which in manufacturing 228 243 394
of which: in production 184 334 455 807
a) Inland 112 141 280
b) Public Free Zone 53 104 137
c) Private Free Zone 19 39 83
of which in manufacturing 64 83 132
of which: under
jImplementation 227 349 329
a) Inland 171 259 273
b) Public Free Zone 44 79 45
c) Private Free Zone 12 11 11
of which in manufacturing 96 100 99
Sources: Study on Law 43 Investment Policies ’Ministry of Economy* 
Economic Studies Unit, December 1979.
Investment & Free Zone Authority 'Facts & Figures* No.IV 
December 1978 and No.VI December 1979.
Egyptian Gazette 17.3.81 quoting the 'Annual Report of the 
Investment & Free Zone Authority*
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By 31st December 1978 20,309 people were employed in non- 
financial Law 43 projects. 9,525 were in the manufacturing sector. The 
amount of investment in 1979, measured in terms of paid up capital 
plus loans, per employee was £E16,00Q for the whole Law 43 category 
excluding the financial sector. For the manufacturing sector of the 
Law 43 group per capita investment was £E9,9000 (1).
These figures were much higher than the average for the relevant 
sectors of the economy as a whole and this raises the question of how 
beneficial such a concentration of investment was. In a country with 
abundant supplies of labour it would seem wise to spread capital more 
thinly over the whole economy so that its marginal return would be 
higher. Another possibility would be to encourage the use of second 
hand or older machinery which might be more labour intensive. This 
might yield gains in terms of training, education in maintenance 
experience (the more advanced an item of machinery is the more likely 
it is to need expert maintenance from the country of its manufacture 
unless it has been deliberately ’designed down' for use in a 
developing economy). Simpler equipment might be more comprehensible to 
the technical cadre available in Egypt.
Another point of view is that the most modern equipment is more 
relevant to the international companies which Egypt wants to attract. 
By encouraging them and their choice of technology Egypt is 
encouraging both profit maximisation inside the firms and therefore 
gains to the economy.
These are the theoretical questions posed by such a pattern. The 
economic decision maker faces a somewhat different set of issues and 
it is these which will determine his response. They include such
(1) MEED, 14.1.1977, P4, op cit.
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questions as whether foreign companies would invest in Egypt if their 
choice of technology is controlled by the government in order to 
achieve certain employment targets. Are such restrictions compatible 
with a move towards a more liberal economy and, if they are, will they
be seen to be? They will also be concerned with the question of
whether investment is replaceable: if one type of investment is
blocked because of its social rate of return is law, will another with
higher social returns come on stream.
The last issue is one of the most important from the government's 
point of view. On the basis of press reports, official studies and 
statements by potential investors further government interference 
would probably block investment rather than shift its technological 
composition or output pattern.
Weak administration has been one of the more serious problems 
facing Egypt and more detailed intervention might have been beyond the 
competence of officials. The bureaucracy has, in part, seen the growth 
of foreign investment and the private sector as a threat. The public 
sector has seen it as a source of competition with unfair advantages. 
Private investment represents a kind of decentralisation to those 
officials who held responsible positions in the planned economy of the 
early 1960s. Foreign investors faced not only unwilling officials but 
also a large bureaucracy lacking clear lines of authority between 
departments and organisations. They had to deal with not only the 
Investment Authority at the Ministry of Economy, but also with the 
General Organisation of Industrialisation at the Ministry of Industry. 
The latter bodies were closely associated with the running of the 
public sector and to a certain extent represented its interests.
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In so far as officials were uncooperative, opportunities were 
created for a group of intermediaries. This group, consisting in part 
of former civil servants and public sector officials, sold to the 
foreign investor its knowledge of the system. The inability of the 
foreign investor to deal with Egypt's bureaucracy therefore gave rise 
to rent-seeking,with knowledge and contacts being the items in short 
supply. The apparent or initial non-cooperation of officials is in 
this light self-serving. Not only were they trying to protect their 
jobs in an overmanned bureaucracy, but also they were creating 
opportunities for bribes, commissions and favours.
The dominance of the public sector meant that many joint ventures 
were set up between it and foreign investors. This increased the area 
of interaction between state run bureaucratic organisation and those 
with the funds to pay rents.
Figures for private and foreign sector investment were biased 
upwards because foreign aid and public funds used in joint ventures 
under Law 43 were counted as private sector finance (1).
Dne of the main reasons for the opening to foreign investment was 
frustration with the performance of the public industrial sector. It 
was supposed to operate within a planned framework with some 
decentralisation compared to the 1960s. After moves in that direction 
after 1975, controls were tightened in 1980, The need to control 
prices so as to reduce inflation involved tighter restrictions on the
(1) Dr. A. Gritly, former Finance Minister and advisor to the 
Ministry of Economy, interviewed, and 0. Waterbury 'Egypt: 
Burdens of the Past and Options for the Future' P298.
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firm than those exercised by the rest of the planning system. Price 
controls were so restrictive that one firm, Delta, in the iron and 
steel sector, actually cannibalised equipment from one of its plants 
making price controlled products (which it found unprofitable) and set 
up production of uncontrolled goods.
Emigration Policy
The emigration of Egyptian workers in the 1970s was not costless 
and is one of the most important examples of virtually unplanned 
economic change. The policies which permitted them to leave, 
represented a significant change in official thinking and added 
profoundly to the concept and reality of a liberal economy. Freeing 
emigration was not explicitly part of the liberalisation announced in 
1974, but arguably had greater effects on the economy than any policy 
announced within the official framework. In permitting emigration the 
government recognised the potential foreign currency remittances which 
Egypt could earn. It caused a shortage of skilled labour inside Egypt 
and has added hugely to the inflow of foreign exchange.
From the mid 1950s until 1967 emigration was strongly
discouraged. For most people it was virtually impossible to leave 
Egypt. In October 1967 a committee, which had been established three 
years earlier, suggested that emigration be encouraged. It advocated a 
policy which involved surveying the Egyptian labour force collecting 
information about labour markets abroad, simplifying the bureaucracy 
pertaining to emigration and encouraging emigrants to remit part of
their savings at home. It also suggested that one agency handle all
emigration matters (1).
(1) A1 Ahram 13.10.67 A1 Ahram al Iqtisadi 17.10.67 quoted in 
A.E.H. Dessouki 'Development of Egypt's Migration Policy 
1952-1978' Cairo University M.I.T. Programme, December 1978.
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The consideration given to emigration was prompted by the 
slowdown in the economy and the growing problems of finding jobs for 
graduates with a rapidly increasing labour force. It was approved by 
those favouring a closed economy and by those who feared that a loss 
of skills would result.
From 1967 until 1973 various moves were made to encourage 
emigration and there was much discussion of the issue during the 
period 1968 to 1970. In 1969 28,000 people applied to emigrate 
compared to 13,000 in the previous six years. This sudden increase 
caused alarm and gave rise to a debate about the effects of 
emigration. Permission to emigrate was suspended in 1969 and in 1970 
regulated emigration was permitted. The government wanted to encourage 
the emigration of all except those with certain skills (1). In 1971 
the right to emigrate was enshrined in the constitution and in 1972 
procedures for leaving the country were again simplified.
After 1972 numerous bodies examined the possibility of easing 
emigration procedures fundamentally; Dessouki lists 11 government 
committees set up or involved in this (2). Thejwere uncoordinated and 
there was no clear hierarchy indicating the relationship between them. 
The fact that so many government departments did sprout committees on 
the subject indicated that the question was important* that it was 
perceived as affecting many sections of society and economy. It also 
showed that the tide was turning decisively towards freeing emigration 
of controls altogether.
(1) Ibid.
(2) Dessouki op cit P15.
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A major impetus towards easing controls was the move towards 
closer cooperation with the oil rich Arab States after 1970. Supplying 
labour was Egypt's contribution to the Arab development process: 
particularly from 1973.
Table 9: Estimates of the Number of Egyptians Leaving Egypt to
Work Abroad p.a., 1963-1976
1968 130,000
1969 165,000
1970 170,000
1971 220,000
1972 210,000
1973 505,000
1976 600,000
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) 'The Migration of population across the 
frontiers of the A.R.E. 1973-78' published quarterly 
Cited by Choucri et al, Migration and Employment in the 
Construction Sector: Critical Factors in Egyptian 
Development1, Cairo University; MIT Technology Adaptation 
Programme, October, 1978. 1971 figures calculated by 
Choucri et al.
There is no concensus about the accuracy of official or other 
statistics on emigration. If the number of Egyptians living abroad in 
1967 is excluded or assumed to be negligible then by 1973, according 
to the figures in Table 9, 1.425 million Egyptians were living abroad. 
This figure assumes no returns to Egypt among emigrants. As 600,000 
left in 1976 and 505,000 in 1973, it is possible that up to 500,000 
left in each of the years 1974 and 1975, especially as these were 
years of rapid growth in the oil rich states to which most Egyptians 
went. The total by the end of 1976 on this basis was 2.035 millions; 
again . assuming no returnf. From 1977 to 1980 two factors are likely
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to have affected the pattern. Firstly growth in the oil rich states 
slowed down somewhat and it is very likely that emigration to these 
states declined as well. Secondly, there is evidence that emigrants, 
having amassed a sum of capital, returned to Egypt (1).
Emigration has resulted in a large increase in remittances
received by Egypt. According to Table 4, remittances totalled $29m in 
e
1970 and ££.95bn in 1980. In 1980 remittances were the most important 
single source of foreign exchange, exceeding petroleum. This would 
seem to be a major policy achievement given that foreign exchange was 
a constraint on development from 1963.
Such a view is reinforced by an examination of the domestic 
labour market. A lack of productive jobs has been a major problems for 
the last fifteen years at least. If labour could be exported then the 
excess supply of one factor of production on the domestic market could 
be converted into an inflow of badly needed foreign exchange. Looked 
at from this macro-economic point of view the policy has been 
successful. This is especially true if the contribution to the Arab 
economy (that of other oil rich states) is seen as a policy 
objective.
There were costs however. The first was inflation, caused by both 
demand and supply factors. The second was the effect on development of 
the emigration of skilled manpower which went beyond inflation and 
involved output losses.
Calculations of these costs have been attempted in relation to 
the construction sector by Choucri, Eckhaus and Mohie-Eldine (2). They
(1) Personal observations.
(2) N. Choucri, R.S. Eckhaus & A. Mohie Eldine ’Migration and 
Employment in the Construction Sector: Critical Factors in 
Egyptian Development’ Cairo University - M.I.T. Technology 
Adaptation Programme October, 1978.
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showed how costs increased in the construction sector as wages were 
bid up and how the cost increases spilled over into other sectors thus 
boosting inflation. Although labour moved into those sectors which 
lost workers on emigration, there was more than a marginal increase in 
wages rates, designed to attract needed skills. Ironically, skilled 
construction workers from Western Europe had to be imported into Cairo 
to work as plasterers in hotels for example. There was a widespread 
shortage of highly skilled labour for industrial employment. The 
Egyptian labour market was very rigid: training did not respond to 
supply shortages or demand changes and so many bottlenecks arose. 
Skilled workers remaining in Egypt could therefore earn a rental 
income because they were in short supply. This could be quite large if 
their skills were required by the private sector. This differential 
was large enough to make it worthwhile importing the European workers 
mentioned above.
It is assumed that the 1980 average wage in the construction 
sector was between £E450-£E50G per annum and imported Western workers 
would not have worked for less than £E10,000 (and possibly much more) 
(1). Their rental income, in the Egyptian context, was therefore about 
$9,500 or about 19 times the basic wage. Even allowing for the fact 
that wages in the construction sector were higher, those with skills 
could do well. The calculation here is very approximate and the number 
of imported workers was small. It does show the scale of the problem 
and the possibility for rental income caused by emigration.
(1) The minimum wage was increased by 25% to £E20 per month in Hay 
1980.
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This compounded the inflationary effects of shortages of 
materials already discussed. Hence the macro-economic picture gained 
from an examination of particular labour markets gives a less healthy 
impression than that of the total labour market (1). Improving 
training and making the educational system more vocationally 
orientated was an important policy objective in 1980, but the 
response was belated (2).
The emigration of skilled workers can be seen in the context of a 
rigid domestic labour market. According to Birks and Sinclair, 15% of 
those working outside agriculture in 1979 were employed in the public 
sector and bureaucracy (3). This figure excluded the armed forces. In 
public employment a worker had security, partial protection against 
dismissal and inflation, a pension and the possibility of doing a 
second job. Such a worker would not necessarily have the time, 
ability, finance or even incentive to train for another job. There 
was therefore a large section of the workforce, often educated at 
university which would not emigrate nor move into other areas of 
employment.
(1) 3. Birks & C.A. Sinclair 'Human Capital on the Nile:
Developments and Emigration in the Arab Republic of Egypt and 
the Democratic Republic of the Sudan' International Labour
Office, Geneva, World Employment Programme Research Working 
Paper, Migration for Employment Project, May 1978.
(2) Dr. Abdel Kader Hatem, Supervisor General, Specialised National 
Councils, Cairo, interviewed.
(3) 3.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair 'International Migration and 
Development in the Arab Region' I.L.O. Geneva 1980 P97.
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Outside this sector relatively few workers had skills^ according 
to Birks & Sinclair (1). In fact, their view may be outdated in that 
some public sector firms were, in 1980, finding themselves short of 
skilled workers as the latter moved into better paid private sector 
jobs. The bureaucracy and public sector were still growing in manpower 
terms and this locked many with 4n education into an immobile system, 
although the most able moved to the private sector.
Egyptians have been returning home in small numbers to settle 
permanently. Those who acquired capital by making use of their skills 
abroad have not necessarily wanted to work as artisans on returning 
home. Their capital allowed them to start small businesses, sometimes 
involving manufacturing but often as importers.
Emigration policy has demonstrated the lack of planning which has 
characterised Egypt since 1963/4. The decision to permit and 
facilitate mass emigration was made pragmatically, in response to 
factors which have been described. It was not accompanied by any plans 
to deal with the consequences. The decision was ad hoc in the sense 
that it dealt with an immediate problem: the shortage of foreign 
exchange. It was also a response to employment problems but only in a 
very general sense.
(1) J.S. Birks & C.A. Sinclair op cit, P97.
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Conclusions
The foreign sector was seen as an area of opportunities. It was 
therefore reformed via the trade and exchange rate systems. This 
encouraged imports, foreign investment and capital inflows.
It was seen as an easy option for reform because it would and did 
result in an increase in the supply of commodities. Exports, other 
than oil, did not grow substantially because they were dependent on 
domestic production which went largely unreformed. This constrained 
domestic production and hence encouraged imports, given rising 
demand.
The foreign sector benefited from increased tourist, oil and 
Suez Canal revenues. These gains were related to political changes 
such as the reorientation from the Soviet block to the West and the 
improvement of relations with Israel. Remittance inflows were related 
to improvements in relations with the oil rich Arab States in the 
early 1970.
The decline in trade with the East meant the end of bilateralism 
and hence a reduction in state control. This also weakened the 
mechanism which tended to balance trade between Egypt and her trading 
partners.
Egypt made full use of the opportunities for capital imports 
exporting labour and selling oil abroad. These funds paid for 
increases in imports which were largely unplanned. They also helped to 
supplement domestic savings. Few of these developments affected the 
exports of industry and agriculture.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
Egyptian economic policy in the 1970s was extremely successful in 
one respect. It increased the total resources available to the economy 
dramatically.
Total resources are defined as GDP plus the excess of imports 
over exports. The ability 0f an economy to persistently run a
balance of payments deficit reflects its credit-worthiness abroad.
Before 1978-79, deficits on the balance of payments resulted in a 
build up of short term foreign debt and consequent financing 
difficulties. After that date increased foreign aid made it 
unnecessary even to receive the blessing of the IMF for economic 
policy (1).
GDP was increased as a result of the growth of rental sector 
incomes. These included oil, Suez Canal tolls and emigrant 
remittances. Table 4, Chapter 7, provides data on the size of these 
items in dollar terms. Converting them into domestic currency provides 
a crude indication of their contribution to the national income.
Table 1 below shows the relationship between GDP, the rental 
sectors and the balance of payments deficit in current prices. Table 2 
shows the same relationships in constant price terms.
The massive expansion of foreign exchange resources in the late 
1970s provided Egypt with an opportunity to overcome what were thoughts b-e. 
one of the major constraints in her development. From 1963 onwards 
shortages of foreign exchange constantly blocked expansion of the 
economy. Evidence was presented in Chapter 4 that a step-like increase 
in public sector production occurred when foreign currency supplies 
increased in the late 1970s but stagnation set in afterwards.
(1) See Appendix 1.
22T-
TABLE:t: TOTAL R E S O U R C E S , G D P  A N D  T H E  RENTAL SECTORS
- / 9 8 Q  //V CU##tENT M / C S S
h  Bn 
12
16
M
/<?
to
g
6
4
&
To fa t resources :
f6  D P ^ (im p o rts  ~
/exports^
/  / a  o p
— \—  
f2
—y-----1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- r—
73 74 75 76 77 78 7f
— i 
801470 7/
SO UPCB Tab to 3 t>o/o w
Ta
bl
e 
la
: 
GD
P,
 
Th
e 
Re
nt
al
 
Se
ct
or
s 
an
d 
To
ta
l 
Re
so
ur
ce
s 
19
70
-1
98
0 
£E
M 
(C
ur
re
nt
 
Pr
ic
es
)
228
o st 1—1 A On00 O PA CM CM
On 00 O st CM
i—1 NO st i—1 00
I—1 rp
On LA CM CM A
A a o O A
On st ON o st
i-H CM CM CM st
r-H i—l
00 CM CM i—l PA
A 00 A A ■—1
On a O PA A
i—1 On CM i—1 i—1
i—1
I"* o A O O
a 1—1 st On O
ON CM PA A a1—1 CO ■—1 ON
NO a On CO <1-
A On 00 PA ■—I
ON CM 00 On O A
■H NO A 00
On
rH■
A *
A NO i—1 A- PA A 0
A CO On PA CM On P
ON 00 PA ON CO i—1 0
rH ■st A 0
L_ A
s:
i—i P
<t a CM LA CM CO
0
-o
a ON A o O a C
On r—i <H LA A 0
rH <t st ■P rH0 0
■H O
•P
0 ONA PA lA CO i—1 ■P A
A' NO PA ON NO CO 1
On NO i—1 I—1 00 CM
■—I PA A rH A
0 On •
•H i—i 0
o -P
C •N 0 P
CM PA ON CM ON m 0 0 oA »H NO ON O C C O CL
ON st iH NO ■H 3 C X<H PA A U. A 0 01 ■P
rH A -P p
0 ■H ■H 0
C • 3 E >■—1 NO A CO •st o A O 0 o
a st <—1 iA O •H p
On <H <-i A ■P P 0 C 0
i—1 PA A 0 0 P *0 o •P
C -P 0 C -H P
P CL 0 0 -P O0 0 A ■H CL
4-> JZ 0 c Eo ■—1 00 r-H CM c CJ rH p-lj iH •H
a a CM CM ON PH 0 rH 0-
ON On ■—1 O •st a O 0 d-
CM A • • 0 ■P "D O0 0 ■H
-P rH <+_ ■—1 0 0
P SZ 0 E a
o 0 0 C O c
D. 1— P 0 O 0E 0 CJ c i—1
■—1 CM A (H • • 1—! 01 P O N JDCD 0 O 00 0 i—1
-P -P ■P On 3 0 TD
P P o ■—1 LO C C
O O 0 O 0Q. a. la ■a ‘HE X c r-t -P Q_£0 ►H C0 Ld 1—1 0 •H 0 (AP 0 0 CD 2:CD
O CO a Cv-p □
■P 3 p PN c A r-N r-'<—-O c. 3 Q 0 ON rH CM ACD ■H o CD CC *H v_/ ^ _ _
cn E CO
_c 0 ••O rH 0 cc 0•H Cd •P 0 »»
P 1— 1 a 0
5 c O 0 p 0Q_ 0 Q. -p 3 -p
Cl d— C H X o O O
CO O 1 LU h- LO Z
t a s l e  a i t o t a l  a e s o u z c e s ,  c p p  a  n o  t h e  fiENrAL s e c t o r s
/9?+ ~/96Q, trt CONSTANT P/?iCES
7
Tbtoi Resources t
b oP+ (imports- exports)]
OOP
ft
7
6 GOP minus renta l 
sectors
S
4
3
2
/
W 4  75 SO
SOURCE : T&b/e- 4* As/ovy
1Table 2a: GDP, The Rental Sectors and Total Resources: 1974-■1980
(in 1973 prices) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(4)
GDP 4297 4886 5269 5683 6226 6766 7767
of which
-Rental Sectors(l) 207 391 748 927 1290 • 1535 1744
Exports -Imports(2) 318 937 621 540 867 1078 655
Total Resources (3) 4815 5823 5890 6223 7094 7844 8418
Sources: GDP & Exports-Imports: International Financial Statistics, 
IMF, 1983.
Rental Sectors: Table 4, Chapter 7.
Notes: 1980 = Fiscal year: duly - Oune, 1974-79 Calendar years.
(1) Oil, Suez Canal tolls and remittances
(2) National Income definition
(3) GDP + balance of imports over exports
(4) GDP deflator unavailable: Consumer price index used 
instead.
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The^availability of foreign exchange was not accompanied by the 
changes in the organisation and control of the public sector. The 
economy became more dualistic than before despite the development of 
joint ventures between the public and private sectors under the terms 
of Law 43.
An important conclusion can be drawn from the analysis. The 
relationships between the public and private sectors and the private 
sector plus the bureaucracy tended to reduce pressure for reform. 
Foreign exchange provided the funds for buying licences, paying bribes 
or meeting black market prices. The private investor could get round 
bureaucratic and policy constraints more easily at the end of the 
decade than at the beginning because more resources were available. 
Greater returns could be earned from, for example, an import licence 
because there was more finance in the economy to pay for imported 
goods. There were therefore greater incentives to find ways around the 
obstacles.
At the same time the bureaucrat had every incentive to fight for 
his job. He could increase his income (both legally and illegally), 
status and power from a situation in which more entrepeneurs wanted 
licences for various activities.
Both the private sector and the public bureaucracy had incentives 
to maintain the status quo. The development of rental incomes and 
increased foreign aid tended -to reinforce this. It was not only as a 
result of rental income and foreign resources that reform was 
subve^t^c/ Foreign resources played little more than a passive role 
permitting other developments such as a growth of imports.
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The earning of rent was widespread and created a whole network of 
interests in favour of the status quo. Subsidies coupled with 
shortages of basic commodities created dual markets with opportunities 
for reselling items on the black market. Low domestic energy prices 
encouraged the use of private cars, generating income for importers 
among others. Low interest rates compared with those which would 
clear markets implicitly subsidied those who had favourable access to 
credit and enabled public sector to survive the rigours of price 
controls. Easing emigration not only provided remittances in cash and 
kind but enabled skilled workers in Egypt to earn rental incomes 
because of their short supply. An over-valued exchange rate subsidised 
all imports.
Practically everyone in the country had some interest in the 
existing system, even if it was only in the short term. Reforms may 
have boosted the economic growth rate by increasing efficiency but 
that would have been a future gain to be traded against possible 
current losses or adjustments.
This was the nature of Egypt's middle way. The centralised 
control of the early 1960s was rejected while complete laissez faire 
was not even considered. It is useful here to examine briefly the 
reasons why extreme policies were not adopted.
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The gist of advice given by Little, Scitovsky and Scott (2), 
Bhagwati (2) and Krueger (3), among others, was that developing 
countries such as Egypt should move away from import substitution 
(IS) towards export promotion (EP). They suggested that IS, together 
with the policies which usually accompany it, formed a chaotic mix. 
This was certainly true for Egypt in the early 1970s. Streeten has 
made the point that both inward looking IS policies and outward 
looking market orientated ones (such as EP) can increase inequalities 
in income distribution (4). This is because the former strengthen 
market imperfections inside the country and can reduce demand for 
labour intensive processes. The latter may reward scarce factors and 
penalise those in abundant supply. Hence capital and management do 
better than workers. In a market orientated system, international 
companies tend to expand production of goods and services with 
increasing returns; while developing countries concentrate on either 
non-increasing returns or relatively slowly increasing returns 
sectors. The economic
(1) I. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott ’Industry and Trade in some 
Developing Countries'
(2) 3. Bhagwati 'Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control 
Regimes'
(3) A.G. Krueger 'Liberalisation Attempts and Consequences'
(4) P. Streeten 'Trade Strategies for Development, Some Themes for 
the 1970s' in P. Streeten ed, 'Trade Strategies for Development' 
Macmillan, 1973.
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mechanism tends to reinforce existing power relationships to the 
advantage of more developed states. Technology available on 
international markets is most suited to its suppliers in that it is 
relatively capital intensive. The capital intensive nature of foreign 
investment in Egypt has been noted in Chapter 7. The products of this 
technology do not always meet the needs of those on low incomes.
Stewart partially integrated the critiques of IS and EP (1). The 
failures of IS are those of inappropriate technology and output; EP 
may not necessarily solve those problems.
The types of policies accompanying EP, according to Krueger and 
Bhagwati, cause growth to accelerate if certain conditions prevail.
The necessary condition is that the additional supply of (Egyptian) 
exports would not result in lower prices on international markets.
This was a fear with regard to cotton exports before the 1970s, which 
resulted in an export tax, but the assumption may not be, in general 
terms, unreasonable.
Abdel Fadil (2) has shown how income inequality grew in the 1960s 
under a regime of import substitution, but this was not the inevitable 
outcome of the trade policy adopted. It had much more to do with the 
accumulation of private profits in the construction sector and the 
nature of land reform than inappropriate technology.
(1) F. Stewart ’Trade and Technology1 in P. Streeten ed, op cit.
(2) M. Abdel Fadil ’The Political Economy of Nasserism1
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Inequalities in income distribution, consumption patterns causing 
social and political tension, slow economic growth and agricultural 
stagnation were problems in the 1960s. These issues persisted in the 
1970s, despite the changes in economic policy. In some respects, 
production might have been stimulated by liberalising the price 
system. Given the problems suggested by Streeten, further 
liberalisation of the trade system would not necessarily have eased 
Egypt’s problems. Adopting a completely free market system 
domestically was not possible either. The events of January 1977 show 
why.
The other extreme alternative was to override the market with 
centralised planning. To the extent to which this was experienced the 
results were unsatisfactory. Egypt suffered many of the problems 
because ownership of the areas of production was not separated from 
the idea of control. As the state owned the public sector it 
controlled it in a very detailed way. The idea that ownership could 
remain public while control was decentralised, was unacceptable in the 
1960s and hard to implement in the 1970s. The centralised control 
system did not exercise full control however. It did not control 
private consumption nor could it raise taxes sufficiently. The public 
sector was unable to increase its savings to a point where they would 
meet investment. As a result the economy relied on imported finance to 
a growing extent.
23G
There was a deeper reason why centalised control was unsuccessful 
in the 1960s for more than a few years. The regime was not 
ideologically committed to the radical change in attitudes that would 
have been needed. It gained its support, in part, from opponents of 
socialism (1).
Given the dangers of extreme policies, it would seem that a 
middle way was preferable. This might have involved partial 
liberalisation of the exchange rate, trade, price and investment 
systems without, for example, ending food subsidies. Egypt followed a 
middle way, but this, too, was unsatisfactory.
The main reason was that the mixture of liberalisation and 
central control was, in part, an unplanned reaction to economic and 
political pressures. The foreign exchange system was modified in order 
to encourage the remittances of Egyptian workers abroad and 
restrictions on emigration were eased. Foreign policy reorientations 
in the early 1970s made it possible to attract Arab finance. Those in 
the late 1970s made American assistance possible. The mixture of 
foreign policy and economic adjustments was highly successful in that 
substantial amounts of economic aid were obtained. American military 
aid replaced Soviet military aid as well. The need for foreign aid has 
been consistently recognised by the Egyptian leadership and in view of 
the country’s complex international relations, she has been successful 
in attracting assistance.
(1) B. Hansen 'Arab Socialism in Egypt: World Development' Vol.3 
No.4 April 1975.
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Domestically, the need to maintain the massive and growing 
employment of civil servants and public sector workers made reform 
hard. Most production in the economy in the 1970s was under a command 
system, as in the 1960s. Public sector firms had to get ministerial 
approval for investment, pricing output and employment policy changes. 
The ministerial decision making process was neither efficient in terms 
of speed nor in terms of decisions given. Fear of inflation in public 
sector products meant that prices were not allowed to increase freely; 
sometimes, as in 1980, they were actually cut, despite rapid inflation 
and shortages in the economy as a whole. Unwillingness to face the 
implications of enforcing higher productivity meant that over-staffing 
persisted. The concentration of power at the top meant that detailed 
decisions about policy had to be taken by ministers.
The command system was not completely pervasive however. Law 43 
firms could legally avoid many economic controls, but the 'Open Door 
Sector' which operated under that law tended not to produce basic 
commodities purchased by the mass of the population. The latter did 
not therefore derive benefit from the more competitive environment in 
which Law 43 firms were supposed to operate.
The public sector suffered from the worst of both worlds. The 
private sector flourished mainly in areas of doubtful socio-economic 
value, while the public sector stagnated behind bureaucratic controls. 
In agriculture, controls were partially evaded, but total production 
stagnated. Agriculture continued to be starved of investment 
resources, despite thepartial reorientation of economic policy.
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This was despite the experience of slow production growth in the 
1960s, a food crisis in the 1970s and the growing international 
realisation in recent years that countries which developed fastest 
were those which gave priorities to agriculture (l).
Egypt's leaders expected a great deal from the outside world. 
Having been isolated for years from most countries outside the Soviet 
bloc ., they thought that simply opening the economy to foreign trade 
and investment would solve the problems. For this reason, Law 43 
companies were supposed to find their own foreign exchange needs by 
exporting, even though many projects were expected to be import 
substituting (2).
Some decision makers knew that internal adjustments would have to 
accompany external ones. Dr. Hegazi's desire to link public sector 
wage rises to productivity increases has been mentioned. He was 
defeated in the political arena because it proved impossible to hold 
down wages in the face of price rises (given the complexities of 
initiating productivity increases), while large profits were being 
made by some in the economy.
By 1980 this problem had reache^crisis proportions. The President 
intervened to increase wages and cut prices in the face of 
accelerating inflation and shortages of commodities. In so doing, he 
did more to reverse the process of liberalisation than anything he had 
done since 1970. The sequence of policy measures during 1980 is 
examined in Appendix 2.
(1) e.g. World Bank Development Report 1979
(2) R.E. Driscoll, P.F. Hayek and F.A. Zacki 'Foreign Investment in
Egypt: An Analysis of Critical Factors with Emphasis on the
Foreign Investment Code'
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The problems behind this were in part recognised. The 1980-84 
plan contained the following remarks:
’....the open door policy reflects a major turning 
paint in the economic management of Egypt for which 
legislative acts alone would be insufficient. A number 
of institutional organisational and indeed behavioural 
changes are necessary .... ’ (emphasis added) (1).
A speech given by the then Minister of Planning with the same 
title as the document quoted above appears to have the same text with 
a number of significant changes. One is that the sentence emphasised 
above was put in the past tense, suggesting that behavioural and other 
changes had been achieved (2).
In this way, one of the most important issues which has faced 
Egypt in . its independent history has been both recognised (but not 
defined in detail) and ignored. The need for change was said to be the 
result of trying to combine a high rate of growth, social justice and 
rigid central planning in the 1960s, high defence expenditures, plus 
the effects of the 1967 War, the low rate of investment after 1967 
with a background of ever increasing population. Two constraints had 
to be removed before progress could be made: the balance of payments 
had to be improved and the nation’s social and economic infrastructure 
rebuilt. The need for change was not explained in terms of analysing 
the way in which people have behaved in the economic sphere.
(1) Ministry of Planning ’Egypt’s Development Strategy, Economic 
Management and Growth Objectives, 1980-84’ November, 1979.
(2) Minister of Planning,undated speech _■ ’Egypt’s Development 
Strategy, Economic Management and Growth Objectives 1980-84’
dated 1979.
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The President also recognised some of the problems; in creating 
the Arab International Bank as early as 1971, he hoped to bypass the 
bureaucracy. The main aim of the Bank was to make foreign currency 
available from the oil rich states and Egyptian emigrants. He 
complained about problems of administration and authorised numerous 
changes in the organisation of government. None of these moves tackled 
the basic problem of how production in the economy was controlled.
The government did not feel able to free firms from Ministerial 
control because there was no political consensus about how the economy 
was to be reformed. Attempts to loosen ministerial control appeared to 
workers as a retreat from socialism towards the capitalism of pre-1960 
Egypt of that of the Law 43 firms. Neither represented an acceptable 
alternative. Ultimately, the problem was one of accountability. The 
government and the President had one basic task: to provide enough 
food for the population on a day to day basis. Radical changes in 
organisation and management result in changes in the balance of power. 
This could have caused instability in a delicately balanced political 
system. With so much power concentrated in the hands of the President, 
there were disincentives to do anything which might disturb the 
existing order. The Open Door was conceived as a means of attracting 
resources to the economy, not fundamentally as a way of changing its 
organisation. For that reason, change in the external sphere - 
permitting emigration, encouraging the inflow of remittances, changing 
foreign relations in part to attract foreign aid, plus investment and 
easing imports - was much more radical than that inside the economy.
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The regime was unable to separate the ideas of ownership and 
control. It did not feel strong enough to pursuade workers that they 
would ultimately benefit from a decentralisation of the public 
sectors decision making. On this crucial issue (as in so many others 
such as collecting income tax or controlling imports), it avoided 
confronting an important group in society. As a result, the public 
sector operated along different lines from the private sector. This 
was much to its disadvantage. It did not gain directly from the 
increase in foreign funds except for the step-like increase in 
production. Resources were not used to cushion those who would suffer 
in the short term from the adjustments inherent in a decentralisation 
policy. Everyone gained from the status quo (although some gained 
much more than others), but they lost in terms of not achieving the 
long term advantages of reform. The availability of an easy option in 
terms of the rental sectors delayed the painful day when reforms 
would have to come.
By 1980 Egypt somewhat resembled the rental economies of the Gulf 
to a certain extent (1). Foreign currency flowed into the Treasury and 
into the private sector. This increased the state's ability to bribe 
pressure groups in order to maintain the status quo. Egypt had a large 
industrial sector with considerable potential. The rental sectors 
provided a cushion for making long overdue reforms leading to long 
term gains. By 1980 however this had not been done. In so far as so 
much power was concentrated in the hands of one man - the President - 
so the assassination which occurred in 1981 may lead to reforms.
(1) As described by H. Mahdavy 'The Pattern & Problems of Economic 
Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran1 in M. Cook ed.
'Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East1.
APPENDIX 1
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The Relationship between Egypt and the IMF
The relationship which developed between Egypt and the IMF was a 
result of the liberalisation policy and the problems which the country 
faced in the period after 1975. It was very different from the 
relationship between the international organisation and some other 
developing countries in the 1970s. This was mainly due to the role of 
the USA and the Gulf Arab States.
Egypt sought links with the IMF in the 1960s and much more 
intensively in the 1970s, as a way of securing finance on 
international markets. Traditionally the IMF provided developing 
countries with a seal of approval enabling them to obtain official and 
private sector loans. The seal was granted if certain criteria 
relating to economic management were met. These included control of 
the money supply, budgetary control, exchange and trade 
liberalisation. In the Egyptian case, the setting of targets for these 
variables became an intensely political matters.
By the end of 1976 Egypt was $452.9m in arrears on its short term 
debt repayments. That debt was about $1.3bn and to it should be added 
medium and long term debts of $5.585bn (1). This situation was a 
result of the continuous rise in the import bill, weak growth of 
exports and the very irregular inflow of the mainly Arab aid which
(1) K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition1 
op cit P351 & P364 and Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) 
14.1.1977 P4. According to Dr. Kaissouni, interviewed, 
debts in 1977 amounted to $12bn of which $4bn were 
military.
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covered most of the current account deficit. The current account 
deficit was reduced to $1.838bn in 1976 compared with $2.615bn in 1975
(1). Between those years total Arab assistance to Egypt fell by 
$1.072bn.
During 1976 the debt crisis came to a head and led to the 
appointment of Abdel Moneim Kaissouni as Deputy Prime Minister for 
Economic and Financial Affairs. He was given wide powers and 
immediately appointed a new team of Economic Ministers. Until his 
appointment the government, headed by Prime Minister Mamdouh Salam, 
had no senior economic minister with a coordinating role. The focus of 
Dr. Kaissouni*s efforts was to reduce the budget deficit and further 
the liberalisation of the economy. It was decided that reductions in 
expenditure would get priority over attempts to float the Egyptian 
pound, at least in the short run (2).
During 1976 discussions with the IMF emphasised the floating of 
the currency, which would have involved a substantial devaluation. The 
new economic team changed the emphasis of policy and with 
undertakings that the budget deficit would be reduced, a $450m loan 
was agreed with the Fund. This sum was to be made available over three 
years and access to it would be subject to the adherence to the agreed 
targets. The availability of these funds would make possible a 
floating of the pound at a future date (3)
(1) MEED op cit
(2) MEED op cit
(3) MEED op cit
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The January 1977 budget brought increases in import duties on 
luxury goods. Subsidies were reduced on a number of goods resulting in 
price rises of 16% for sugar, 31% for petrol, 12% for cigarettes and 
46% for cooking gas. Before the budget was announced there had been 
disturbances as a result of price rises but the new measures were 
followed by widespread and serious rioting. According to press 
reports, 73 people were killed and 2,000 arrested (1).
There were precedents for the unrest: in 1978, 1973 and 1975 
riots had occurred for various reasons. They usually occurred in the 
winter when the need for heating and warm clothing pushed up living 
costs and increased hardship among the urban poor. Following the 
1977 riots, the price rises were withdrawn.
The January 1977 budget was the first major attempt to reduce 
spending in the economy since the beginning of the liberalisation 
programme. The aim was to obtain IMF approval of the economic progress 
and thereby gain access to increased Arab and other funds. These funds 
would reduce or remove the need to borrow on short term markets at 
high rates of interest. The government's problem had become more acute 
as a result of the riots because it could not easily reduce its 
expenditure. The budget deficit, according to Ikram, equalled 20.0% of 
GDP in 1976 and this was felt by the IMF and others in Egypt and 
abroad to be excessive (2). The budget included annual pay rises and
(1) Financial Times (F.T) 18, 1977 P22.
The Times 19th, 20th & 26th 1977.
(2) K. Ikram 'Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition1 
P325.
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other benefit increases. As they were not related to productivity they 
were considered inflationary and the need for restraint therefore 
intensified (1).
The riots were the most serious experienced in Egypt since the 
1952 revolution and posed a major threat to social stability. External 
finance was more urgently required and a political element had been 
added. The stability of the country dependent on such an inflow. In 
April 1977, the Gulf Organisation for Development in Egypt (GODE) 
agreed to provide $1.475bn in balance of payments support for that 
year, on the assumption that a deal with the IMF would be agreed (2). 
GODE also underwrote a $25Gm loan on the Eurodollar market. The IMF 
agreed to a $146m standby programme (3). In May 1977 the Consultative 
Group for Egypt (made up of GODE, Iran, Japan, Western nations, the 
IMF and the IBRD) gave its blessing to Egypt's economic policies.
Short term debt repayments began again (see Tables 23-25, Chapter 6) 
and more funds were made available for investment.
Domestic problems were severe however: the budget deficit was 
reported in July 1977 to be double the level that it had reached in 
January. According to the Undersecretary in the Finance Ministry, this 
was due to large scale overspending (4).
(1) Financial Times (F.T) 22.6.1977.
(2) Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) 31.11.1977.
(3) F.T. 11.5.1977
(3) Katub Ibrahim quoted by A1 Goumhouria, in MEED 8.7.1977.
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By November of that year the government was negotiating for a 
$600m loan from the IMF over a three year period, instead of the 
$450m. This was the culmination of a major improvement in the capital 
account. This also reflected to the increase in long term loans 
received between 1976 and 1977.
Unlike many other developing countries, Egypt was able to get 
economic assistance before agreement with the IMF was reached because 
there were other sources of finance available to her.
The measures introduced only partly met the initial IMF 
requirements and so the relationship developed with the international 
body was only a tenuous one. The size of the IMF's direct contribution 
was modest in terms of Egypt's overall requirements but their initial 
availability did provide a seal of approval favoured by other 
potential lenders.
In April 1978 the $600m IMF credit was still under discussion. As 
part of the negotiations Egypt considered reviewing the subsidy system 
and allowing interest rates to rise (1). Discussions continued on 
floating the pound. During 1977 more important transactions were moved 
into the parallel exchange market which effectively increased their 
cost in terms of domestic currency. Investment funds broughtinto Egypt 
under Law 43 could be repatriated at the parallel rate under an 
amendment to the Law introduced in 1977. In July 1978 agreement was 
reached with the IMF on a loan of $750m (2). It, too, was to run for
(1) MEED 7.4.1978 P4
(2) F.T. 2.8.1978
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three years and represented a special case allowance by the Fund.
This meant that the conditions attached to the loan were more lenient 
than previous ones. Following the announcement of the agreement, 
further Arab funds were made available out of the $2.0bn GODE 
capital.
Under the agreement Egypt received balance of payments assistance 
because of the structural problems she suffered. The government 
undertook to review the economic structure, adjust costs and prices, 
optimise the use of resources, give priority to irrigation and 
drainage, amongst other things. The exchange rate system was to be 
reformed and bank borrowing was to be cut as the fiscal deficit was 
reduced. Interest rates were to be raised, interest on savings was to 
be tax exempt and subsidy cuts were to be re-examined.
By November, 1978 there were signs that the budget deficit was 
exceeding the limit agreed with the IMF and as a result the 15th 
November 1978 tranche of the IMF loan could not be drawn (1).
During 1977 only $105m was drawn from the IMF because Egypt 
exceeded the budget limits. The Fund was concerned that without 
restraints on domestic expenditure external debts would mount and 
servicing problems would recur. The United States was anxious that 
Egypt not be pushed into a deflationary policy after the events of 
January 1977. According to the 'Economist', pressure was put on the 
IMF by the USA to ease the terms to be imposed on Egypt. It was this 
pressure which resulted in the special case facility already 
mentioned (2).
(1) F.T. 24.11.1978
(2) The Economist 9.12.1978.
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The 1978 fiscal deficit was substantially higher than that in 
1976 and 1977, although current operations, public savings and debt 
figures showed improvements. In May 1978 Dr. Kaissouni resigned as a 
result of disagreements within the government but he was not replaced. 
The Cabinet lacked a Minister with coordinating powers in economic 
matters until May 1980.
The 1979 budget was calculated at a single exchange rate for the 
first time, the main effect being to push up the currency costs of 
items formerly imported at the relatively high official rate of 
exchange. This simplification and effective devaluation of the 
exchange rate was a major step in the programme of liberalisation 
advocated by the IMF. One consequence of using a lower rate was to 
increase the costs of subsidised commodities domestically. They rose 
from £E679.7m in the revised 1978 budget to £E1.179.9m in the budget 
proposed for 1979, an increase of 73?o (1).
By February 1979, a drawing from the $750m fund was blocked. This 
was the second to be so. Once again the budget was exceeding the 
agreed limits and, more significantly, there was disagreement over the 
1979 budget plans; despite the move to a lower exchange rate (2). The 
Egyptians hoped for US pressure an the IMF to ease its terms at a time 
when foreign exchange shortages were becoming less serious. By the end 
of 1979 the agreement, reached in 1978, had collapsed.
(1) MEED 26.1.1979
(2) The Economist 3.3.1979.
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At the beginning of 1980 negotiations began for a new agreement 
which Egypt hoped would be worth $lbn (l). An agreement for $600m was 
initialled in February 1980 (2).
The amount was smaller than originally hoped for because of 
improvements in the balance of payments which were by then becoming 
apparent. By November 1980 the $600m deal had also broken down (3). 
This was due to the radical change in budgetary policy which occurred 
during that year. The continued strengthening of the balance of
£*^ 3 pi
paymentsAaway from the types of policies favoured by the IMF.
The relationship with the IMF reflected a series of economic and 
political factors. Firstly, between 1976 and 1980 Egypt's external 
account was transformed by increased oil, tourist, Suez Canal and 
remittance revenues. Her need for IMF aid and the mark of 
respectability which it conferred, decreased. She was in the fortunate 
position of having close links to the oil rich states, some of whom 
had a direct interest in her political and social stability. Having 
moved away from an interventionist policy in the Arab world and having 
started a liberalisation of her domestic economy, Egypt was a more 
attractive partner for some of the oil rich states. Her international 
position vis a vis Israel meant that the USA had political reasons for 
providing economic support in certain circumstances. These were all 
factors which gave Egypt a special position amongst the nations 
which, during the 1970s, applied for assistance to the IMF.
(1) F.T. 8.2.1980
(2) F.T. 22.2.1980
(3) F.T. 3.11.1980.
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Economic policy operated at two levels during the period of 
retrenchment in 1977. At the ministerial one Dr. Kaissouni and his 
team concentrated on reorganising the subsidy system, which they 
considered to be irrational. By this they meant that subsidies were 
benefitting many who did not need them (1). This policy was made 
difficult by the higher level of international prices which prevailed 
for wheat and oil imports. The latter factor had enriched Arab oil 
states after 1973 and many Egyptians felt that the War which they had 
fought in that year had made the oil price rise possible and 
effective. This is debatable, but the perception of Arab oil wealth 
contrasted with the increased need for austerity in an already poor 
Egypt; caused at least in part by the need to pay more for oil. 
However, the aim of reducing subsidies was only partly achieved.
At another level, the appointment of Kaissouni by the President 
can be seen as an attempt to speed up the liberalisation of the 
economy, so as to increase the amount of foreign aid available to 
Egypt. It is possible that the President was unaware of the 
difficulties involved in rationalising the budget and the January 1977 
riots must have made him wonder what the advantages of such a policy 
were. About 18 months after his appointment, Kaissouni's resignation 
was accepted; by 1978 the short term foreign exchange crisis had been 
dealt with. The 1977 riots contributed to a realisation in the USA and 
elsewhere that Egypt could not adopt international prices for basic 
commodities and that she needed increased aid from abroad.
(1) Dr. Kaissouni, interviewed.
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From 1978 until early 1980 minor attempts were made to reduce 
subsidies but little was achieved. Following the changes announced in 
May, 1980, when subsidies were increased, it can be concluded that 
Sadat's commitment to 'budget rationalisation' as part of the 
liberalisation programme was very pragmatic. He went along with it in 
order to attract foreign aid as long as it did not cause social and 
political problems at home.
APPENDIX 2
Economic Policy Since 1980: Choices with Fewer Constraints
The unplanned and uncoordinated nature of policymaking was 
highlighted in dramatic policy changes announced in 1980. These showed 
how fiscal policy was largely unrelated to overall planning.
Between 1978 and 1980, the balance of payments was radically 
transformed. The estimated current account deficit of $1.35bn in 1980 
was more than covered by inflows of aid, foreign investment, supplier 
credits and remittances (1). During 1979, the increase in oil prices 
and the recovery of oil fields in the Sinai had made prospects for
the balance look optimistic for the first time.
On the political front, there had been a transformation between 
1977 and 1979. The peace treaty signed with Israel in 1979 meant that 
Egypt was not in a state of war, for the first time since 1948. 
However, the negotiations leading up to the peace treaty were arduous 
and lengthy. Opposition at home meant that the regime was anxious 
about domestic security and so its economic policies were adjusted 
accordingly. The peace treaty had, to some extent, been sold 
domestically on the grounds that it would contribute towards 
prosperity.
Subsidies could not be cut in such a context by any more than a 
marginal amount. On 14th May, 1980, as inflation accelerated, the 
President announced major economic changes (2). These included a 25%
(1) Financial Times (F.T) 6.10.1981 Supplement, P2.
(2) According to the Ministry of Economy, foods prices were increasing 
at 50/a p.a. and the overall consumer price index at about 40% p.a. 
in the first half of 1980. 1 Recent Developments in the Egyptian 
Economy1, Ministry of Economy, ESU January 1981.
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increase in the minimum wage to £E20 per month. Certain prices were 
reduced and workers were exempted from defence and national security 
taxes. Private sector workers were to get a 10?o wage rise. The 
measures were fallowed by the resignation of the Cabinet and the 
President assumed the Premiership, heading a new one.
The new Cabinet quickly introduced a new budget, having redefined 
the financial year to start in July. It was organised to show a 
surplus by the removal of investment from the budget. The previous 
budget contained a £E3bn deficit.
The new 1980/1 budget was the first for many years to contain no 
price rises, but most of the other changes were presentational and it 
had to cover the increased wage and subsidy expenditures ordered by 
the President. Public sector civil service wage increases were not 
tied to productivity, and so were inflationary. Unlike its 
predecessor, the 1980/81 budget did not have IMF approval (1).
The direct emphasis on fighting inflation by restricting the 
upward pressure on prices, contrasted with earlier anti-inflationary 
policies which attempted to reduce subsidies in order to cut the 
budget deficit. The June 1980 budget reduced the price of 400 
commodities. Public sector companies faced increased foreign 
competition at the time, as a result of the Open Door Policy. This was 
due to imports, rather than domestic production under the foreign 
investment code, although the latter did portend greater competition 
within the economy. Yet, economic policy at this time restricted their 
ability to compete even further (2)
(1) F.T. 12.6.1980
(2) F.T. 5.6. 1980
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Inflation was the main problem facing the President, in that it 
threatened the living standards of urban workers. The public sector 
and its problems took second place. The Presidential statements 
reflected this anxiety about inflation. The problem was apparent in 
1975, when the rise in the consumer pice index was 9.7%.
In 1975 President Sadat said:
I have noticed that the cost of living has gone up to an
unbearable level  if we are not capable of putting an
end to the corruption and controlling the increase in prices, 
we would be facing a very serious situation. (1).
By 1980, when prices were rising at 20% annually, he said:
....the people must get what they need at suitable prices ... 
aid should reach those who need it, not the hotels or pockets 
of merchants ....the present criminal rise (in prices) must 
stop immediately. (2).
There have been a number of responses to inflation. The first, 
already discussed, was to freeze many public sector prices. This was 
done because many of the public sector's products were those on which 
the workers and poor relied. A second kind of response was exemplified 
in the events of September 1980.
(1) Arab Report & Record 1-15 April 1975.
(2) Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC, 9.9.1980
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In that month, the prices of unrationed sugar and edible oil were 
doubled. Rationed amounts of these commodities were not sufficient to 
meet market demand and many relied on buying unrationed supplies. No 
public warning was given on the price rises and when they were 
implemented, government shops which sold these items were physically 
attacked. Within days, the price rises were withdrawn. The airvi of the 
price increases was to reduce shortages by cutting demand. It is not 
clear whether the extra revenue would have gone into increasing the 
supply of sugar and oil, or simply added to general revenues.
Also, in September 1980, the sale of meat was banned for one
month. This was decided by the President and no Cabinet Minister 
defended the decision in public. Meat prices had been increasing 
rapidly prior to September and President Sadat wanted to deal with 
traders and sellers of meat, who were thought to be profiteering from 
the inflation. Meat was not consumed by the poorest sections of the 
community in Egypt and so the President would, in theory, gain 
popularity from those who ate it by dealing with the inflation without 
restricting the consumption of the poor, who have very limited ability 
to substitute one item of consumption for another. In fact, those who 
could afford meat shifted their consumption to such substitutes as 
eggs and poultry, thus pushing up prices of the latter; the elasticity 
of supply for these, like many other foodstuffs, being low. This 
latter effect hit the poor as prices for eggs and poultry rose at the 
same time as the prices rises were being announced for sugar and oil.
A number of isses are involved here. Firstly, the meat sales ban
was a political act, admitted to be such by the President, who took 
full, personal responsibility for it. The economic consequences of the 
meat ban were either not calculated, or pointed out to the President 
and ignored. They were, from his and the government's point of view,
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highly undesirable, because the indirect effect on the cost of living 
of the poor had the effect of a trick. Its political consequences 
therefore backfired.
Secondly, the timing of the move was unfortunate in that the 
unplanned economic effects, which were inflationary, coincided with 
other measures by the government which were, at least in the short 
term, inflationary. The decisions about the price of oil and sugar 
were made by the government on the basis of a Cabinet decision. The 
meat decision was the President's, and was probably taken against 
ministerial advice. Timing, coordination and a feel for the social 
consequences of measures were all weak, but were only a pale 
reflection of the miscalculations of January 1977.
The measures had two different sources; one came from the 
government, the other from the President. It was politically and 
constitutionally possible for the President to over-rule the 
government and introduce immediate measures of which they 
disapproved.
Subsidies affected that rate of inflation in a number of ways. In 
the short term, thejheld pricer down, but in the longer run they had to 
be financed by inflationary means. They also helped to sustain a 
higher level of demand for subsidised goods than would have otherwise 
existed, something which detracted from exports. Subsidies also had 
allocative effects; they effected the efficiency of the economy and, 
as a result, the pattern of production.
According to the President, the Open Door Policy had, by 1980, led 
to a 'disturbance in the balance of incomes'. He also referred to an 
'income gap' and implicitly recognised that income inequality was 
increasing (l)
(1) Egyptian Gazette 3.9.1980.
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